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ABSTRACT:
The dissertation is divided into two parts. Part I will 
concentrate on the theoretical debate and will put forward 
hypotheses on the functioning of security institutions. This section 
updates the classical literature on collective security w ith 
contemporary contributions and original insights and it attempts to 
shed light on the limits of the current debate between paradigms on 
the question of international institutions. Chapter 2 will summarize 
the arguments of the main paradigms. The two main positions -the 
neorealist/pessimistic one and the liberal/optim istic one- will be 
analyzed and a new concept of the conditional utility of institutions 
in international relations will be proposed, attempting to overcome 
the "all or nothing" deadlock of the current debate.
The other three chapters of Part I will concentrate on the 
central concept of the work. Chapter 3 will introduce the various 
definitions of collective security and their position within the w ider 
contest of the theory of international relations. In particular, i t  w ill 
be argued that there are two different conceptions of collective 
security. A maximalist one defines the concept as a security system 
replacing all other mechanisms. A minimalist one sees collective 
security as an international regime which can operate alongside 
other mechanisms. Chapter 4 will analyze the limits and the 
shortcomings of the maximalist conception, which is both 
unrealistic and even counterproductive. Chapter 5 will look at the 
positive effects of collective security either as an instrum ent for 
dealing with specific contingencies or as a general framework for 
facilitating cooperation and improving international standards of 
behaviour.
Part II applies the findings of the first section to the historical 
record and to three case studies: the Abyssinian crisis, the Korean 
W ar and the Gulf Conflict The cases were selected because they are 
the only uncontrovera^l instances in which collective security has 
been applied and because they are conveniently placed in  three 
different international systems: the multipolar inter-war period, the 
bipolar Cold W ar and the post-Cold W ar period. Finally, in the 
conclusion, crucial issues for practitioners will be highlighted w ith 
special reference to the prospects for a more stable system in the 
future.
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INTRODUCTION1
Man, Aristotle said, is a social animal. As long as memory goes 
back, hum ankind has always been organized in communities based on 
family, tribe, religious or national identities. However, m an is also a 
competitive animal. lEversince^there has been a recorded history, 
hum an communities have fought one another for scarce resources and 
have identified themselves in negative terms. Egyptians distinguished 
themselves from Hyksos, Jews from Philistines, Romans from 
Carthaginians. Part of the meaning of being Egyptian or Jew or 
Roman was that one was not Hykso, Philistine or Carthaginian. 
Competition between diverse communities has indeed been part of 
the fabric of history and it has at times even determined the evolution 
of civilization.
The tension between cooperation and conflict characterizes
international relations because -unlike in  domestic politics- there is no
world government to guarantee the safety of states and to impose
peace on them. A world government is unattainable because the
various communities are too diverse to tolerate each other in a single
entity and -following Freud's remarks in his famous letter to Einstein-
domestic violence would readily replace international rivalry. It is as
unlikely that China endures American policemen as Europeans would
not tolerate Islamic schools. As Kant rem arked two Centuries ago, a
truly global government would necessarily be perceived as tyrannical
because it w ould have to impose itself on too many different and
distinct cultures. Until power is decentralized into a constellation of
multiple and equally sovereign units, there will always be the
possibility of a war.
Rousseau perceptively emphasized this point when he affirmed
th a t
"It is quite true that it w ould be much better for all men 
to remain always at peace. But as long as there is no security 
for this, everyone, having no guarantee that he can avoid war, 
is anxious to begin it at the moment which suits his own 
interest and so forestall a neighbour, who would not fail to 
forestall the attack in his turn at any moment favourable to 
himself, so that many wars, even offensive wars, are rather in 
the nature of unjust precautions for the protection of the 
assailant7 s own possessions than a device for seizing those of
others. However salutary it may be in theory to obey to the 
dictates of the public spirit [which counsel peace], it is certain 
that politically and even morally, those dictates are liable to 
prove fatal to the m an who persists in observing them with all 
the world when no one thinks of observing them towards 
him" 2
War is therefore inherent in the international system. There has 
never been and there is in fact no single state which does not have an 
army of some sorts. This was even recognized by neoscholastic 
theologians like Francisco De Vitoria, who quoted S t Augustine and 
the Holy Scriptures to prove that a Christian may lawfully fight and 
wage war as Abraham had done four times according to the Genesis:
"It is lawful to draw the sword and use weapons against 
malefactors and seditious subjects w ithin the commonwealth; 
therefore it m ust be lawful to use the sword and take up arms 
against foreign enemies too. [...] There can be no security for the 
Commonwealth unless its enemies are prevented from injustice 
by fear of war".3
However, international relations are not a state of perpetual 
war. Human loyalties and identities do not exhaust themselves w ith 
the nation state and its interests. Another neoscholastic theologian, 
Francisco Suarez wrote:
"The hum an race, though divided into no m atter how 
many different peoples and nations has for all that a certain 
unity, a unity not merely physical, but also in a sense political 
and moral bound up by charity and compassion; wherefore 
though every republic or monarchy seems to be autonomous 
or self sufficing, yet none of them is, bu t each of them needs 
the support and brotherhood of others, both in material and a 
moral sense".4
Above all, w ar and conflict are costly emotionally and 
materially. As civilization progressed, so did the technologies of 
armed conflict and they reached a point in which they could threaten 
the very survival of civilization itself. Hum an communities have 
therefore always tried to devise methods of peaceful cohabitation, 
which have generally been short lived because each wanted as 
favourable as possible an arrangement and because the established
conventions would soon fall victim to changed realities. History has 
therefore oscillated between periods of peace and periods of war.
Peace has by no means been rare, bu t it has always been precarious.
This is the essence of the issue of international order.
The XX Century was hailed as a messianic time for perpetual 
peace. Norman Angell wrote an influential book, The Great Illusion, 
which explained the reasons why war, which had become 
counterproductive, would soon fall into oblivion. Fatefully, the book 
was published only months before the guns of August broke the peace 
in 1914. However, the First World War was supposed to be the "w ar to 
end all wars". After the Second World War which followed only 20 
years later, the world has indeed experienced its longest spell of 
stability in m odem  times. Yet, it was a stability based on the horrors 
of Hiroshima and which had followed the Holocaust, arguably the 
lowest point ever touched by hum an civilization.5 Peace in  the XX 
Century has so far been achieved more because of necessity than 
because of virtue. If progress is possible in hum an affairs, it is also 
reversible.
Although the questions of w ar and peace and of stability and 
conflict have always been central in history, the m odem  form of the 
debate on international order has been contemporaneous to the 
emergence of the system of states in XVII Century Europe, (^versince) ' j f  
the end of the 30 Years' W ar in 1648, statesmen have tried to d ev ise  
systems to avert w ar and its evil consequences, even if they have also 
jealously defended other values which were a t times incompatible 
with the cause of peace. In the words of Hinsley:
"At the end of every w ar since the end of the XVTO 
Century, as has been the case before, the leading states m ade a 
concerted effort, each one more radical than the last, to 
reconstruct the system on lines that w ould enable them, or so 
they believed, to avoid a further war. [...] These initiatives are 
as characteristic and distinctive of the operation of the system 
as are the dynamic of its wars. So is the fact that they came to 
nothing".6
The Peace Conferences of Westphalia in 1648, Utrecht in 1713, 
Vienna in 1815, Versailles in 1919 and the Conferences at the end of 
the Second World War have all engineered a mechanism for the
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- prevention of wars like the ories which .they were closing. Some of the 
mechanisms were explicit, other '-implicit. Some systems rested, on one 
... major power taking responsibility for the maintenance of 
international Order, other identified the collectivity of states as the
  guarantor of peace. Some of the systems Kaye lasted longer, but all
-sooner or later- have eventually broken down.; The _ question of 
: . international order is certainly not an easy - one.
This dissertation examines one of the possible answers on 
which the hopeful experiments of the League of Nations- and of the 
United Nations were based. Collective security was introduced in 
international relations at the end of the First World War, which had 
brought such devastation that the peacemakers thought that 
civilization would not have survived another similar conflict The 
idea was simple: there may be m any background reasons and motives 
for wars, but in the final instance wars occur because one state attacks 
another. If all states agreed not to commit aggression and ter support 
the victims of an attack, no state w ould be in a position of invading 
another and face the combined opposition of all others. W ar -it was 
expected- would soon fall into oblivion. Given the lack of a world 
_ government to ensure peace, an international institution backed by 
the collectivity of states w ould take that responsibility.
The concept failed-to fulfill I ts  promises. Kalevi Holsti counts 
almost 100 wars which have occurred since it was introduced.7 
Collective Security was unable to stop the combined expansionism of 
Germany, Italy and Japan before the Second World War. After 1945, 
the concept has proved to be an insufficient cause for peace as it did 
riot irihibit the Cold War between the superpowers. The end of the 
Cold W ar has also demonstrated that collective security is not even a 
necessary cause for peace as the conflict was overcome completely 
outside the established institutional framework. Both if the Cold War 
ended because of the internal collapse of the Soviet Union or if it 
ended because of shrewd American policies, collective security and 
the United Nations were cut off from the key processes.
Yet, the idea has displayed an extraordinary appeal and 
resilience. President Wilson took the concept from proposals 
originating in liberal circles during the w ar and turned it into 
American policy. The concept was embodied in the League of Nations
which emerged from the Versailles Peace. Despite the collapse of the 
League in the 1930's, collective security was chosen also after the 
Second World War, with the founding of the United Nations. This 
attempt was even less successful than the first one because the Cold 
War soon underm ined the new system, which was not allowed to 
operate. Nevertheless, after the end of the Cold War, the concept has 
reemerged as one of the main foci for the construction of a new 
international system.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of bipolar 
confrontation, the main powers -as it has happened after the end of all 
other major conflicts- have engaged in consultation in order to find a 
new stable international order. Collective security has yet again been 
prom inent in these attempts. In 1990, the formal end of the Cold War 
has been acknowledged at a special meeting in Paris of the Conference 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the appropriate regional 
collective security instance. Even more relevant has been the new 
activism which has characterized the collective security instance par 
excellence, the United Nations. It was believed that the reasons which 
had inhibited the operation of the system had now been removed and 
that the international community could finally unite its forces in the 
establishment and maintenance of peace throughout the globe.
The first major disturbance to peace, the Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait, was successfully dealt w ith w ithin a multilateral framework. 
In the wake of victory in the Persian Gulf, US President Bush called for 
the establishment of a New World O rder based on collective security. 
The resulting enthusiasm pushed the international community to 
collective interventions in all kinds of contingencies. Since 1989, the 
UN has been actively involved in such different places as Namibia, 
Mozambique, Angola, Cambodia, El Salvador, Somalia, Haiti, Croatia 
and Bosnia. UN Secretary General Boutros-Boutros Ghali suggested a 
new role for the blue helmets which could be dispatched without the 
previous consent of the parties concerned which had been "hitherto 
necessary".8 The foreign policy agenda of President Clinton when he 
was elected was based on "assertive multilateralism".
Yet, some of the problems which had rendered the system 
ineffective before 1989 soon begun to reemerge. Most of the new 
operations ended inconclusively or w ith unexpected costs which were
not deemed worth the effort Especially in the former Yugoslavia, the 
frustrations of the international community -tom  between the will to 
"do something" and the reluctance to be draw n in a bloody conflict- 
were most ev ident The initial enthusiasm therefore increasingly gave 
way to disillusionm ent New operations were seen w ith reluctance. In 
1995, Boutros Ghali returned on his steps and abandoned his peace 
enforcement dreams when he announced that peacekeeping 
operations required the consent of the parties involved. Also in the 
United States the mood swung against multilateralism. A May 1995 
Presidential directive spelled new criteria for American participation 
in UN operations. The criteria were very restrictive and excluded that 
US troops could serve w ithout an American commander.9
These two extreme positions reflect the two main views on the 
prospects for institutions in the realm of international security. On the 
one hand, neoliberal enthusiasts argue that collective security is able 
to solve all types of conflict situations and that it could replace all 
other traditional security mechanisms. On the other hand, neorealist 
critics argue that collective security is bound to fail in all situations 
and that it is illusory or even dangerous to rely upon i t  However, 
both positions underline only parts of the truth. The "all or nothing" 
approach does not capture the essence and the complexity of 
international politics. The argum ent of this dissertation is that 
collective security is useful, but w ith significant conditions and 
limitations.
Although collective security sometimes fails to operate, other 
times it may work. The Gulf conflict, and earlier the Korean War, have 
demonstrated that at least in some instances multilateral operations 
can succeed. Furthermore, collective security and the norm  that 
aggression should be resisted are today an integral part of the fabric 
of international society. The fact that institutions are not always useful 
does not necessarily imply that they are always useless. The search for 
perfection is often an enemy of the search for the good because it leads 
to overlook significant -although incomplete- improvements.
The fact remains that collective security cannot always be relied 
upon because it is dependent upon the changing mood of states. Like 
financial corporations, institutions cannot act independently from 
their shareholders and board members.10 The Cold War competition
which inhibited the United Nations is by no means the exception in 
international relations. Furthermore, competition of that sort hinders 
multilateral solutions especially w hen they are most needed, that is 
when global peace is in danger. This means that enthusiasts are w rong 
when they point to the successes of collective security and argue that it 
therefore should be applied to all situations. As adding a pound of 
sugar does not necessarily improve a coffee, so more of a good thing 
is not necessarily a better thing.
The fact is that in an anarchic international system states face 
compelling duties which at times may lead them to disagreements. 
Cooperation can never be taken for granted because there is no 
overarching authority to enforce it. A multilateral system which is 
dependent on cooperation will necessarily be conditional upon the 
specific situation. Sometimes states w ill be unable to follow the 
international rules because they are perceived as conflicting w ith their 
own security. Other times state security will not be affected, and states 
will have no incentive to invest in a multilateral system. Even 
democracies, which are the most enthusiastic proponents of collective 
principles which resemble their domestic organization, are 
particularly reluctant to risk their blood, treasure and electoral 
fortunes in  remote areas.
Ultimately, the worse damage can arise from the gap between 
the capacity of international organizations to deliver and the 
expectations which are associated to them. We should clearly identify 
the shortcomings and the merits of institutions so that we can avoid 
the former w ithout ignoring them and concentrate on the latter. We 
should therefore stop expecting the UN and other institutions to do 
w hat they cannot do and to act as a panacea for all global problems. 
We risk otherwise to underm ine the credibility of the institutions and 
inhibit them even when they are useful. If progress can be achieved in 
the question of international order, it m ust necessarily be m odest and 
cautious.
My central conclusion is that the conditions for the operation of 
institutions profoundly affect the concept of collective security. If the 
conditions are not respected, like in the immediate aftermath of the 
Gulf War, collective security could be unrealistic or even 
counterproductive as it would force states to intervene when they
should n o t Furthermore, the application of multilateralism against all 
odds would undermine the support for the collective effort and would 
divert resources from the real problems. If on the other hand the 
conditions were taken seriously, then collective security would be 
sheltered from failure but in such a diluted form so as to be a very 
different concept from the one originally intended by its founders. 
Collective security would in fact not be much of a security system at 
all but would rather modestly resemble the systems for consultation 
which flourished in the XIX Century.
This work aims at proposing answers to these crucial questions: 
w hat is the relevance and role of institutions in international 
relations? Are the current paradigms appropriate in this respect? What 
kind of institution is collective security? W hat are its major strengths 
and its major weaknesses? What has been its relevance in history? 
How did it perform in the three instances in which it has been 
applied? Finally, w hat are the lessons that can be draw n from the 
theory and evidence of collective security and how can they be used to 
increase the prospects for stability in the future?
The following dissertation is divided into two parts. Part I will 
concentrate on the theoretical debate and will pu t forward hypotheses 
on the functioning of security institutions. This section updates the 
classical literature on collective security w ith contemporary 
contributions and original insights and it attempts to shed light on 
the limits of the current debate between paradigms on the question of 
international institutions. Chapter 2 will summarize the arguments of 
the main paradigms on the question of the role of international 
institutions. The two main positions -the neorealist/pessimistic one 
and the liberal/optim istic one- will be analyzed and a new concept of 
the conditional utility of institutions in international relations will be 
proposed, attempting to overcome the "all or nothing" deadlock of 
the current debate.
The other three chapters of Part I will concentrate on the central 
concept of the work. Chapter 3 will introduce the various definitions 
of collective security and their position within the wider contest of the 
theory of international relations. In particular, it will be argued that 
there are two different conceptions of collective security. A 
maximalist one defines the concept as a security system replacing all
other mechanisms. A minimalist one sees collective security as an 
international regime which can operate alongside other mechanisms. 
Chapter 4 will analyze the limits and the shortcomings of the concept 
and especially of its maximalist conception, which is both unrealistic 
and even counterproductive. Chapter 5 will look at the positive effects 
of collective security either as an instrument for dealing w ith specific 
contingencies or as a general framework for facilitating cooperation 
and improving international standards of behaviour.
Part II applies the findings of the first section to the historical 
record and to three case studies: the Abyssinian crisis, the Korean W ar 
and the Gulf Conflict The cases were selected because they are the 
only uncontrovertial instances in which collective security has been 
applied and because they are conveniently placed in three different 
international systems: the multipolar inter-war period, the bipolar 
Cold W ar and the post-Cold W ar period. Furthermore, new m aterial 
has been considered for the last two cases. Finally, in the conclusion, 
crucial issues for practitioners will be highlighted w ith special 
reference to the prospects for a more stable system in the future.
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2. A n a r c h y , In s t it u t io n s  a n d  P e a c e
i. Neorealism and Neoliberalism
Classical theories of international relations rested on simple 
and basic assumptions about the nature of individuals and societies. 
On the one hand, realists tended to see these in negative terms. Their 
pessimistic conclusion that conflict was endemic to international 
politics stemmed from their assumption that hum an beings are 
dominated by w hat Morgenthau called "striving for power".1 In this 
view, working international institutions were either impossible or 
even dangerous distractions from the eternal and inescapable struggle 
for power.
On the opposite end of the spectrum, liberals assumed a 
positive view of hum an nature. It followed that the natural state of 
international relations was one of harmony. Conflict was exceptional 
and senseless. It was therefore caused either by misperception or by a 
handful of aggressive rulers failing to realize that the "true" interests 
of their societies laid in peace. In this view, institutions were welcome 
but unnecessary since states were naturally inclined to cooperate.
Both schools attributed their optimistic or pessimistic 
conclusions to equally optimistic or pessimistic assumptions about the 
nature of states. The m odem  debate introduced systemic factors into 
the analysis instead. In particular, the focus shifted from the nature of 
states to the anarchic condition of the international system. Conflict 
and cooperation were no longer to be explained simply by states' 
propensities, but also by the constraints and opportunities presented 
by the international system to all states, irrespective of their specific 
characteristics. Anarchy became "the Rosetta stone" for deciphering 
international relations.2
The anarchic system acts like a prism, mediating and distorting 
between states' policies and international outcomes. W ar can arise 
even if no state specifically wants i t  Conversely, good intentions are 
not sufficient for a peaceful outcome whereas bad intentions are not 
necessarily conducive to war. For example, an excessively tolerant 
policy may positively invite other states to take advantage of one's 
own moderation, thereby increasing the chances of a conflict3 On the 
other hand, an aggressive policy could trigger a counterbalancing
coalition of other states, resulting in a stable balance. State policies can 
therefore lead to unintended and perverse consequences.4 Whereas in 
the classical literature anarchy brought wars simply because "there 
was nothing to stop them", contemporary theories investigate the 
effects of anarchy as an "efficient" cause of conflict5
A system is not in  fact only an arena in which units are 
interconnected so that the actions of one influence all others but it is a 
black box which independently affects outcomes. Positive and 
negative feedbacks interact w ith the inputs which therefore do not 
have a linear and monotonic relationship with their ou tpu t In other 
words, a system is such w hen outcomes are different from the sum of 
the inputs.
One of the simplest systems in everyday* life is that for 
regulating heat in a house. It is composed by theW aiators (the input) , ' 
by a thermostat (the feedback) and by the heat actually warming the 
house (the output). The radiators produce heat until the thermostat 
shuts them down. The final outcome -heat at about 21° C- is different 
from the heat that the radiators would have produced if the 
thermostat had not been working.
Both major schools in the contemporary debate -neorealists and 
neoliberals- seek to uncover the effects of anarchy on state behaviour. 
Both schools therefore maintain similar assumptions about the nature 
of international relations. The basic unit of analysis is the state which 
is a unitary and rational actor motivated by a set of given and neutral 
preferences. Systemic effects should in fact be operating on all states 
regardless of whether they are "good" or "bad".
According to a systemic treatm ent of international politics, like 
units should operate differently in different systems while different 
units should behave more homogeneously in the same system. It is 
not that contemporary scholars assert that factors at the state level are 
unim portant and that the difference between Hitler' Reich and 
Adenauer's Federal Republic are irrelevant Nevertheless, in  order to 
explore systemic factors, these m ust be isolated from other processes 
operating at different levels of analysis.
While assumptions are similar, neoliberals and neorealists 
disagree on their consequences. The neorealist view of anarchy 
emphasizes the lack of a world government capable of protecting
states. If these w ant to survive, they m ust resort to self help because 
they have no-one to look to for guaranteeing their own security. Since 
all states are potentially dangerous to each other and since they can 
never be sure of each other's intentions, states ensure their survival by 
maximizing their capability to defend themselves from other states.
In particular, states not only will choose conflict w hen -like in a 
classical realist world- their interest directly clash with those of others 
but they will also forego cooperation w hen this can favour a potential 
adversary. In other words, even w hen it brings them absolute gains, 
cooperation is dangerous in a neorealist world because it can bring 
even higher relative gains to a potential adversary.
According to Kenneth Waltz, states, when faced with an 
opportunity to interact, do not ask themselves: "will both of us gain?" 
but "who will gain more?".6 There is always the danger that today's 
partner will become tomorrow's enemy and will use offensively its 
enhanced capabilities. It is im portant to emphasize that the 
maximization of relative gains (that is of one's own capability to 
defend itself vis-a-vis others) is not irrational: states therefore 
deliberately and rationally forego cooperation if it risks to strengthen 
a potential future enemy. In such a situation, conflict is not unintended 
but the only choice.
The focus on relative gains renders cooperation rare and 
difficult to maintain. Grieco writes: "a state w ill decline to join, will 
leave, or w ill sharply limit its commitment to a cooperative 
arrangem ent if it believes that gaps in otherwise m utually positive 
benefits favour partners".7 Even economic cooperation is inhibited by 
security considerations because economic advantages can be 
translated into crucial elements of military superiority. There is 
therefore a "hierarchy of issues" in which the primacy of security 
concerns influences the prospects for cooperation also in other areas.
Conflict is thus not caused by the inherent wickedness of states, 
but by the structural conditions in which states operate irrespective of 
their good or bad intentions. This paradox is epitomized by the logic 
of the security dilemma which applies not only to states but to any 
unit in a system without central authority.
"Groups and individuals living [in anarchy] m ust be, and 
usually are, concerned about their security from being attacked,
subjected, dominated or annihilated by other groups or 
individuals. Striving to attain security from such attack^, they 
are driven to acquire more and more power in order to escape 
the impact of the power of others. This, in turn, renders the 
others more insecure and compels them to prepare for the 
w orst Since none can feel entirely secure in  such a world of 
competing units, power competition ensues and the vicious 
circle of security and power accumulation is on".8
The security dilemma is an unintentional consequence of the 
will to survive. It acts as a perverse positive feedback on instability, 
widening and amplifying any eventual conflict of interest. It is also 
characterized by a self defeating but inescapable dynamic. Even if 
states are motivated only by defensive objectives, they will decrease 
their security by provoking the reaction of their counterparts. 
However, a failure to take care of one's own defense may be even 
more disastrous. A perpetual competition is still preferable to 
extinction.
Until anarchy persists, states will thus be doomed to play a 
cautious game if they do not w ant to "fall by the wayside", whatever 
their intrinsic propensities.9 In Hobbes' words, they are forced to 
acquire the "state and posture of gladiators". Conflict is -according to 
neorealists- endemic to anarchy as there is no chance of excluding the 
possibility of a war.10 The security dilemma can only be ameliorated 
but cannot be escaped even if states w anted to. State behaviour is not 
the result of deliberate choice but is dictated by the necessities of 
survival under anarchy.
However, cooperation is not impossible in a neorealist w orld.11 
The pessimistic analysis of the behaviour of individual states leads 
paradoxically to relatively optimistic conclusions about stability at 
the systemic level. Like in a perfectly competitive market the profit 
maximizing urge of firms leads to structural equilibrium, also under 
anarchy competing states can unintentionally bring about peace. It is 
the famous mechanism of the balance of power.12
The concern for relative gains brings in fact states to coalesce 
against the stronger side which is also the one which threatens their 
independence the m ost Cooperation is in this sense a function of 
conflict as states gang up only in order to face other states. In Liska's
words, "alliances are against, and only derivatevely for, someone or 
something".13
Furthermore, "joining the weaker side increases the new 
member's influence within the alliance because the weaker side has 
the greater need"14. As the study of political coalitions has shown, 
alliances will tend to form if there are multiple players because none 
can achieve its goals independently.15 However, w inning coalitions 
will tend to be as small as possible because the players will not w ant 
to share their payoffs with other players if these are unnecessary to 
win. In short, states will generally choose balancing over 
bandwagoning.
This acts as a negative feedback on destabilising differences in 
power differentials. The stronger a state, the more resistance it will 
encounter, thereby increasing the incentives to be moderate. Together 
w ith mechanisms of emulation -in order not to be left behind- this 
process allows states to preserve a mutually deterring balance. In 
short, the system displays a natural propensity to stability.
Cooperation is necessary in a neorealist world at least for w hat 
balancing alliances are concerned16 However, also cooperation -like 
conflict- does not result from deliberate choice but is dictated by 
circumstances: either it is imposed by a stronger state on its weaker 
partners or it is the consequence of the necessity to form a balance. As 
soon as the circumstances -that is the distribution of power- change 
also the behaviour will accordingly be adjusted. Coalitions -like the 
Quadruple Alliance against Napoleon or the Grand Alliance against 
Hitler- will break up as soon as their common goal is attained.
In this view, cooperation is spontaneous and institutions are 
unnecessary to attain it. Systemic factors will in fact determine state 
behaviour w ith respect to both conflict and cooperation. Eventual 
institutions coupled w ith cooperation will merely be epiphenomenal, 
that is w ithout an independent intrinsic value because "institutions 
largely mirror the distribution of pow er in the system".17 This view 
recuperates the Hobbesian idea that "covenants without the sword are 
but words and breath."18
On the other side of the debate, neoliberals are more optimistic 
on the prospects for cooperation and the role of institutions.19 
Neoliberals discount the neorealist focus on relative gains and assert
that states are mainly concerned w ith absolute gains instead. In this 
view, the main point about anarchy is the absence of an agency 
capable of forcing states to meet their commitments, rather than the 
lack of a protector which forces states to compete for their security. 
Anarchy is more an opportunity than a constraint There is therefore 
more freedom of action than in relative gains competition: states are 
free to cheat each other but they are also free to cooperate if they so 
choose.
The problem for cooperation will therefore originate not in the 
preoccupation of favouring another but in the temptation to maximize 
their utility by cheating their counterparts or in the fear of being 
cheated themselves. Conflict arises -in short- because of the am bition 
to maximize one's own absolute gains rather than because of the fear 
of increasing other's relative gains. States have sufficient reasons to 
inhibit cooperation even w ithout competition for relative gains.
This situation can be described by w hat Thomas Shelling has 
called mixed-motive games in which incentives to cooperatioii and 
conflict coexist in the preferences of the actors.20 Despite its simplified 
form this class of games can capture many of the processes at w ork in 
international relations. Even the closest allies maintain in fact some 
divergent interests as each would still prefer -if it could- to reduce the 
share of the costs it pays for the production of the jointly desired 
good.21 Similarly, even the most competitive adversaries usually 
share at least some common interest. For example, both combatants in 
a w ar generally prefer that the conflict does not escalate to the use of 
weapons of mass destruction quite disproportionate to the stakes of 
the war.
The classic examples of a mixed motive game are the prisoner's 
dilemma and the question of public goods. In the first case, the 
problem is that the short run attem pt to maximize utility by free 
riding generates the counterpart's retaliation, leaving both sides 
worse off than if they had cooperated in the first place.22 If the game is 
played only once, both sides will try to reach their best outcome by 
cheating and the result will be m utual defection.23 The prisoner's 
dilemma is an instance in which individual rationality collides with 
collective rationality. Cooperation under anarchy may fail despite the 
fact that it may be in everyone's in terest "Taken individually, the
states of the world are more often than not rational; taken together, 
they constitute an international system which is usually irrational".24
The dilemma arises between two states, because each will try to 
minimize its share of the costs of the interaction, but it is particularly 
acute when there are many actors. As the num ber of states increases, 
the allocation of roles for collective action will become more 
problematic because the importance of the contribution of each single 
one will accordingly decrease and its temptation to free ride will 
therefore be strengthened. As Mancur Olson has masterly 
demonstrated, public goods -which benefit a whole group and from 
which no one can be excluded if it defects- are typically 
underproduced.25
However, conflict is not a foregone conclusion. Since states are 
concerned w ith their absolute payoff rather than w ith relative gains, if 
the game is reiterated states have an incentive to move to a 
cooperative equilibrium which is more mutually advantageous. 
Cooperation arises "w hen the states realize that a desired distribution 
of 'the goods' cannot come about by way of autonomous action".26 In 
a neoliberal setting, cooperation is thus more easily attainable than in  
a neorealist one. If m utual cooperation brings to each state a higher 
absolute payoff than mutual defection, states w ill soon abandon their 
attempts to cheat their counterparts if only they realize that the other's 
retaliation to their own free riding will damage their own utility. The 
same desire to maximize utility which fosters the temptation to free 
ride also fosters cooperation if this is more advantageous for each 
counterpart individually.
In a neoliberal w orld as in a neorealist one, cooperation and 
conflict are the result of structural interaction rather than of states' 
social propensity.27 Like in microeconomic theory, the interests 
governing the units' intentions are given. W hat determines the final 
outcome is the setting where interaction takes place. Cooperation 
arises w hen a situation offers "jointly accessible outcomes [which] are 
preferable to those that are or m ight be reached independently".28 
Both the prisoner's dilemma and the problems of collective action 
-unlike the security dilemma- leave some room for m aneuvre to 
improve outcomes.
Neoliberals do not deny that sometimes relative gains will 
make cooperation impossible. Relative gains transform mixed motive 
games into a 0-sum game in which mutual conflict is always 
preferable to m utual cooperation. Nevertheless, they dispute the 
claim that cooperation is always structurally inhibited and that 
competition is the only reason for the absence of cooperation. W hen 
the problem is free riding rather than competition, cooperation can 
and does emerge in the interest of the parties.29
Institutions are in these circumstances a useful tool of statecraft 
As will be argued in chapter 5, institutions can tame free-riding by 
raising the costs of defection and the effects of retaliation; by 
increasing the value of future cooperation vis-a-vis short term free 
riding; by establishing rules and focal points around which actors' 
expectations converge and by fostering cross-issue-area linkages.
In the w ords of two of the foremost neoliberal scholars:
"International institutions may therefore be significant 
since institutions embody and affect actor's expectations. These 
institutions can alter the extent to which governments expect 
their present actions to affect the behaviour of others on future 
issues"30
If institutions help to avoid free riding, they allow cooperative 
outcomes w hen the actors would otherwise choose mutual defection. 
Far from being epiphenomenal or unnecessary, they help to bring 
about an outcome otherwise impossible. Especially in the absence of a 
w orld government, institutions are in fact the main instrument for 
states to avoid suboptimal mutual conflicts and to achieve m utually 
beneficial cooperation.
Both paradigm s highlight the systemic causes of conflict and 
cooperation. Anarchy can be an efficient cause for international 
outcomes. However, the two schools point to different mechanisms. 
While "neorealist" relative gains force states to forego cooperation in 
fear of strengthening a future adversary and conflict is therefore 
irreversible, "neoliberal" conflict emerges out of "political m arket 
failures" which damage absolute gains and lead states to attem pt to 
reach a more satisfactory cooperative equilibrium. Neoliberals are
therefore more optimistic in their hope that conflict can be averted in 
the interest of the actors involved.
ii. Anarchy and Its Effects
Usually, the differences between neorealism and neoliberalism  
are attributed to different assumptions about states utility functions. 
On the other hand, they also derive from the two different definitions 
of anarchy employed. For the first school anarchy shapes actors' 
preferences and leads to a high sensitivity to relative gains.31 For the 
other school, anarchy leaves states free to maximize their absolute 
utility.32 In the real w orld however, the effects of anarchy are not 
constant and vary between the compelling situation described by 
neorealist and the one in which cooperation is more easily attainable, 
as argued by neoliberals.
Although the lack of a world government forces states to keep 
security considerations always in  the background, not all systemic 
configurations produce the same risks of wars and the same threat to 
state survival. Relations between India and Pakistan are different from 
those between Belgium and France, because the probabilities of a 
conflict are different in the two cases. Similarly relations betw een 
Hitler's Germany and Churchill's Britain <and)different than those 
between Attlee's and Adenauer's. If the intensity of the tyranny o f 
survival varies, states will enjoy varying degrees of freedom of 
maneuvre.
Arnold Wolfers has put forward the m etaph 
fire. In this instance:
"general fear of losing the cherished possession of life, 
coupled with the stark external threat to life, w ould produce the 
same reaction whatever the [...] peculiarities of the actors". If on 
the other hand "the house in  question merely were overheated 
[...] the reaction of different inhabitants m ight range from 
hurried window opening and loud complaints to complete 
indifference". In sho rt "where less than national survival is at 
stake, there is far less compulsion and therefore a less uniform 
reaction" 33
Anarchy means that w ithout a hierarchical authority capable of 
allocating roles, states will pursue their own interests and will
ore pi^ ^ > f a house on
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autonomously decide w hat those interests are. Yet, this does not 
necessarily imply that states will always consider their own survival 
as the most urgent and pressing of their goals.34 When the security of 
a state is not directly threatened, concern for relative gains w ill 
decrease and states will be free to pursue their absolute gains and -if 
convenient- to engage in cooperation. As Axelrod and Keohane have 
pu t i t  "World politics is not a homogeneous state of war: cooperation 
varies among issues and overtime".35
This means that anarchy produces two quite distinct and 
different problems for cooperation. If tension is high, relative gains 
considerations will be in the forefront and cooperation will be 
impossible. W hen tension is low, prisoner's dilemma and public 
goods will make cooperation difficult but possible and desirable.
Neorealists themselves concede that, although anarchy remains 
a constant, its effects on the security of states -and thus on their 
behaviour- vary.36 According to Joseph Grieco, sensitivity to relative 
gains "will increase as a state transits from relations in w hat Karl 
Deutsch terms a 'pluralistic security community' to those 
approximating a state of w ar".37 In a security community conflict is 
not physically impossible but it is so improbable that it is not 
considered as a potential option. Anything that affects the probability 
of w ar will therefore influence the chance of cooperation and of 
establishing working institutions.
For example, the power transition strand of neorealism points 
out that hegemonies can more easily bring about stability. W hen 
pow er differentials are large, the leading state needs not to worry 
about the others' relative capabilities while the less powerful states 
m ight as well concentrate on their absolute gains because they would 
not be able to compete w ith the hegemon anyway.38 In Robert 
Gilpin's words: "the Pax Britannica and the Pax Americana, like the 
Pax Romana, ensured an international system of relative peace and 
security".39
Other times, even in a multipolar world, states coalesced 
against an aggressor in a balancing alliance pu t their conflicts of 
interest aside and may even be interested in their allies' absolute 
gains in the interest of the allied cause. "States worry more about 
relative gains of enemies than of allies".40 Before making decisions on
the issue at stake, states make metadecisions (about amity and enmity) 
concerning w ho they are dealing with.41 If the alliance systems are 
sufficiently stable, as during the Cold War, a significant portion of 
international relations becomes ripe for collaboration.
In any case, the presence of multiple major states in the system 
decreases the emphasis on relative gains because a state cannot allow 
itself to forego too many absolute gains if it does not w ant to lose its 
position in the international hierarchy of power.42 In a multipolar 
system, the necessity to distribute one's attention decreases the 
probability that any pair becomes locked in  a 0-sum game. As Robert 
Axelrod has pointed out, a state which consistently defects in an 
environment in  which everybody else cooperates would also fall by 
the wayside because its aggregate payoffs are lower.43
Stability will also result from the nature of prevailing military 
technology. The predominance of defensive weapons over offensive 
ones could well reassure states to forego relative gains considerations 
because they w ill feel reasonably secure from outside attack and to 
pursue m utually advantageous activities instead. "If the cost of w ar is 
sufficiently high that the use of force is no longer at issue, then 
cooperation again becomes possible".44
For example, the introduction of atomic weapons has brought 
stability to the relations among the great powers. The sheer cost of a 
nuclear war w ould be such that it renders states cautious about 
initiating hostilities. Furthermore, the destructive potential of nuclear 
weapons favours the defensive because their use is much more 
credible by a state whose independence is threatened than by one 
which wants to conquer.
Finally, the relative propensity of a system is determined by its 
relationship w ith  the nature and intentions of the units. It is in fact 
impossible to examine a system w ithout any reference to the units 
that compose i t  For example, the system of tides provoked by the 
gravitational interplay between the moon and the earth would not be 
the same if the seas were m ade of mercury rather than water. Waltz 
himself accepts that although structures "shapes and shove, they do 
not determine behaviours and outcomes not only because unit-level 
and structural causes interact, but also because the shaping and 
shoving may be successfully resisted".45
In other words, the intentions of the major powers are 
im portant States react to threats -that is to capabilities coupled with 
intentions- rather than to raw capabilities by themselves.46 It is clear 
that, although even a system with moderate states can lead to conflict, 
a system which contains virulently revisionist powers like Nazi 
Germany will be more conducive to wars than a system in which all 
powers wish to preserve the status quo. Domestic variables are 
im portant in determining systemic stability.
In such situations, as Barry Buzan suggests, "An anarchy of 
states may or may not result in chaos, but certainly does not 
necessarily, or even probably, do so". He therefore distinguishes 
between "mature anarchies", which are prone to collaboration, and 
"immature" ones, which are prone to conflict instead.47 Also Jervis 
highlights this possibility in his perceptive analysis of security 
regimes: "if the connections between outcomes and national power 
are indirect and mediated, there is more room for choice, creativity 
and institutions to refrain and regulate behaviour, and to produce a 
regim e".48
Anarchy is not sufficient to explain the relative propensity of 
states. The decentralized nature of the international system leads 
states to pursue their independent interests and to resist attempts to 
lim it their ability to do that. However, depending on circumstances, 
the pursuit of self interest can dictate cooperation as well as conflict. 
Anarchy alone does not therefore determine the level of stability in a 
system, which in fact varies across space and across time despite the 
fact that international politics has always remained anarchic. As 
Professor Hinsley has pointed out, "if international anarchy 
invariably caused war, thus the states of Europe should have never 
have known peace since the close of the Middle Ages".49
In this sense, the lack of a world government does not lead to a 
Hobbesian state of war of all against all. Rather, it approximates a 
Lockean state of nature in which individuals do not necessarily slip 
into a state of w ar although the possibilities of a conflict are always 
p resen t50 "Possibility is not probability".51 The crucial variable for 
the emergence of cooperation and institutions is the probability of 
war. If this is high, like during the Cold War, states will be very 
sensitive to relative gains as they are afraid to concede advantages to a
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potential adversary which may soon use against them. If the 
probability of conflict is low, as in the case of a security community 
like the one among Scandinavian countries, states will be able to 
afford to concentrate on their absolute gains.
It is im portant to point out that these variations do not 
necessarily occur only across different international systems in time, 
but that they affect different pairs or groups of states within the same 
international system, which is therefore characterized by zones of 
peace and zones of turmoil. Unlike the ideal types of pure conflict 
-where cooperation is impossible- and pure harmony -where 
cooperation is unnecessary- described by the classical debate, in a 
given international system both conflict and cooperation are present 
at the same time. What matters is their relative proportion. Both 
global and regional international relations swing back and forth from 
the polar situations of a state of w ar and a troubled peace, to use 
Hoffmann's terminology.52
Neorealist are right w hen they point out that sometimes states 
cannot allow themselves to cooperate because they are constrained by 
competition. States will therefore always resist cooperation if it 
damages their long-term ability to defend themselves if circumstances 
should change. In general, states resist perm anent transfers of 
sovereignty. However, neoliberals are also right w hen they assert that 
tinder certain specific circumstances states will be relatively free to 
cooperate in their own interest.
iii. International Institutions
International institutions are a set of rules which influence 
actors' roles and expectations with the aim of establishing a 
predictable pattern of behaviour.53 They constitute the watershed 
between w hat is deemed as normal, expected and acceptable and w hat 
is considered deviant, unexpected and unacceptable. Institutions can 
be constituted by formal rules -like those of a written constitution- or 
by informal conventions, like the restraints of belligerants during a 
w ar or the expected behaviour of a gentleman at a formal dinner.
Unlike in domestic politics, where institutions are coupled with 
agencies capable of enforcing their precepts, in international politics 
this executive power is lacking. One of the key issues in the theory of
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international relations is therefore w hether they can affect states' 
behaviour in  a substantive manner or rather whether they m ust limit 
themselves to rubber-stamp an existing state of affairs.
Both schools are inadequate in their treatment of the role of 
institutions. Each emphasizes only one of the two structural problems 
which anarchy creates for cooperation. Neorealists highlight relative 
gains considerations, whereas neoliberals point to free rider 
problems. Recent attempts by both groups of scholars have attempted 
to incorporate in either paradigm also the processes emphasized by 
the other school of thought but with only incomplete success. The 
problem is that while neoreali^ iverestim ate  the power of structural 
variables to determine systemic outcomes, neoliberals underestimate 
them.
In particular, neoliberals exaggerate the value of institutions as 
independent variables capable of affecting outcomes independently54. 
This view wrongly assumes that in fact anarchy always allows 
cooperation to emerge, which -as we have just seen- is not the case. 
There are contingencies in which states are unwilling or unable to 
cooperate because of competition for relative gains, irrespective of the 
presence of institutions in the system or even of the abstract absolute 
preferences of states. Institutions can help cooperative preferences to 
emerge w hen they are present, but they cannot bring them abou t
On the other hand, neorealists are wrong when they dismiss 
institutions as useless tools of statecraft because structural constraints 
suffice to bring about systemic outcomes. For example, in  a recent 
statement on the neorealist view of institutions, Mearsheimer writes: 
"My central conclusion is that institutions have minimal influence on 
state behaviour". States do not follow models of behaviour but their 
own interests; w hen the two converge it is only by accident This view 
is based on the incorrect idea that relative gains are always the m ain 
obstacle to cooperation. W hen -as between two enemies- relationships 
are governed by relative gains, cooperation would be impossible. 
When -as between two allies- relationships are not governed by 
relative gains considerations, cooperation would be spontaneous and 
structurally determined.
The problem is that cooperation is difficult even when 
structural conditions dictate it. Cooperation is distinct from harmony
because compatible behaviour is not automatic but requires active 
coordination instead. Neorealists discount the possibility that free 
rider problems will inhibit collaboration even when relative gains 
considerations allow i t  The prediction of balancing behaviour rests 
indeed on the absence of free riding.55 However, it is as impossible to 
exclude problems of this kind in an anarchic setting as it is to rule out 
relative gains considerations.
Even when faced w ith a grave common danger, states still have 
a temptation to let others shoulder the costs of containm ent For 
example in the Napoleonic period, the First, Second and Third 
Coalitions collapsed despite the fact France was growing stronger and 
therefore the incentive to balance was increasing. Also the Fourth 
Coalition, which eventually managed to destroy Napoleon, was 
created only after France had been defeated in  Russia.56 According to 
Richard Rosecrance: "such a response was not surprising: in the 
balance of power system, European nations each waited for the other 
to take the lead against a disruptive state".57
Another instance relates to the origins of the Second W orld 
War. Both Britain and France employed military doctrines which 
transferred onto its allies the burden of restraining Nazi Germany.58 
More significantly, when Germany's pow er and intentions w ere clear 
to all, the Soviet Union signed the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of non­
aggression, in an attempt to divert Germany's expansion towards the 
W est59 In other words, Moscow chose to free ride even though 
Germany was growing stronger.
Neorealists overlook the fact that, by reducing the incidence of 
free riding, institutions allow the emergence of cooperation in those 
situations in which cooperative interests coexist w ith conflictual ones. 
Institutions have a role any time free riding is a possibility. These 
situations do not only refer to minor questions and peripheral issues 
but include the crucial operation of the balance of power. The ancient 
Greeks -not only despite but because of their well known cynicism- 
introduced the institution of hostage exchange between allies because 
they did not completely trust the "spontaneous" systemic mechanisms 
to work.60
Institutions should therefore be conceptualized as intervening 
variables between systemic characteristics and the behaviour of
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states.61 They are not independent variables because they necessitate 
certain systemic conditions in order to emerge.62 Since they are 
created by states (and not viceversa) w ithout independent 
enforcement power, institutions cannot force states to cooperate 
unless they already willing to do so. In Giulio Gallarotti's words: 
"order is institutionally assisted rather than managed [that is] the 
environment in which [international institutions function] m ust 
[already] be conducive to the effectiveness of supranational 
management in general".63
However, institutions -when they exist- are not merely 
epiphenomenal as they contribute to bring about outcomes which 
would have been otherwise impossible. Free riding could in fact 
inhibit cooperation even w hen interests converge. Inasmuch as they 
tame free riding, institutions are not useless. Their utility w ill be 
limited because they will not operate in all systemic configurations, 
but it is also not negligible.
Specifically, institutions act as a positive feedback on 
cooperation: states m ust already be willing and able to cooperate in 
order to establish them but, once they are in place, they allow for a 
higher degree of cooperation than if they had not existed. If no will to 
cooperate is present, institutions will be helpless but if it is present, 
they can accomplish it and increase i t  Once in place, institutions can 
facilitate further attempts to coordinate policies.
Institutions will be especially necessary since the lack of 
hierarchy in the international system excludes an authoritative 
allocation of roles. Some form of decentralized coordination is 
therefore needed when states w ant to collaborate and avoid free 
riding. It is ironic that neorealists -with their emphasis on conflict- 
overestimate the simplicity of cooperation under certain conditions. 
Institutions are useful and significant precisely because -as neorealists 
maintain- cooperation is difficult and precarious.
Anarchy causes two problems to states: it forces them to m ind 
about their relative power positions and it exacerbate their problems 
of collective action. While institutions are useless for the first kind of 
problems, they are useful for the second one. Their utility is 
conditional on w hat type of dilemma states are facing in the particular 
contingency in question. The conditional utility of institutions can be
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thought of as the relationship between a priest and a Christian. The 
priest cannot guarantee the Christian's salvation/ especially if the 
latter is unwilling to be saved. In some circumstances the priest m ight 
even be counterproductive. However, if the Christian is willing to be 
saved, the priest may help and direct him.
The first conclusion that can be reached about institutions in 
international relations is that they are precarious and helpful at the 
same time. In the anarchy of states, institutions will be difficult to 
establish and to maintain. Success can never be guaranteed in the 
absence of a hierarchical authority capable to guarantee compliance. 
However, institutions are useful precisely because cooperation is 
difficult and not a foregone conclusion.
In sum, the following analysis of collective security will 
therefore be a liberal one, because it seriously considers the claim that 
institutions have a role to play in international politics. However, it 
w ill be a moderate, conditional and m odest brand of liberalism. 
Moderate because it recognizes that institutions can be 
counterproductive if excessively rigid. Conditional because it 
recognizes that institutions cannot operate under all systemic 
configurations. Modest because it recognizes that institutions under 
anarchy cannot change the behaviour of states unless these are already 
disposed to collaborate. Institutions, short of the establishment of a 
w orld government, can help us to lim it the perverse effects of anarchy 
and competition in the international system, but they cannot 
eliminate them.
The effectiveness and the probability of success of institutions 
depends not only on the context bu t also on their specific 
characteristics and on how these are adapted to the context. N ot all 
situations are suited for all kind of institutions and some forms are 
better than others in certain situations. Institutional forms m ay in  fact 
range from the highly articulate United Nations with its network of 
specialized agencies to the simple Morse code for ship-to-ship 
communication.
A useful distinction has been pu t forward by Oran Young, who 
has compared the concepts of "order" and "regime". The first are 
"broad framework arrangements governing the actions of all (or 
almost all) the members of international society" while the latter are
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"more specialized arrangements that pertain to well defined activities 
[...] and often involve only some subset of the members of 
international society".64
The two types can be draw n on the same continuum w ith 
respect to their degree of institutionalization.65 Orders are highly 
institutionalized in the sense that they prescribe very different 
behaviour than the one which could be observed if they were not in 
place and that they require states to comply w ith the international 
rules even against their interests. Regimes are less institutionalized 
arrangements which do not prescribe behaviour incompatible w ith 
the actions that would emerge spontaneously.
The distinction between the two is not merely in their form, but 
also in the philosophy behind them. Orders are more ambitious 
institutions which seek to change the way international relations have 
operated until they came into existence. In a way, orders seek to 
change state preferences and to reinforce the conditions which gave 
rise to them. Orders are centralized and "strong" in the sense that the 
institution would be independent from its members and would take 
on a life of its own.
On the contrary, regimes are more modest arrangements which 
depend more heavily on the existing preferences of states and on the 
prevailing conditions in the system. Regimes do not seek to change 
states' preferences, but merely to accommodate them.66 Regimes are 
decentralized and "weak" because their members are independent vis- 
a-vis the institution which w ould therefore require states to follow its 
precepts only when it is convenient for them to do so.67.
The relative utility of orders and regimes is heavily influenced 
by the analysis of the effects of anarchy. Given that these are variable, 
the way institutional forms adapts to changes in the propensity to 
stability of the system is crucial. The second conclusion about 
institutions is that there is a tradeoff between their credibility and 
their effectiveness. If an institution is not adaptable enough to 
accommodate the variations in  the effects of anarchy, it will collapse 
and it will become ineffective. If on the contrary an institution is too 
adaptable, it will not make any difference to outcomes. In short, 
whereas orders can be hyper institutionalized, regimes can be hypo 
institutionalized.68 In turn, this depends on three variables which
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concern the issue area in which they operate, the way they are 
organized and the membership they encompass.
* The question of the issue area is a crucial one because the 
willingness of states to cooperate varies according to the subject in 
question. Technical issues are the most manageable because they are 
usually least threatening for a state's independence. The 
standardization of international telephonic codes could hardly pu t in 
jeopardy the sovereignty of a state. For w hat more substantive issues 
are concerned, the general rule is that institutionalized cooperation is 
more difficult in the security realm than in the economic one. This is 
due mainly to two reasons.
On the one hand, security matters are "inherently m ore 
conflictual".69 The stakes are higher in the security realm because it is 
the very survival of a state which is in play rather than its prosperity 
or the possession of a material good. The immediate losses of a 
breakdown of cooperation are more serious and, in case of complete 
defeat, cannot be recuperated. The ultimate cost is not the loss of a few 
percentage point of m arket share, but it is loss of life. States therefore 
tend to avoid putting themselves in a situation in which they have to 
trust others for their own very survival.
On the other hand, measurements in the field of security are 
more difficult than in economics. Military power cannot be estimated 
w ith precision and states can therefore never be sure. If indeed a 
precise and transparent method of measuring military power was 
uncovered, wars would be unnecessary as both combatants w ould 
know the exact outcome in  advance and could settle their differences 
on the basis of the new equilibrium of forces w ithout firing a sho t 
Moreover, defensive power cannot always be distinguished from 
offensive power. States are therefore more sensitive to relative gains 
in the security realm because they can more easily be translated into 
decisive advantages.
* Secondly, institutions can be draw n along a continuum 
ranging from rigid to flexible according to the way they are 
organized. The first element of institutional organization concerns the 
degree of formalization. Institutions may be structured around formal 
organizations with a written constitutions, a headquarters and an 
international bureaucracy entrusted with its implementation or
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-alternatively- they may be informal agreements w ith a minimum of 
codification.70 NATO, w ith the North Atlantic Treaty, its Brussels 
offices w ith branches in all the allied capitals, its integrated command 
and its political organs, is an example of the first type. On the other 
hand, the Missile Technology Control Regime, which is an informal 
agreement on the part of a handful of states geared to the control of 
exports of technology which could be used by third parties to build 
ballistic missiles is an example of the latter.71
Another element regards the agenda of the institution which 
may be diffuse or specific.72 For example, UNESCO covers a wide 
range of subjects all relating to culture and can enlarge its scope to 
include new subjects whereas the regime governing responses to 
hijacking refers only to very specific contingencies codified in the 1963 
Tokyo Convention and 1970 Hague Convention. Usually, the more 
sensitive the issue at hand to the sovereignty of a State, the more 
specific the institution has to be because states do not tolerate to take 
open-ended commitments in areas crucial for their own prerogatives. 
Conversely, in questions which do not directly influence the essence 
of the state, members can sustain a certain independence on the part of 
the institution in setting its own agenda.
A related element is that of the intensity of the com m itm ent An 
institution may demand compliance or it can adm it non-systematic 
violations of its principles. An example of the first type is the Non- 
Proliferation regime which would be significantly weakened if one of 
the signatories acquired nuclear weapons because it would invite its 
neighbours to do likewise in retaliation. On the other hand, the 
system of international monetary relations presided over by the 
International Monetary Fund has survived despite the fact that it has 
been violated in many single instances. The more formal, specific and 
demanding is an institution, the more it can be defined as rigid. The 
more informal, general and tolerant, the more it can be defined as 
flexible.
* The last dimension concerns the kind of membership. An 
institution can be either universal or circumscribed to only a subset of 
the international community. The World Trade Organization, 
comprising most states in the international system, is a universal 
institution while the North American Free Trade Agreement includes
only a subset of those states even if it concerns similar subjects. 
Obviously, there is a trade-off between the number of members and 
their relative homogeneity. The larger the membership, the more 
heterogeneous it is likely to be. The Be-Ne-Lux agreements for the 
free movement of goods and people between their shared borders is 
only possible because of the profound homogeneity of the three 
countries. On the contrary, certain institutions m ust by their nature 
apply to a heterogeneous and vast membership, like for example the 
Conventions relating to the treatm ent of diplomats.
These three factors determine the likelihood of success for an 
institution. An institution will encounter increasing difficulties the 
more the issue area influences the survival of a state, the more rigid 
its organization and the more heterogeneous its membership. 
Conversely, the prospects are encouraging if the issue area is less 
contentious, its organization is flexible and its membership is 
homogeneous. The risk is that order will be too ambitious to be 
realistic w ith respect to one or more of the three variables while 
regimes can be too m odest Too ambitious an institution may be 
impossible; one which is too modest, useless. Between the Schylla of 
impossibility and the Carybdis of inutility institutions m ust find their 
role in a complex environment in which anarchy makes their 
establishment and preservation difficult but in which they are one of 
the most precious and longed for mechanisms to further the interest of 
states an4 of the international community.
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3. Th e  D e f in it io n  o f  C o l l e c t iv e  Secu rity
i. The Concept of Collective Security
Collective security is a multilateral institution set up by states 
to establish and preserve peace throughout the international system. It 
is a universal agreement to regulate the use of force which applies to 
all states under its domain and aims at establishing preponderance 
against an eventual aggression. It is based upon the general principles 
of the indivisibility of peace and of diffuse reciprocity. The 
fundamental assumption is that w ar is not inevitable either because 
there is a fundamental underlying harmony of interest among states 
or because reason is sufficient to reconcile eventual conflicts of 
interests.1
Collective security addresses the problem of w ar in a direct 
manner: the unilateral use of force is forbidden (or even outlawed) 
and collective sanctions are set up against eventual transgressors. The 
aim is a more stable world for the whole international community. 
The means is a universal response to aggression. Global order w ould 
be predicated on the nation of one for all and all for one. "The 
aggressive and unlawful use of force by any nation against any nation 
will be met by the combined use of force of all other nations".2
Collective security is therefore composed of three elements. 
First, an agreed procedure -usually a treaty- is identified for the 
organization of the decisions of the international community. 
Secondly, states explicitly renounce w ar as an instrument of policy 
except in self defence. Thirdly, states pledge to support any state 
victim of an attack should somebody disregard the first elem ent
An eventual aggressor would therefore be isolated and w ould 
have to face the organized power of the whole international 
community. The choice w ould be between yielding and being 
overwhelmed. In theory, no state should be able to face alone all the 
others together. Even w ithout a world government, the international 
community would provide a function similar to that of the police or 
-rather- of vigilantes. Individual states would renounce their 
monopoly of power to the collectivity, which would then use it to 
keep the peace against eventual disturbances. "Having m ade 
arrangements to name the aggressor by community decision, nations
-instead of reserving their power to defend or enforce their national 
interests- would be lined up like a police force to strike against any 
country, friend or foe, that has been declared an aggressor".3
The theory rests on the simple notion that overwhelming 
power is more effective than mere equilibrium to maintain the peace. 
In the words of A.F.K. Organski: "the relationship between w ar and 
the balance of power appears to be exactly the opposite of w hat has 
been claimed. The periods of balance, real or imagined, are periods of 
warfare while the periods of known preponderance are periods of 
peace".4 The objectives of collective security are therefore those to 
deter aggression by envisaging a disproportionate reaction and to 
defend victims effectively should deterrence fail. An overwhelming 
international sanction would in fact be added to the spontaneous 
reprisal of the victim. "The logic of collective security is based upon 
the deterrent effect of aggregate, preponderant power".5
The idea is to render aggression fruitless so as to punish 
violations and deter future wars. "Preponderance provides a more 
robust deterrent than equality and eliminates the possibility that w ar 
m ight break out because the aggressor misperceives the strength of 
the opposing coalition".6 If Wilhemine Germany and inter-war Japan 
had known in advance the amount of power that eventually ganged 
up against them, they would probably have thought twice before 
pursuing their aggressive intents. Collective security seeks to 
organize that power before, rather than after, the aggression has taken 
place.
As an im portant by-product, collective security also promises 
to reduce tensions because it is based upon the cooperative principle 
of one for all and all for one rather than on a competitive balance. 
Each state would be reassured by a universal guarantee and could 
allow itself to behave confidently w ith counterparts rather than 
assessing each event vis-a-vis w orst case scenarioes. Unintended 
action-reaction spirals would thus be defused. In turn, the confidence 
allows states to fulfill at less risk their first pledge not to use force 
unilaterally.
The multilateral character of collective security does not only 
concern the quantity of states involved bu t also the kind of relations 
among them. As John Gerald Ruggie has pointed out "w hat is
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distinctive about multilateralism is not merely that it coordinates 
national policies in  groups of three or more states, which is som ething 
that other organizational forms also do, but additionally that it does 
so on the basis of certain principles of ordering relations among those 
states".7 In other words, collective security is based upon a 
generalized principle rather than on a coincidental convergent sum of 
individual and particular interests. The principle is then applied 
impartially and indivisibly throughout the dom ain of the institution 
irrespective of the specific circumstances involved and of the specific 
concerns of participants. In the words of Lord Bryce, one of the 
prophets of the concept at the time of the Versailles Peace Conference: 
"W hat w e contemplate is not a league of some states against others, 
but a union of as many as possible in the common interest of all".8
Not only the means but also the objectives m ust be
multilateral. International actions based on unilateral rather than 
multilateral motivations are not therefore collective security even of 
they involve a multiplicity of states or are endorsed by an
international organization. In this way, Russian "peacekeeping" 
operations in the former Soviet Republics of Georgia or Tajikistan do
not constitute an example of collective security and rather resemble
the exercise of a sphere of influence on Russia's near abroad. It would 
in fact be difficult that Moscow acquiesced to a Tajiki peacekeeping 
force in Chechenia.
Similarly, any imposition of an imperial stability, like the Pax 
Romana, is not collective security because it serves the interests of one 
party while affecting the collectivity only indirectly. On the contrary 
any coincidence of collective security w ith the interests of one or m ore 
of the parties involved should be purely fortuitous.
Decision-making has to be joint rather than independent and 
inspired by generalized principles.9 The predictable and restrained 
behaviour of the superpowers during the Cold W ar was also not the 
result of collective security even if it resulted in a stable environm ent 
The m utual restraint did not originate from a negotiated adjustment 
of interests but by mutual nuclear deterrence. The Soviet Union and 
America did not choose to cooperate in a multilateral framework but 
were rather forced to moderation by the prospect of a nuclear 
holocaust. Inter-bloc and intra-bloc relations during the Cold War
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were collective and they brought security, bu t they were not collective 
security.10
The principle on which collective security rests is the 
indivisibility of peace.11 According to the main prophet of collective 
security, President Woodrow Wilson: "Every matter which is likely to 
affect the peace of the world is everybody's business".12 War 
anywhere is a threat to peace everywhere. It is therefore in every 
state's interest to stop aggression wherever it occurs.
This may be for one or more of three reasons. Firstly, states 
may feel part of a moral cosmopolitan community which is hurt 
anytime an aggression is unleashed against a fellow nation. Although 
not a direct threat to their own security, states may see any act of 
brutal aggression as a violation of their peace of mind requiring a 
response. Societies may feel empathic to one another and outraged by 
violations of individual and collective hum an rights. Also in domestic 
society individuals expect the police to punish criminals even if they 
have not been victims of a crime or they do n o t’live in an unsafe 
neighbourhood because they feel part of a community.
Secondly, states may prefer to stop aggression before w ar gets 
out of control and involves them. This is either because of the 
intrinsically perverse nature of w ar or because the appetite of the 
aggressor increases w ith each success. President Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt, in his attempts to convince American opinion of the 
necessity to support Britain in the Second W orld War, used to refer to 
the Nazi menace as a contagion or a fire which needed to be 
eradicated before it was too late. "Suppose m y neighbour's house 
catches fire and I have a length of garden hose".13 Each particular war 
is dangerous because, once started, it is difficult to end i t
Thirdly, states may feel that their own security would be better 
served in a world in which aggression is punished severely because 
they themselves may become victims of aggression in the future. As 
the Haitian delegate to the 1935 League of Nations' Assembly 
discussing the Abyssinian crisis remarked: "Let us never forget that, 
one day, any of us could be somebody's Ethiopia". In this way, even if 
the particular w ar in question is unimportant, the very institution of 
w ar is in general a danger to states' survival.
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The indivisibility of peace means that the unilateral use of force 
is always unjustified as it puts in jeopardy the whole international 
community. In this sense w ar is illegitimate because no nation has the 
right to single handedly break global peace for its own interests. 
States should no longer be the sole judges of their own conduct As 
Hoffmann has highlighted, the only legitimate use of force is in self 
defence or for non-selfish -that is multilateral- purposes.14
Collective security punishes whoever uses force as an 
instrument of policy irrespective of the merits of that policy. For w hat 
aggression is concerned, there can be no distinction between "good" 
and "bad" purposes. The concern is with the method of dealing w ith a 
dispute rather than with the dispute itself.15 In this view, a state can 
wage a just w ar only if it does not initiate the hostilities. However, 
once the hostilities have begun, a just w ar becomes a duty more than a 
right.
This also means that aggressors are not punished for the 
wrongfulness of their objectives or for their threatening posture but 
qua violators of a general norm of conduct In other words, Saddam 
Hussein was to be punished because he committed an act of 
aggression rather than because he was a danger to the stability of the 
Persian Gulf. Similarly, it should be indifferent whether the aggressor 
is a ministate or a superpower.16 In both cases the threat to the 
multilateral norm  is the same because both challenge the 
indivisibility of peace equally even if they affect systemic stability 
very differently. For collective security, all wars are bom  equal.
The general principle behind collective security means that 
states have to be motivated by universal, rather than particularistic, 
motivations.17 A collective security operation is one explicitly 
endorsed by a collective security instance like the United Nations, the 
League of Nations, the Organization of American States or the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. However, in 
order to be really different from the spontaneous mechanisms it seeks 
to replace, the multinational action m ust include at least one state 
which would not have intervened had collective security not been in 
place. If all states involved would have intervened anyway, collective 
security would not bring any multilateral value added.
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Both the moral force and the functional utility of collective 
security rest on the involvement of states unaffected by the particular 
dispute and which can therefore offer a more effective and 
disinterested support to the victim of aggression.18 After all, as 
Arnold Wolfers has pointed out, states would not exchange their 
traditional security practices for a multilateral system if they had no 
reason to expect a more effective protection.19 In theory, all 
aggressions should be m et with the same amount of support that of 
the whole international community.
The indivisibility of peace principle is therefore incompatible 
with the age old concept of neutrality. Every dispute should concern 
equally all states as if their own security were directly threatened. In 
these circumstances, "partiality becomes a duty".20 if the initiation of 
violence is banned, then there can never be a moral equivalence 
between two combatants because who fired the first shot is always 
unequivocally wrong. It is therefore impossible to m aintain an 
equidistant posture in a conflict
This is the reason why the German request in 1926 to be 
exempted from a series of potential conflicts was turned down. The 
Weimar government wished to ensure, in the negotiations for its 
accession to the League of Nations, that it would not have been forced 
to fight against its newly found Soviet ally. However, the League 
powers felt that if Germany could opt out from particular operations, 
other nations would have followed suit and the whole concept would 
have been irredeemably compromised.
Collective security is also different from alliances. While the 
latter are geared toward a specific threat, the former operates against 
an unspecified aggressor. Collective security is based on the notion of 
all against any one rather than on the traditional and unilateral idea of 
some against some specific others. In Henry Kissinger's words: 
"alliances always presume a specific potential adversary, collective 
security defends international law in the a b s tr a c t " .21 Alliances take 
the form of states A+B+C against states Y+Z. On the contrary, a 
collective security system takes the form of an agreement between 
A+B+C+Y+Z against any one of them (A, B, C, Y or Z) who commits 
an aggression.22 There is no prearranged direction for the agreement,
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no "us" and "them". All states are potential aggressors and all are 
potential enforcers. Collective security operates tous azimuth.
Such a definition also highlights that other major difference 
between collective security and alliances. While the first is an inward- 
looking and inclusive institution aimed at regulating relations among 
its members, the latter is aimed at an outside threat and is therefore an 
exclusive institution. "The focus on internal regulation distinguishes it 
from an alliance that is organized for the purpose of effectively 
reducing threats that originate outside the membership".23 This is the 
reason why collective security requires a universal membership. 
Eventual disputes m ust arise from within for the institution to be able 
to tackle them. According to Charles Lipson: "all security is internal" 
to the collective security system. States m ust in fact explicitly and 
positively endorse the system before it  can apply to them.24
It is possible to envisage a system on a regional basis, like the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe or the 
Organization of African States, but even in this case membership m ust 
be universal -or quasi-universal- in the region in question.25 
Collective security is not aimed at the equilibrium between opposing 
forces, but at their union in the common cause of peace. Furthermore, 
the inclusiveness of collective security means that the aggression in 
question m ust take place w ithin the regional domain of the 
institution. For example a OSCE intervention in an Arab-Israeli 
conflict would not constitute a collective security operation unless it 
was endorsed by an organization like the United Nations which 
included both the combatants and the enforcers.
In this way, it is therefore possible to exclude -contrary to w hat 
some analysts have suggested- that a collective defence organization 
like NATO is a collective security organization.26 NATO is an 
innovative institution because it has fostered an unprecedented degree 
of political and military integration. Never before had an integrated 
command been established in peacetime nor the obligation to 
intervene on behalf of any ally was spelled more clearly than in 
Article 5 of the Atlantic Treaty. Nevertheless, some of the crucial 
elements of collective security are lacking.
Firstly, NATO was formed because of a specific threat: the 
Soviet Union. Secondly, its membership was limited to those who had
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a common interest in containing Communism and did not include the 
potential threat but tried to keep it as far as possible instead. Thirdly, 
NATO never entertained the ambition of regulating relations among 
its members. W hen the Greco-Turkish conflict over Cyprus broke out 
in the 1970s, NATO allies were not called to intervene to stop 
aggression and to support the victim.
Not only is collective security different from an alliance, but it 
can even be incompatible with i t  As in the case of neutrality, the 
principle of the indivisibility of peace does not easily tolerate 
exceptions. States would be required to punish friends as well as 
foes.27 It would otherwise be impossible to isolate the aggressor and a 
powerful alliance of many states could therefore hope to defy the will 
of the international community. Alignments should therefore be 
shaped by general norms which are beyond the states' control rather 
than by their interests and choices.
While w ithout any legal obligation states would naturally seek 
to favour their allies and underm ine their enemies, under collective 
security states may be forced -depending on the legal circumstances- 
to fight an ally or side by side with an arch-enemy or even in defence 
of a most brutal dictatorship. In theory, Canada should have declared 
w ar on the United States for its invasion of Panama in 1989 if this had 
been declared unlawful. Similarly, the international community 
should have defended the infamous regimes of the Khmer Rouges in 
Cambodia or of Idi Amin in Uganda against aggression at the end of 
the 1970's.
Collective security seeks to substitute the short term interest of 
allies against a common threat w ith the long term universal interests 
of global peace. It asks to forego alliances bu t it promises an 
harmonious w orld in which each is guaranteed by all and in  which 
alliances are therefore superfluous. For example, according to Senator 
Vandenberg, who was commenting on Soviet post w ar foreign policy: 
"the alternative is collective security which is better in the long view, 
from a purely Russian standpoint: to forcefully surround herself with 
a cordon of unwillingly controlled states thus affronting the opinion 
of mankind or to win the priceless asset of world confidence 
embracing full and whole hearted cooperation w ith and reliance upon
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a vital international organization".28 Unfortunately, the Kremlin did 
not take the Senator's advice.
In other words, states are asked to renounce the specific 
reciprocity of alliances for the sake of the diffuse reciprocity of 
collective security.29 Following Robert Keohane's terminology, while 
the first involves a specific quid pro quo every time it is invoked, the 
latter implies a higher long term benefit although not necessarily a 
reward for each single compliance.30 The distinction resembles the 
difference that exists between a firm 's investment on m aterial 
resources, which necessitates a syntagmatic return for the expenditure 
made, and an investment on the firm 's image (like a publicity 
campaign) which can bring more or less profits according to a set of 
circumstances. The return may in the latter case be indeterminate but 
if the long term benefits seem sufficiently large, it may still be w orth 
it.
It is im portant to point out that collective security is only one 
of many possible types of multilateral intervention. The fact that an 
operation is not governed by unilateral motives does not 
automatically make it an instance of collective security. In particular, 
collective security should not be confused w ith peacekeeping, as the 
two concepts entail different and mutually exclusive philosophies. 
Peacekeeping envisages an impartial intervention involving only 
passive use of force. An intervention of this type can only take place 
w ith the consent of the parties involved and in the presence of a 
ceasefire.31
On the contrary, collective security entails opposite ends and 
opposite means. An aggressor is identified and then tem porarily 
evicted from the family of nations. Collective security is impartial in 
the sense that it applies equally to all states w ithout prejudice but it is 
partial in the sense that it does identify an enemy. It would otherwise 
be as if the police, summoned for a burglary, rounded up the house 
and waited for the parties to settle their differences rather than going 
in and arresting the burglar.
Not only does collective security, like the police, identify a 
culprit and a victim, but it also positively invites states to punish the 
first and protect the latter. Nor is such an intervention limited. Rather 
than waiting for an agreement between the parties, collective security
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imposes the will and the norms of the international community and 
enforces a termination of the hostilities w ith superior force whatever 
the desires of the parties.
In this sense, peacekeeping and collective security are 
alternative methods of multilateral involvement which do not lie on a 
same spectrum but are divided by a distinct and discrete interval.32 
The intervention in fact can be either partial or impartial and either 
limited or unlimited. The force structures, rules of engagement and 
objectives of the two types of operations are diametrically opposed 
and should not be confused. A military presence endowed w ith only 
passive force cannot be partial, and viceversa.
The blurring of the distinction can only spell the failure of the 
m ultilateral action as the contingents on the field need to know 
whether they should shoot at one of the combatants or whether they 
should retain an impartial outlook. Once the impartiality is broken, it 
cannot be regained. As the 1994 British Army Field Manual 
imaginatively puts it, while a peacekeeping operation resembles the 
role of a referee in a rugby match, a collective security operation 
resembles instead the role of a team playing the match. In the first 
case, a single man in a neutral outfit is sufficient to fulfill the task. In 
the other case, 15 men w ith  their ow n uniforms are actively involved 
in the game. Clearly, the two roles are fundamentally different
The classification along two dimensions -partiality and use of 
force- suggests that there are two further types of multilateral 
intervention which are often overlooked and confused w ith either 
peacekeeping or collective security.33 Firstly, an operation can be 
impartial but involving an unlimited use of force. In this view, the 
international community would actively impose its will on both sides 
in w hat is commonly referred to as peace enforcem ent There would 
be neither aggressor nor victim bu t -for the sake of international 
peace and security- the conflict w ould be crushed by superior outside 
force. This type of operation can be envisaged especially in case of the 
collapse of authority w ithin a state as was the case in Somalia in 1992.
Secondly, the operation can be partial, like collective security, 
but entailing only a limited am ount of force. In other words, in a 
similar manner to the gunboat diplomacy of colonial powers in the 
XIX Century, the multilateral intervention w ould support one side in
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a conflict but would do so for well defined and limited objectives 
short of the crushing of the other side. Examples of this type of 
interventions are the establishment of safe areas protected by the 
international community in Northern Iraq in the aftermath of the Gulf 
War and in Bosnia during the Yugoslav Civil War. In both cases, the 
multilateral operation was aimed against one combatant w ithout 
necessarily seeking its complete defeat
To sum up, we can therefore sketch a taxonomy of different 
types of intervention of which collective security is only one of four, 
as can be seen in table 1. First, a peacekeeping operation is partial and 
limited. Secondly, a peace enforcement operation retains an impartial 
outlook but involves an active and unlimited use of force. Thirdly, a 
multilateral intervention can be partial but aimed at lim ited 
objectives. Finally, a collective security operation is partial in that it 
identifies an aggressor which m ust be punished and unlimited in that 
it aims at its unconditional defeat
Table 1. Types of Multilateral Intervention
limited
use of 
force
unlimited
outlook
partial impartial
intervention peace keeping
coDedivesecurity peace enforcement
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ii. Collective Security and World O rder Proposals
Martin W ight has divided the various ideas on international 
order into three main groups, also called the three R's. Firstly, Realists 
-or Machiavellians- are rather pessimistic on the prospects of changing 
either the international system or the units that compose i t  The forces 
which urge states to compete are so strong that they cannot be 
overcome. The main instruments for avoiding w ar are therefore the 
prudent policies of states and the mechanism of the balance of power. 
Secondly, Rationalists -also called Grotians- aim at producing stability 
by improving the way in which the international system works, 
w ithout radically changing its nature. By introducing institutions such 
as international law or conventions like those of an "international 
society", rationalists aim at taming the competition between states 
and at facilitating collaboration. Finally, Revolutionaries -or 
Kantians- propose a radical transformation of the international system 
and of the units that compose it in order to overcome altogether the 
dilemmas of anarchy.
The concept of collective security represents an attempt to bring 
peace to international relations w ithout altering their fundamental 
characteristics. It is therefore grounded in the second tradition. It is a 
way to m oderate anarchy, which is deemed unacceptable, w ithout 
establishing a w orld government, which is deemed unattainable. 
Collective security therefore represents an attem pt to square the circle 
between universal motivations toward peace and the retention of 
national sovereignty. Peace is considered possible within the present 
system of sovereign states. The crucial new factor introduced is a legal 
obligation. Collective security seeks neither to change the 
organization of states nor of the international system. In this way, 
collective security is distinct from other liberal views of international 
relations, and especially from the revolutionary tradition.
The Kantian school sees in the domestic organization of states 
the key to perpetual peace. Republics -or as we w ould call them today, 
democracies- are based on the principles of the division of powers and 
of popular sovereignty. Since the citizens will have to bear the direct 
costs of fighting, they will be naturally reluctant to start a w ar if they 
have the right to decide over such questions. In Kant7s words: "if the
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consent of citizens is required to decide whether w ar should or should 
not be waged, nothing is more natural than the fact that, since the 
burdens of war will fall upon them, [...] they will meditate for a long 
time before initiating such an evil game".34
This will be especially so if the counterpart is another republic 
which is based upon the same legitimacy of popular sovereignty. The 
tendency to solve domestic conflicts under the rule of law would 
therefore be transferred -provided certain conditions are met- at the 
international level in  the relations between republics, which would 
thus be free to establish a pacific confederation. Nevertheless, insofar 
as collective security attempts to bring peace to the whole 
international system -and not just to its democratic segments- it 
should be kept separate from "Republican Liberalism".
Collective security does not address the question of the 
domestic organization of states. By its universal aspirations, it rather 
seems that collective security assumes the sufficiency of legal 
obligations irrespective of domestic politics. This is the reason w hy all 
sorts of states -democracies and not- have been founding members of 
the League of Nations and of the United Nations and that their 
constitutional rules do not refer to any specific type of domestic 
organization of states. While collective security rests on the notion 
that pacta sunt servanda, both if the counterpart is a democracy or not, 
revolutionary liberal theories point out that cum hereticis fides non 
servanda, that is relations should be different if the counterpart is a 
democracy or n o t35
Furthermore, collective security aims at preserving state 
sovereignty and w ould not concern itself w ith domestic questions. On 
the contrary, revolutionary liberalism believes in the messianic 
function of a certain political system and would therefore actively 
attempt to promote i t  While collective security is solely concerned 
with interstate wars, revolutionary liberalism considers processes 
within states as crucial variables.
A certain amount of confusion derives from the fact that many 
proponents of collective security also believed in the Kantian 
proposition of a separate peace among democracies. Woodrow Wilson 
remarked that "only a nation whose government was its servant and 
not its master could be trusted to preserve the peace of the world. [...]
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A steadfast concert for peace can never be maintained except by a 
partnership of democratic nations. No autocratic government could be 
trusted to keep faith w ith  or observe its covenants".36
Democracies are indeed steadfast supporters of the concept, 
which has been introduced by democratic states in international 
relations and mainly upheld by them. W ithout democracy, it is even 
conceivable that collective security would have never been applied. 
Collective security appeals to democracies because it resembles their 
domestic organization based on the rule and impartial enforcement of 
law. Collective security also rigidly distinguishes between peace and 
war, in accordance w ith the democratic characteristic of rejecting the 
idea of a continuum in  which w ar is simply the continuation of 
politics by other means. Public opinion -on which democratic politics 
depends- demands clarity on these issues and tends to support 
collective security because it provides an aura of moral legitimacy and 
clarity to a situation.
However, if Republican Liberalism and collective security were 
merged into a single theory, the latter would become irrelevant if it 
required that the participants were democratic. For example, 
according to James Mill: "it is only in  countries the rulers of which are 
drawn from the mass of the people, in other words in democratic 
countries, that the sanction of the laws of nations can be expected to 
operate w ith any considerable effect".37 Similarly, Professor Zimmern 
wrote in the 1930's th a t
"collective security, the safety of all by all, cannot, at the 
present stage of hum an history, be a policy for the world as a 
whole. It can only be brought into practical effect between the 
free peoples who, if they are sufficiently powerful, can form the 
nucleus of what, as the social and political advancement of 
m ankind proceeds, will become an increasingly large and 
im portant political constellation"38
In this view, it is clearly democracy, rather than the law of 
nations and international institutions, to bring peace.
Collective security is more pessimistic about the prospects of 
reforming international society as we know it than other idealistic 
schools of thought while being more optimistic about reaching peace 
within the present international system. In this view, the concept
belongs to the Grotian tradition which believes that world order can 
be attained largely w ith processes endogenous to international society 
w ithout recourse to a radical transformation of domestic or 
international politics.59
According to Grotius, the best way to obtain order was 
through international institutions: "It would be useful and in 
some fashion necessary that the Christian powers should make 
between themselves some sort of body in  whose assemblies the 
troubles of each should be determined by the judgm ent of 
others not interested and there should be sought means of 
constraining the parties to come to an agreement within 
reasonable conditions".40
Although it rejects a revolutionary transformation of 
international society and wants to build on it instead, collective 
security still is a proposal for world order opposed to the doctrine of 
the balance of power in its realpolitik connotation. In Roosevelt's 
view, collective security "spells -and it ought to spell- the end of the 
system of unilateral action, exclusive alliances and spheres of 
influence and balances of power and all the other expedients which 
have been tried for centuries and have always failed".41
The balance of power relies exclusively on states' unilateral 
interests in stopping aggression. Global peace is a desirable -but 
unintended- byproduct of the competition of states. No state aims at 
an actual balance but since each does not w ant that another becomes 
predominant, the consequence will be a m utually restraining 
equilibrium. Each attempt at altering the balance will preoccupy the 
other states which would respond to the instability by retaliating in 
kind thereby restoring the equilibrium.
On the contrary, collective security assumes all states to uphold 
the values of the international community. States are expected to act 
together not because of a temporary coincidence of their self interest 
against a greater danger, but because they all share the long term goal 
of global peace. If they all act accordingly, also their individual 
interests will be met. In other words, collective security reverses the 
relationship between individual and community goals implicit in the 
balance of power theories. While under anarchy the independence of
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the state is the primary goal and peace is a by-product, under a 
multilateral system it w ould be viceversa.
It is therefore not a coincidence that both major attempts to 
establish a collective security system took place after major wars 
-World W ar I and World War II- for which the balance of power was 
largely held responsible. The spontaneous mechanism of balancing 
under anarchy were deemed insufficient and criticized on both moral 
and functional grounds. The balance of power is considered im m oral 
because it relies on the selfish interests of states rather than on the 
welfare of societies and of the international community. It is also 
considered unjust because, by leaving security to spontaneous and 
unilateral reactions, it leaves stronger states in a better position to 
protect themselves than weaker ones. The prototypical example of this 
is the partition of Poland at the end of the XVUI Century in the name 
of the equilibrium between Prussia, Austria and Russia.
On the contrary, collective security aims at peace throughout 
the international system rather than at the security of individual 
states. Furthermore, the international guarantee is extended to all 
states alike irrespective of their position in the international 
hierarchy. Each state is entitled to the same security and collective 
security therefore satisfies the principle of equality. As Michael Doyle 
has pointed out: "collective security presupposes a collective 
commitment to defend all its members from aggression, no matter 
who is the aggressor. A balancing system is directed against 
capabilities, not aggression and it does not presuppose anything but 
individualistic decisions. Balancing, indeed, presupposes the 
possibility of aggressive w ar as an instrum ent in righting an 
imbalance of power".42
Alternatively, the balance of power is criticized because it fails 
to maintain stability. A policy of equilibrium indeed sometimes even 
demands w ar as an instrument of balancing. Moreover, the balance of 
power can break down if states unilaterally decide that they are either 
unwilling or unable to fight the aggressor. This was the case w ith the 
Napoleonic Wars and w ith this Century's World Wars. According to 
Organski: "nations are reluctant to fight unless they believe that they 
have a good chance of winning, but this is true for both sides only 
when the two are evenly matched".43
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The theory of the balance of power correctly indicates that in 
front of a systemic threat there will be a tendency on the part of states 
that a balance will form. However, it cannot predict that an effective 
balance will actually form in each and every circumstance.44 In the age 
of total war, this lack of certainty may seem enormous as even a 
single failure could represent the end of civilization. The balance of 
power thus seemed obsolete and a different type of system 
appropriate. Collective security is seen as a more reliable alternative 
because it gathers overwhelming power against the aggressor and 
because it provides a clearer standard of conduct
Collective security is therefore an attem pt to improve the way 
in which international relations w ork and to provide a more solid 
basis for security than the spontaneous "natural" mechanisms 
operating under anarchy. "Collective security was originally 
developed in reaction against and in the hope of providing a 
substitute for the traditional system of competing alliances" 45 In this 
way, it is an expression of the belief in the power of reason to alter 
social behaviour. By introducing a set of norms and legal obligations, 
collective security seeks to introduce an element of voluntarism into 
international politics.
The assumption is that if only states convince themselves that 
peace is a desirable goal, it is then possible to devise a mechanism for 
the attainment of such an objective. States are assumed to be 
sufficiently free from structural constraints to be able to change their 
behaviour according to the obligations they have undertaken. 
Moreover, it is also assumed -in a reductionist fashion- that if the 
behaviour of states changes, also systemic outcomes will change.
This implies a volitional and voluntaristic view of international 
relations which is epitomized by the fact that collective security does 
not spontaneously emerge from the international system but requires 
positive and explicit codification in international agreements. 
According to Claude, "it has no real significance unless and until 
affirmative arrangements are m ade for its establishment" 46 In other 
words, collective security is a social, rather than a natural, construct 
Clearly, this view stands in opposition to the laissez faire approach 
implicit in the balance of power.47
As other Grotian approaches to international politics, collective 
security occupies the m iddle ground between realist cynicism and the 
more revolutionary forms of idealism. It lies in the m iddle ground 
between an intolerable anarchy and an unattainable world 
government.48 The traditional practices are seen as unsatisfactory. 
However, the key to reform is not a fundamental alteration of the 
nature of states or of the international system, but the innovative use 
of an age-old instrument of international relations: a treaty.
iii. Two Conceptions of Collective Security
The core of the concept of collective security is the introduction 
of a legal obligation to renounce w ar and to collectively punish any 
violator. According to Downs and Iida: "the sine qua non of collective 
security is collective self-regulation", which is the right and the duty 
of the international community to enforce the collective norms. In a 
way, each state should internalize w orld order into its individual 
security considerations. W ar is not m ade physically impossible but is 
limited by self restraint However, this same core can be applied in 
different ways.49 Specifically, it can be interpreted -in a maximalist 
fashion- as the only and exclusive principle governing the relations 
among states or it can be applied -in a minimalist mode- as one 
possible principle alongside other and more traditional ones.50
A maximalist conception of collective security aims at the 
establishment of a rigid, universal and formal international order as 
described in the previous chapter. It stems from a radical critique of 
balancing under anarchy and it seeks a qualitative change in the way 
international relations operate. In the literature, this conception 
coincides w ith those analysts who see collective security as the 
antithesis to the balance of power.
Maximalism is based on the idea that w ar can be abolished by 
fiat by replacing traditional security mechanisms. It is a firmly 
voluntaristic proposition implying that states could abandon their 
traditional concerns for the sake of universal motivations. Even 
w ithout a w orld government to enforce the multilateral norms, states 
are expected to behave as if that government existed. Stability and 
peace would be attainable by mere force of will.
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If no other security mechanism is at work, the active solidarity 
to a victim of aggression m ust be considered as legally binding. 
Multilateral norms would be applied in each and every contingency. 
Like a trip wire, any violation m ust trigger a symmetric response. The 
whole international community would be ipso facto at w ar w ith any 
aggressor. In Claude's words, collective security would mean 
"security for all states, by the action of all states, against any state. [...] 
Ideal collective security [...] offers the certainty, backed by legal 
obligation, that any aggressor would be confronted with offensive 
sanctions".51
States would be required to completely abandon their 
discretion over the use of force and w ould react to any aggression 
unconditionally. Not only they would renounce w ar as an instrum ent 
of policy, but they would be required to renounce to decide over the 
opportunity to send their own troops on the side of the victim. In 
other words, they would lose w hat Carl Schmitt considered the central 
element of their sovereignty, that is their ability to decide unilaterally 
when a state of emergency occurred requiring the use of force.
A maximalist type of collective security does not seek to work 
on the independent policies of states and coordinate them more 
efficiently. Anarchy is the problem and it is caused precisely by those 
independent policies. Collective security in this sense seeks to remove 
-rather than reconcile- sovereignty from states in  the field of their 
security. Collective means that multilateral measures are different 
from a sum of unilateral ones.
The maximalist conception represents a radical break w ith 
traditional practices. Martin W ight term ed it "revolutionary". No opt 
outs or excuses could be tolerated. States would be forced to resolve 
any eventual discrepancy between their individual interest and the 
collective norms in favour of the latter. States would become mere 
agents of the collective will as defined in multilateral treaties and 
procedures. Once acknowledged the principle of the indivisibility of 
peace, states would completely substitute universalist motivations for 
their national interests. The pursuit of unilateral goals w ould not be 
tolerated if the system is to work. In exchange, the problem of 
aggression would be tackled by the m ost direct route as each violation 
would immediately be met by overwhelming force. This is the view
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held by President Wilson" who wanted "not a balance of power, but a 
community of power; not organized rivalries but an organized 
common peace".
Like in a^iojbbesian social contract, states would give up  to an 
international organization their right to decide on matters involving 
the use of force. The organization would then have the executive 
powers -like the police- to provide security for all. Although it would 
still not be a full-fledged world government, because the organization 
would still be composed of states and it would therefore not enjoy a 
monopoly of force, it w ould be an embryo of i t 52
The necessity to intervene in each and every case requires that 
the collective security organization has an efficient process of decision 
making. The other analogy w ith domestic politics is that unanimity 
could not always be afforded and, like in a Parliament, decisions 
would necessarily be taken by some form majority voting. If a veto 
was allowed, collective security could not in fact operate always.
Operationally, a maximalist type of collective security would 
be constructed to work in as many situations as possible: (a) decision­
making w ould adopt majority-voting rather than consensus (b) 
military forces would be under multilateral command or at least 
earmarked for multilateral use and (c) collective principles and actions 
would be invoked in an increasing num ber of situations expanding 
the scope of the institution from flagrant interstate aggression to all 
kinds of violence and beyond.
On the other side of the spectrum, a minimalist conception 
w ould aim only at an incremental improvement of international 
politics. It is an attempt to complement, integrate and reinforce 
traditional policy of balancing w ith an international regime rather 
than to completely replace them w ith a new international order. 
Collective security would not be the exclusive means of conflict 
resolution but it would coexist alongside other, more unilateral 
mechanisms. Its main characteristic, distinguishing from the 
maximalist type, would be its selectivity.
Rather than implying a rigid legal obligation to intervene in 
each and every contingency, the minimalist conception acknowledges 
the fact that, unless sovereignty is removed from states, the 
functioning of a multilateral regime requires their consent. States
would remain judges of the opportunity of their use of force and could 
opt out if unwilling or unable. In other words, the institutions would 
operate conditionally to the desires of the states which compose i t  
Sometimes states will prefer to employ multilateral mechanisms, 
other times they will prefer other solutions.
More than a World Parliament, a m inimalist collective security 
organization w ould therefore resemble a forum for diplomatic 
discussion. This implies that problems would be faced as they arose 
rather than ironed out of existence. The scope of the institution would 
remain limited. Multilateral sanctions w ould not be mandatory, but 
recommended in case of aggression. Decisions would be reached by 
consensus rather than by majority voting while the actual use of 
military force would remain firmly in the hand of states. 
Furthermore, the minimalist conception would tend to remain 
specifically concerned with interstate aggression rather than w ith the 
use of force in general.
The objectives of the minimalist conception of collective 
security are more m odest Global and perpetual peace would not be 
imposed, but encouraged. This implies a more realistic view of the 
willingness of states to renounce to their sovereign discretion in the 
field of security although it also promises a less watertight system for 
the abolition of war. Minimalism does not promise a new w orld order 
but a functioning regime. Since opt outs are allowed, it is recognized 
that under certain conditions collective security just will not be able to 
operate. Minimalist collective security is therefore less effective 
-because it does not work always- but also less vulnerable -because it 
does not need to work always.53
Nevertheless, although it does not seek to reform international 
relations, it still tries to improve them. A m inimalist conception seeks 
to introduce incentives for moderate behaviour and sanctions for 
aggression and expansionism. Even of not applied automatically, 
these mechanisms would be inserted in the menu of possible reactions 
to aggression, strengthening the idea that the unilateral use of force is 
unacceptable in a society of responsible states. In this way, it does not 
seek to replace traditional motivations w ith universalist ones, but 
attempts to make the two converge.
If every ten aggressions the spontaneous mechanism of the 
balance of power triggered a response to five, minimalist collective 
security w ould try to bring the rate to seven or eight while 
maximalist collective security demands a response in each and every 
one of the ten contingencies. In other words -as can be seen from table 
2- while the balance of power implies unilateral motivations applied 
on a selective basis, maximalist collective security would on the 
contrary entail multilateral motivations applied automatically. A 
minimalist conception w ould retain the m ultilateral motivations of 
collective security but it w ould apply them on a selective basis.
Table 2. Types of Security Systems
Security System Motivation Application
Balance of Power unilateral selective
M inimalist multilateral selective
Maximalist multilateral automatic
The minimalist conception is based on a less radical critique of 
traditional balancing policies and on a more optimistic assessment of 
the ability of international society to reach and maintain stability w ith  
institutions which are endogenous to it. Whereas the maximalist 
model relied on the possibility o f creating the conditions for its 
effectiveness, the minimalist one is more skeptical on the likelihood 
of forcing states to follow binding principles and rigid mechanisms in 
the absence of a world governm ent In other words, it has less faith in 
legalistic and supranational institutions and more faith in diplomatic 
and international ones. In this sense, collective security w ould not 
seek to reject traditional mechanisms, bu t rather to build on them.
According to Gulick, one of the major students of the balance of 
power:
"Collective security, far from being alien to the 'age-old 
tradition of the balance of power', not only derives from the 
latter, but also m ust be regarded as the logical end point of the 
balance of power system, the ideal toward which it has been 
moving, slowly and haltingly, for several hundred years. The 
contention leads to the hypothesis that the League of Nations 
and the United Nations, when considered as instruments for 
maintaining the 'continuing coexistence o f . governments in 
contact w ith one another', were merely further refinements in 
balance practice".54
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Also Quincy W right adheres to the same -minimalist- view:
"Policies of balance of power naturally lead to policies of 
collective security which become institutionalized through 
common organs, procedures and rules of law to assure that 
aggression will always be confronted by insuperable force. 
International organization to promote collective security is, 
therefore, only a planned development of the natural tendency 
of balance of power policies. It is the natural tendency of states, 
when faced by an emergency, to gang up against the aggressor 
who, if successful against his first victim, will eventually turn 
on the others".55
A useful historical precedent of an institution between a 
voluntaristic conception and a laissez-faire one is the Concert of 
Europe which emerged from the Congress of Vienna and  which 
"allowed the great powers to cooperate effectively over more limited 
collective goals [...] What made the Concert w ork was its focus on 
communication among great powers to avpick deepening conflicts 
over third party disputes".56 The statesmen Which)convened to rebuild 
the foundations of European peace after the French Revolutionary and 
Napoleonic Wars did not attem pt to construct a rigid maximalist 
system of automatic intervention transcending the will of the states 
that composed it, but they also did not w ant to return to the 
completely unilateral system of the XVIII Century. That system had in 
fact brought about too many wars for them not to worry about the 
vulnerability of their domestic social systems, exposed by the 
revolution. Furthermore, that system had been slow and uncertain 
and it had failed to check French power until 1812.
They therefore introduced a new mechanism by which all the 
great powers (and only the great powers) had a collective 
responsibility toward the maintenance of stability. A necessary 
condition for this was the innovative solution of including France in 
the settlement's negotiations from the start despite the fact that it had 
lost the war; in other words, the Concert was not geared "against" 
anybody. Revisions of the status quo could be reached only by 
consensus and that any unilateral violation could be sanctioned by all 
others, irrespective of their particular interests involved. Although
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they were not mandatory, the principles of multilateral responsibility 
and of collective interests w ere made explicit57 
According to Hinsley:
"the impressive thing about the behaviour of the 
Powers in 1815 is that they were prepared, as they had never 
been previously been prepared, to waive their individual 
interest in  the pursuit of an international system. This fact is 
not rendered any less impressive by the recognition that they 
were prepared to waive their individual interests because it 
was in their individual interests to do so. They had recognized 
for the first time that it was in their interest to do so".58
The Concert was a weak institution in the sense that it 
depended on the good will of the great powers. When this vanished, 
the Concert simply collapsed. In Elrod's judgm ent "Concert 
diplomacy broke down because statesmen refused to abide by its 
rules". Nevertheless, it brought about one of the longest spells of 
peace in European history and it managed to establish a code of 
conduct concerning the proper and admissible aims and methods of 
international politics which was respected throughout most of the 
Century. It was -in short- more than a reflection of great power 
politics.59
The distinction between the two conceptions highlights a 
crucial dilemma for collective security. If -in accordance with 
maximalism- collective security is considered as a way to radically 
reform the international system, it can become unrealistic. If on the 
other hand the legal obligation is interpreted more loosely, collective 
security can become irrelevant as it w ould not be different from the 
system it seeks to improve. Too rigid a system may be a chimera, one 
which is too flexible, may be useless.
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Peace.... op. dt.. p. 27
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History. Cambridge, 1960, p. 267; Richard Elrod, op. cit.. p. 162, Schroeder, op. 
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5®Hinsley, op. cit.. p. 197
J e r v is , Security Regimes.... d t . p. 178
4. Th e  Lim it s  o f  M a x im a l ist  C o l l e c t iv e  Sec u r ity
i. The Conditions for a Multilateral System
Maximalist collective security rests on the assumption that a 
majority of states will always abide by their legal obligations and w ill 
go out of their way to implement i t  If it did not always work, it could 
not in fact replace the other security mechanisms and establish itself as 
a new world order. Furthermore, if it  worked only intermittently, not 
only it could not claim to have radically reformed the international 
system, but it would also induce states to pursue alternative methods 
of defence, thereby further underm ining its multilateral base.
The maximalist conception implies an exceptionally dem anding 
comm itm ent Not only does the concept concern a difficult subject like 
security and applies it throughout the international system, but it also 
requires a rigid and automatic application. States would be asked to 
intervene irrespective of their interests and desires. This claim is 
unrealistic on three counts. Firstly, states demand certain conditions in 
the international system in order to be willing and able to forego 
discretion over the use of force. Since these conditions cannot be 
guaranteed, also the abandonment of discretion will necessarily be 
conditional. Secondly, even when conditions are present, states are not 
easily draw n in multilateral endeavours w hen the lives of their 
soldiers are at stake. The incentives of a purely voluntaristic system 
may simply be insufficient and active participation can by no means 
be taken for granted. Thirdly, if collective security is applied when the 
conditions are less than ideal, it could even be counterproductive.
The proponents of collective security themselves adm it that it 
needs some preconditions in order to work.1 Even after a multilateral 
agreement has been concluded, implementation in each particular 
instance presents difficult problems. Although collective security has 
been formally introduced on the international scene in 1919, it has 
been able to operate only under exceptional circumstances because 
usually either the will or the ability of states was lacking.
The ability to intervene in a multilateral operation depends 
upon four factors. Firstly, there m ust be a clear and recognized 
definition of aggression. W ithout previously agreed procedures, 
states would argue on who was to be punished rather than mounting a
multilateral operation. Worse still, states which disagreed could find 
themselves fighting on opposite sides frustrating the attempts to 
isolate the aggressor.
For example, during the Bosnian War in the early 1990's Russia 
and the W est had different perceptions on which one w as the 
aggrieved party. While the West, and most of the United Nations, 
w ished to support the government in Sarajevo against w hat it 
believed was Bosnian Serb aggression, Moscow wished to defend the 
rights of its Serbian ally and its associates in Bosnia. If the situation 
got out of hand, Russia and the West could have stumbled in a major 
confrontation between each other rather than uniting their forces 
under the banner of collective security.
The League of Nations tried unsuccessfully during the inter-war 
period to negotiate a common and indisputable definition of 
aggression. W hen Japan invaded Manchuria in 1931 it took more than 
a year for the League's Council to consider the Lytton Report which 
explained that a violation had occurred. By this time however, the 
occupation was complete and no sanction was imposed on the 
aggressor. The United Nations has never even attempted to find a 
prearranged definition and leaves interpretation on a case by case 
basis to the Security Council.
The problem is not easily solved as the following example 
demonstrate.
* When the United States attributed a string of terrorist attacks 
to Libya in 1986 and consequently mounted a bombing operation 
against Tripoli, a maximalist conception of collective security would 
have dictated an international response against the United States. The 
problem is that the multilateral operation should have been against 
Libya if a terrorist attack was considered an act of aggression or, 
viceversa, against the United States if its retaliation was considered 
unjustified.
* In the occasion of the 6 Days W ar between Israel and its Arab 
neighbours in 1967, Tel Aviv pleaded that its offensive was just 
preem pting an imminent enemy attack. Was Israel to be punished 
because its troops crossed the border first or was it to be supported by 
the whole international community against a major threat to its very 
existence?
* Similarly, in 1981 the Israeli Air Force trespassed into Iraqi air 
space and bombed the nuclear facility at Osiraq. Although this was an 
unequivocal unilateral use of force against another sovereign country, 
also in this case Israel argued that it was acting in self defence to avoid 
the risk of being confronted by an hostile Iraqi offensive nuclear 
capability.
* In 1992, the United Nations imposed sanctions on Serbia 
because of its support for the Bosnian Serb militia fighting for 
independence from the Bosnian government in Sarajevo. Yet, in this 
case aggression was defined very broadly as no regular Serb troops 
from the Yugoslav National Army crossed the internationally 
recognized border with Bosnia.
* On the contrary, the Tanzanian invasion of Uganda at the end 
of the 1970's to depose the ruthless dictator Idi Amin involved a full 
scale military operation of a member state of the United Nations 
against a fellow member but was not considered an aggression given 
the hum anitarian objectives of the operation.
From these examples it is clear that a purely legalistic 
definition of aggression -that is who fires the first shot- is not 
universally accepted by the international community. In Lipson's 
opinion: "there are serious practical difficulties in specifying 
aggression or other significant violations that call for collective 
action".2 If an objective definition is impossible and it is necessary to 
inquire on the subjective aims of the use of force, disagreements will 
arise as each state will uphold its own interpretation of events. 
According to Organski: "friends of the aggressor agree; friends of the 
victim protest".3 An automatic type of reaction is therefore impossible 
because states must first, if at all, agree on the aggressor's identity 
before they can mount an operation against it.
A related problem is that of the proportionality of the sanction. 
States may agree on the identity of the aggressor but m ight still 
disagree on the appropriate reaction. In particular, the question is 
whether the response should be commensurate with the violation or 
whether it should punish the aggressor irrespective of the damage it 
has provoked. Should the multilateral troops stop at the disputed 
border or should they go on to destroy the aggressor completely?
- 75-
For example, in the Korean episode there w as a fierce debate 
between those w ho wanted only a restoration of the status quo ante 
and those who w anted to punish North Korea and reunite the country. 
Similarly, during the Gulf W ar many wished that the international 
coalition advanced to Baghdad to depose Saddam Hussein. While in 
the first instance a disproportionate reaction was granted, in the 
second case the operation did not go further than liberating K uw ait
The problem concerns means as well as objectives. If the 
deterrent pow er of the international community is not sufficient and 
positive action is required, a question arises on w hat instruments 
should be used and how they are going to be selected. In particular, a 
crucial threshold lies between forcible and non-forcible means like a 
diplomatic embargo or an economic blockade. If the former are 
chosen, another threshold arises between counterforce means, like a 
ground offensive, and countervalue strategies aimed at destroying the 
aggressor's capacity to resist, like indiscriminate bombing or even 
nuclear retaliation. Given the complex and intricate nature of many 
situations, the answer to these question is not a foregone conclusion.
Secondly, collective security requires a certain distribution of 
power. In general terms, power m ust be diffused throughout the 
international system so that each state is vulnerable to collective 
sanctions. If pow er is excessively concentrated in few hands, the 
international community w ould not be able to reverse the aggression 
of the stronger powers. Some states w ould simply be too powerful 
and an international operation against them too costly.4
In this view, the ideal situation for collective security w ould be 
a multipolar system in which no state is stronger than a coalition of 
the others. For example, in the XIX Century, a coalition of states was 
able to contain the strongest power in at least three instances: against 
Napoleonic France first, Czarist Russia secondly and lastly against 
Wilhemine Germany in the First World War.
The worse situation is that of a bipolar system -like that of the 
Cold War- in which each superpower commands such a proportion of 
global resources so as not to fear a collective sanction. When the 
Soviet Union intervened in  Hungary in 1956 or w hen the United States 
troops entered the Dominican Republic in 1965, it would have been 
physically impossible to stop them short of a nuclear war. At most,
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each superpower should worry about the other superpower, as would 
be the case even without collective security.
Furthermore, in a bipolar system the structural constraints of 
competition are stiffen Since only two states belong to the class of 
superpowers, neither can hope to offset any change in the distribution 
of power to the other's advantage with a balancing coalition of third 
states. Only direct responses would do. In other words, each must 
counter every move of the other if it does not w ant to lose the bipolar 
struggle. The whole world becomes an arena ripe for competition.
This means that states cannot be indifferent to the adversary's 
gains even if they take place in a remote region. International 
relations become therefore a zero-sum game in  which one's gain is the 
other side's loss. Collective security is thus inhibited not only by the 
w ish to save resources for the bipolar struggle, but also by the fear 
that the other will use the multilateral interventions to its own 
advantage for penetrating regions otherwise inaccessible.5
It should therefore not be a surprise that when Moscow offered 
to the United Nations a Soviet airborne division for "peacekeeping" 
during the Yom Kippur W ar between Israel and its Arab neighbours 
in 1973, W ashington reacted to the prospect of Soviet troops in the 
Middle East -albeit under a UN banner- w ith a grade HI nuclear alert 
States in a bipolar system are therefore more constrained than their 
counterparts in a multipolar setting to enter into a cooperative 
security system.
A special case is represented by unipolar -or hegemonic- 
systems. If one state was predominant, the others w ould not organize 
an effective coalition against i t  However, collective security could 
work in all the other situations. Although the hegemon w ould be 
immune to collective security it could actually favour its operation 
under the other circumstances as all other states would be vulnerable 
to the international community if it could count on the hegemon's 
support A situation of this kind resembles the Pax Britannica imposed 
by the British Empire in extra-European issues at the zenith of 
London's power in the middle of the XIX Century.
In other words, if the predom inant state did not hold 
expansionist designs, collective security could effectively work in a 
unidirectional way under the tutelage of a benign hegemon. If on the
contrary the hegemon committed an act of aggression, the 
international community w ould be helpless and could do no more 
that to bow to the will of the strongest In this case, no security system 
at all could do anything about i t
There is not therefore a linear and monotonic relation between 
polarity and collective security. Its chances are best w hen there is 
either only one or m any powers in  the international system. Its 
success is least probable when there are only two powers in the 
international system. Since the polarity of a system may change over 
time w ith the emergence of new powers and the disappearance of old 
ones, it follows that also the prospects for a m ultilateral system will 
accordingly change.6
Thirdly, even if power is diffused, global tension m ust be low. 
Collective security is like the export of security from a stable region 
to one in which aggression has taken place. However, states m ust 
enjoy a surplus of security if they are to export it and to invest it in 
areas where they have no direct in terest If global international 
relations are unstable and there are high expectations of an 
international conflict, states w ould probably prefer to m aintain their 
stock of resources for the w orst contingencies rather than to afford the 
luxury of defending remote victims of a distant attack.
This is precisely w hat happened in the 1930's, as will be seen in 
chapter 7, when Britain and France were so preoccupied w ith the 
prospect of a German threat after Hitler's rise to power that they felt 
they could not afford to waste resources in the containment of 
Japanese aggression in the Far East and of Italian aggression in East 
Africa. As the Admiralty kept repeating like a mantra, the Royal Navy 
just did not have sufficient power to restrain one of the two regional 
aggressors while keeping Germany at bay in Europe.
Fourthly, weapons of mass destruction m ust not have 
proliferated. If an aggressor possesses nuclear weapons, it will 
probably be immune from a collective reaction motivated by less than 
vital interests. It is difficult to expect that a state subjects its own 
troops in the field or even its cities to the threat of nuclear retaliation 
in order to fulfill its treaty obligations under a collective security 
system. If nuclear weapons are widespread, too many states will be
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immune from collective security for the system to work effectively. 
According to Inis Claude:
"The threat of thermonuclear w ar poses new problems 
which make collective security irrelevant [...] Who can imagine 
that a contemporary superpower, brandishing its fiendishly 
powerful m odem  weapons, could be deterred from aggression 
by the threat of the United Nations to improvise a collective 
military venture?".7
Objective factors are insufficient to explain the relative 
incidence of a collective system in different systemic configurations.8 
Not only m ust states be able to follow the precepts of multilateralism, 
but they m ust also be willing to do so. In particular, only if states 
believe that the system is legitimate will they w ant to establish a 
mechanism to maintain its stability. If one or more states have 
heterogeneous and revolutionary designs over the international 
system -because it holds low stakes in the status quo and is willing to 
run risks for a revision of the international order- this will inhibit 
collective security. In other words, most states m ust be sufficiently 
motivated to defend the status quo. Moderate revisionism could be 
tolerated bu t the foundations of the system should not be doubted. In 
Kissinger's words, states m ust seek "adjustments w ithin the existing 
international order rather than in its overthrow".9
It is essential that states perceive that such a change will entail 
direct risks or losses for themselves. Not being a revisionist power is 
not enough. An isolationist power which does not hold expansionist 
aims bu t is indifferent to the fate of the system as a whole -like 
America in the two decades after the Treaty of Versailles- is not an 
asset for collective security. In short, states m ust see positive 
incentives for avoiding a war.
Even those states which do maintain revisionist objectives m ust 
not be excessively virulent. The international community m ust in fact 
be in a position to deter them. If a state is so opposed to the 
international order and feels it has so little to lose that a w ar is its 
preferred outcome, collective security will not operate as it should. 
States should join the system in good faith if the necessary reciprocal 
trust is to develop. N ot only in fact no Hitler would enter sincerely 
into any kind of security system, but also other states would not
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choose multilateral systems if they believe they are confronted by a 
Hitler.10
If a virulently revisionist state is present in  the international 
system, no accommodation is possible and collective security would 
in this case rather resemble a perm anent alliance to contain the 
specific th rea t In short, the system m ust exhibit a minimum of 
political solidarity. Most states should hold compatible views of the 
existing order and m ust identify positively w ith each other's security. 
Also revisionist states m ust be willing to suspend their claims in 
order to avoid the need for specific countermeasures inhibiting the 
operation of a generalized system.
For similar reasons, collective security cannot tolerate 
perm anent rivalries. There could otherwise not be any expectation of 
reciprocity. If during the Cold W ar South Korea had attacked North 
Korea, the United States w ould hardly have coalesced w ith the 
Communist bloc against the aggressor in the expectation that the 
Soviet Union w ould have attacked North Korea in case of an 
aggression against South Korea. In the pre-1914 system, collective 
security w ould have been impossible because of the Franco-German 
dispute over Alsace-Lorraine. France would never have helped 
Germany against Russia in  case of an attack of the latter on the former 
while France could not expect German support in case of an 
aggression perpetuated by Berlin's only ally Austria-Hungary.
The conditionality of collective security questions the validity 
of the maximalist conception at its foundations. The very fact that 
collective security needs certain conditions excludes the possibility 
that it will always work. A conditional maximalist system is a 
contradiction in terms. If either the willingness or the ability to 
defend the m ultilateral principles is lacking, collective security 
collapses because both are necessary preconditions. However, neither 
is sufficient The limit of maximalism lies in the impossibility to 
guarantee that collective security will w ork in each and every 
circumstance. In turn, the impossibility of certainty stems from the 
lack of a central government capable of forcing states to implement 
the universal system. If compliance is voluntary or corroborated only 
by moral sanctions, the legal obligations can always be evaded.
The conditions for collective security are further complicated by 
the fact that in general willingness and ability are inversely related. 
Both factors are structurally influenced by similar variables but are 
affected by them in opposite ways. In general, the ability of states to 
join a multilateral framework necessitates a reasonably low level of 
international tension so that resources for individual security can 
safely be diverted to collective security. On the contrary, the 
willingness of states to fight for the international order is a function of 
the vulnerability of that order. In a stable system the incentives to be 
involved in remote areas and the need to invest in security systems 
are accordingly reduced.
In other words, if tension is too high -as in the late 1930's or 
during the Cold War- states will not afford collective security while if 
tension is too low they will not desire i t  In the immediate aftermath 
of the First World War, w ith Germany in defeat and Bolshevik Russia 
bent on its civil war, the international system displayed so few 
immediate dangers that the major powers wished to cash in their 
peace dividends rather than to involve themselves in any minor 
quarrel. Only in the area between these two extremes can a security 
system be expected to function effectively.
Ultimately, in the absence of a world government capable of 
forcing states to comply, there can be no guarantee that they will 
always willingly do so. In at least some instances, states will not 
afford a multilateral system. If collective security needs the presence 
of certain conditions in order to function effectively, the maximalist 
claim to replace all others security systems will be unrealistic. 
Furthermore, if applied in less than ideal circumstances, collective 
security could -as will later be seen- even be counterproductive.
Finally, the conditionality challenges the claim that maximalist 
collective security can function as an autonomous security system. For 
any given state, international politics does not display an 
homogeneous level of danger. The world is divided between actual 
and potential allies and actual and potential adversaries. The required 
willingness and ability for a multilateral system is more easily 
attainable for w hat concerns relations with the first and it is more 
difficult for the latter. Unfortunately, it is precisely in these kinds of 
situations that collective security would be more useful.
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Figure 1. Requirements for a collective security system
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A s instability rises, so does the willingness to establish a security 
system, but the ability to do so diminishes because states m ust take 
care of their own unilateral security. Conversely, in a stable system, 
states can invest in multilateral security but they will not have the 
incentive to do so became they w ill already feel secure. Collective 
security will thus be possible only in certain situations, when states 
will have both the willingness and the abilmity to implement it.
m
x
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ii. The Chimera of Maximalism
It is indisputable that if maximalist collective security worked, 
it would provide a more stable and peaceful world which most states 
would find more congenial. In such a situation states would either 
autonomously refrain from using force or would readily be forced to 
abandon it by the immediate and overwhelming reaction of the whole 
international community. There would be fewer wars and those few 
ones would terminate quickly and decisively. Those analysts which 
seek to demonstrate the abstract superiority -in terms of stability for 
individual states as well as for the international system as a whole- of 
collective security over other security systems therefore lim it 
themselves to expressing a tautology.11 As George Kennan has wisely 
pointed out, the desirability of collective security is beyond dispute, 
what is at stake is its feasibility.12
In particular, collective security has been officially part of the 
international system since 1919 and not only multilateral sanctions 
have never been m ade m andatory on states but also the collective use 
of force has been authorized only three times in the almost 100 wars 
which have taken place since. The point is that, w ithout a world 
government capable of enforcing compliance, states will not 
necessarily follow their legal obligations. The moral pressure of 
collective security is in fact insufficient to change a government's 
m ind once it has decided that the issue in question is not worth the 
bones of a grenadier.
The problem lies in the principle of the indivisibility of peace 
to which the maximalist conception appeals. If peace is truly 
indivisible, why have states not applied collective security so far? If 
conversely peace is mostly divisible, why should states do so?13 It is 
unclear in this sense w hether the indivisibility of peace is a normative 
or a descriptive concept W hat is clear is that it has not been a 
sufficient rationale for the radical alteration of states' motivations.
Some scholars have pointed out that it is not collective security 
that has failed in the last seven and a half decades but the policies of 
states.14 For example, Charles Kupchan has argued that "the League 
and the UN might have failed to preserve peace, but the historical 
record suggests that military, economic and political conditions at the
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national level, not collective security itself, were the root of the 
problem. [...] The core of the problem was the unwillingness of the 
major powers to act decisively, not the existence of the League 
itself'.15 Commenting on the collapse of the League, Arnold Toynbee 
has remarked that "the reason why the League failed was that the 
enforcement of the Covenant had been backed by insufficient armed 
power and insufficient resolution to use such power as was 
available".16
Yet, this is precisely the problem. As Professor Hinsley has 
perceptively pointed out: "The League, as it was constructed, was 
bound to fail; and it was bound to be constructed as it was 
constructed".17 The question is therefore not w hat kind of collective 
security works but why have states have chosen a type of collective 
security which has not worked. The structural deficiencies of the 
League of Nations and of the United Nations are not so much 
important in themselves but "as indicators of how far the member 
states are willing to go in their support of collective security".18
Simply put, the problem is that collective security is an 
institution created by states and these -unless compelled- are not 
prepared to give up the necessary am ount of sovereignty for a 
maximalist system to work.19 It is unrealistic to expect states to 
willingly renounce one of their defining prerogatives. It is therefore 
not an accident that states resist the automaticity implied by 
maximalist collective security, they simply do not w ant i t 20 
Morgenthau puts it succinctly: "collective security expects the policies 
of states to be inspired by the ideal of m utual assistance and a spirit of 
self sacrifice which will not shrink even from the supreme sacrifice of 
war should it be required by that ideal"; this would constitute "a 
moral revolution infinitely more fundam ental than any moral change 
that has accrued in the history of W estern civilization".21
This may not be only -or necessarily even mainly- because 
states have sinister objectives. More often, states will feel that in a 
world in which no central authority can guarantee their safety, it is 
unwise to renounce that freedom of action which is sometimes their 
only instrument of defence. While institutions in general -as we have 
seen in chapter 2- only require that security dilemmas and 
competition are moderated sometimes, a maximalist conception
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requires them to be attenuated always. At the very least, states will 
not renounce discretion irrevocably and unconditionally because in 
the absence of "institutions or authorities that can make and enforce 
international laws, the policies of cooperation that will bring m utual 
rewards if others cooperate may bring disaster if they do not".22 The 
chimerical nature of the maximalist ideal largely stems from the 
impossibility, on the part of states, to evade the structural lack of 
certainty under anarchy.
Furthermore, there are reasons for which states are willing to 
fight and violate international norms even at the risk of collective 
sanctions. Virulently revisionist states are not uncommon in the 
international system. Most analysts explain the failure of collective 
security w ith the presence of states of this type like Germany before 
1945 and the Soviet Union after the Second World War. Yet, it is 
precisely against this type of states that the effectiveness of a security 
system m ust be weighed. It is curious that many proponents of 
collective security assume states to be willing to fight -at any time and 
at any place- for the sake of peace but discount the possibility that 
states will use force for reasons closer to their own national interests.
On the contrary, there is often a motivational gap between the 
aggressor -fighting for w hat it holds as a vital interest- and the 
enforcers of the collective will, who by definition do not have 
unilateral interests in play. The concentrated benefits of aggressors are 
likely to prevail over the diffused benefits of collective security. This 
creates a problem of credibility for the special kind of deterrence 
implicit in the concept It is not in  fact a matter of capability, since the 
international community usually commands enough power to 
overwhelm most potential aggressors, but of the will to use them; The 
threat of a collective reaction may be sufficient to restrain many states 
with moderately revisionist objectives but its credibility may not be 
enough for states resolved to risk everything -even their eventual 
destruction- to reach their goals.23
Some revisionist states, like Hitler's Germany or Saddam 
Hussein's Iraq have not surrendered to the will of the international 
community even after devastating bombing campaigns. The threat of 
collective economic or military sanctions was therefore insufficient to 
divert them from their aggressive intentions. Only the actual
- 8 5 -
imposition of superior force was able to achieve th a t Short of that, 
sanctions m ay even favour the aggressor because they generate a 
"rally around the flag" effect which can be exploited to mobilize 
nationalist sentiment in favour of the aggressive government's 
domestic standing.
Other times, states will not respect their pledge to renounce 
force not because of expansionist objectives but because they feel that 
they have no choice. For example, Britain and France during the Suez 
crisis of 1956 countervened their obligations under the UN Charter 
because they felt that E gypf s nationalization of the Suez Canal was 
simply unacceptable. Similarly, Israel in 1967 entertained an offensive 
against its neighbours because it sought to preem pt w hat it believed 
was an imminent attack.
Secondly, even if many states are prepared to abandon their 
prerogative to use force aggressively if they so choose, they will not 
renounce their ability to abstain from a multilateral operation they do 
not believe essential. This is because they will not w ant to be forced to 
invest their scarce diplomatic and military capital in actions which 
have no direct relevance to their own security. Furthermore, if they 
intend to free ride, "who, among the informal policemen, will punish 
their partners if some fail to participate in  joint action?".24
Under anarchy, there cannot be in fact any certainty that they 
will not need their resources for more urgent matters. Unlike in 
domestic society, where individuals can freely and confidently invest 
their energies and capital, in international relations states have to 
think about their survival, which is a prerequisite for any further goal. 
The stakes are simply too high for states to take chances and afford to 
renounce their discretion over the use of their means of defence in 
exchange for an uncertain and vague reciprocity.25 As the British 
Foreign Secretary in the run  up to the Second W orld War, Viscount 
Halifax, remarked, collective security involves "dangerously 
indefinite commitments quite disproportionate to the real security 
that these commitments [give]".26
The paradox is that while states need concrete proof that it will 
work before entrusting their security to it, collective security needs 
faith on the part of states in order to work.27 A vicious circle ensues in 
which collective security does not w ork because states do not have
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confidence in it while states will not trust it unless and until it works. 
It is enough for states to fail sometimes to induce states to retain an 
ability to act independently in case multilateralism does not work. In 
turn, this causes collective security to fail even when it could have 
worked in the absence of structural impediments, because states do 
not trust i t
States in an uncertain and insecure world will not in fact 
renounce to safer and tested instruments of defence, like alliances, in 
exchange for less secure multilateral mechanisms. George Marshall, 
who was serving as US Secretary of Defense during the only instance 
in which the UN applied the concept during the Cold War, was quite 
skeptical of collective security which he sarcastically considered "a 
generalized notion of all nations bonding together in undertaking a 
vague obligation to hypothetical events brought about by some 
unidentified state".28 Another former Secretary of State, Henry 
Kissinger, argues that while
"the purpose of an alliance is to produce an obligation more 
predictable and precise than an analysis of national interests; 
collective security works in the exact opposite way. It leaves the 
application of its principles to the interpretation of particular 
circumstances w hen they arise, unintentionally putting a large 
premium on the mood of the moment and, hence, on national self 
w il l" 29
Even democracies, in which collective security is most popular, 
w ill be reluctant to implement the automatic mechanisms of the 
maximalist conception. Democracies like collective security because it 
is an international analogy of their domestic techniques of conflict 
resolution and because it lends a strong footing for a moral and 
legitimate foreign policy crucial for maintaining public support 
Democratic powers have therefore been in the forefront of the 
creation both of the League and of the UN. Furthermore, every time 
an international crisis arises, democratic public opinions have always 
called on the w orld organization to deal w ith it in a multilateral 
fashion.
However, there is a discrepancy between the desirability of 
maximalist collective security and the practical consequences it
-87 -
entails. The desire for peace involves in fact the willingness to fight 
wars wherever and whenever they occur. According to Claude: 
"collective security is fundamentally an attem pt to mobilize the 
w orld 's anti-war forces for the prevention of w ar by the threat to 
make war".30 Not only this contradicts their stated peaceful intentions 
but it also erodes the very foundations of democracies. Automatic 
sanction would deprive parliaments and other elected institutions of 
the right to decide on the most crucial issue of the involvement of 
national troops in  foreign wars. International obligations of this sort 
w ould override the very principle of popular sovereignty on which 
democracies res t
In short, until anarchy persists, maximalist collective security is 
unrealistic because it fails on its own stated goal to guarantee security 
to all and at all tinies. Such a conception is in fact plagued by the 
syndrome which affects all mechanisms based on voluntaristic 
premises, that is the attempt to remove an undesirable effect w ithout 
dealing w ith its causes. In changing state's legal obligations and m oral 
duties without changing either the states or their environment, a 
maximalist system cannot guarantee that a universal reaction will 
always take place because it cannot influence the determinants of 
states' behaviour under anarchy.
Furthermore, also like other voluntaristic solutions to complex 
social problems, the maximalist idea risks to become 
counterproductive. In an international system in which there are a 
multiplicity of actors, processes and events which interact w ith  each 
other in a non-linear and counterintuitive way, to change only one 
factor may have undesired consequences on all others. A symmetrical 
geometric figure may be symmetrical despite -or because- its 
components are asymmetrical and it may lose its symmetry if one 
component is changed. Also in international relations, good 
intentions may not necessarily lead to a desirable outcome.
As Friedrich Von Hayek has warned, interference w ith a 
complex social system generally tackles only one aspect of a process 
and thus, "even though it aims at reaching some particular and 
predictable result, it is unknown what it will end up inhibiting. [...] 
We will never be completely aware of all the costs that the pursuit of a 
particular result implies w hen it is sought by such interference".31
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Hayek was criticizing command economies which only superficially 
seem to be allocating resources more rationally, but in reality they 
bring inefficiencies because they underm ine individuals' natural 
incentives to work for p ro fit Similarly, tinkering with the incentives 
of states in the security realm may in fact have disastrous 
consequences by inducing them to refrain from action w hen they 
should intervene and to intervene w hen they should n o t
iii. The Dangers of Automaticity
A recent collection of essays proclaims that "collective security 
at its w orst is roughly equivalent to balancing under anarchy at its 
best".32 The idea is that although collective security cannot always 
work, it w ill improve international relations a t least in some instances 
while w hen it will not be able to w ork it will give way to 
spontaneous balancing. Since it is better to improve traditional 
mechanism sometimes rather than never, the reasoning goes that it is 
always w orth it to switch to a collective security system. A t best, it 
will provide a more stable world. A t worst, it w ill not w ork and states 
will have the same chance to contain aggression than before.
However, arguments of this kind are simplistic because they 
overlook the systemic consequences of institutions which can have 
unintended effects. Not only they can fail to make any difference, but 
they could also do more harm than good. Structural failure can in fact 
arise not only despite multilateral institutions but precisely because of 
them.33 Collective security is no exception and can have 
counterproductive consequences in at least five counts if applied in 
less than ideal circumstances. In this way, the conditionality of 
collective security implies not only the danger that it will not work, 
but also the danger that it w ill work when it should n o t In 
Morgenthau's words: "the supreme paradox of collective security is 
that any attempt to make it work w ith less than ideal perfection w ill 
have the opposite effect from w hat it is supposed to achieve".34
Firstly, the introduction of voluntaristic elements in a complex 
social arena can have unforeseen byproducts.35 The formal banning of 
inter-state w ar may not in fact have reduced violence at all but may 
have fostered the tendency to wage undeclared and covert wars 
instead.36 Collective security may even favour aggression by
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forbidding preventive wars or discouraging alliances which m ay be 
useful to deter a potential aggressor. The latter can therefore enjoy a 
sanctuary until it will feel ready to begin offensive operations.37
Once a w ar had actually started, collective security could 
prolong a war rather than putting an end to it. If the multilateral 
intervention fell short of the crushing of the aggressor, the 
international community could not negotiate w ith the attacker in fear 
of appearing to be rewarding aggression. Unless it could gather 
overwhelming strength, collective security therefore eliminates 
compromise solutions and forces states to pursue an unconditional 
surrender and other rigid diplomatic stances.
In general terms, collective security raises the stakes of any 
dispute increasing the difficulties for any negotiated endeavour. 
Collective security turns any issue into a matter of principle. For the 
states directly involved, the question can become one of loss of face. In 
a polarized environment like that of the Cold War, any problem can 
become an occasion for an ideological contest, as can be seen for 
example from the endless battles in the United Nations over the future 
of the Middle East in the 1970's and 1980's.
Issues are emptied of their concrete value and become symbolic 
struggles in which the very future of international society is at stake. 
For the system as a whole, maximalist collective security turns any 
violation into an example to deter future aggressions. It is sufficient 
that the multilateral response fails once for the whole edifice to be pu t 
in d o u b t In this way, the international community cannot allow itself 
to compromise because it would otherwise erode its own credibility 
and encourage other states on an expansionist course. This can 
exacerbate, rather than moderate tensions as any minor instance 
becomes a test for the whole system.
Secondly, an automatic system of collective security could 
waste precious resources by forcing states to intervene in each and 
every case of aggression. States could thus deplete their military 
potential in fighting lesser threats while their attention could be 
required to contain a major danger instead. Collective security 
requires a symmetrical response -one aggression, one reaction- 
irrespective of particular circumstances. However, not all aggressions 
are equally destabilizing for the system as a whole. In the presence of
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multiple threats, states should concentrate on the most dangerous one 
because they do not command unlimited resources. On the contrary, a 
maximalist conception w ould impose to state to intervene to their 
exhaustion.
One of the main fears in W ashington at the time of the Korean 
War was that the Communist attack was designed to tie down US 
resources -committed to the peninsula in  the defence of a principle 
rather than of its intrinsic strategic value- to prepare for an aggression 
elsewhere. Similarly, at the time of the Japanese invasion of China in 
the late 1930's Britain felt that it w ould overstretch its resources if it 
opposed the aggression while it desperately needed all of its forces in 
Europe.
The erosion does not just involve material resources. Especially, 
but not only, for democracies also the political will for foreign 
operations is not unlimited. An excessively sensitive trigger would 
force states to intervene beyond the desires of domestic opinion, 
overstretching willingness to be involved in  foreign affairs. This 
problem is compounded by the fact that collective security requires 
states to fight even in remote areas w ith no interests involved. The 
ensuing disillusion could provoke an isolationist backlash inhibiting 
states from intervening also when it would really be necessary.
For example, the very limited losses sustained the United States 
in Operation Restore Hope in Somalia in 1992-1994 were sufficient to 
provoke a complete change of mood in American public opinion. 
After the humiliation of US forces in the streets of Mogadishu, 
Washington has been reluctant to be involved in any further United 
Nation operation and has introduced guidelines which make 
American unconditional participation in future UN operations 
virtually impossible.38
Collective security could also force states to fight against a 
potential ally in the containment of a greater th rea t39 If no excuses are 
allowed, states may find themselves fighting w ith each other instead 
of against an imminent danger if one of them is found guilty of 
aggression. "If several states refuse to shoulder the burdens required 
by sanctions against aggression, collective security paralyzes 
defensive alliances w ithout substituting them w ith a universal 
alliance".40 Such a situation arose in 1939 when, after Hitler's attack on
-91 -
Poland, the League of Nations was forced to expel the Soviet Union 
from the organization because of its attack on Finland. Following the 
precepts of collective security, Britain and France could have ended up 
fighting the Soviet Union instead of establishing an anti-Nazi 
coalition. As will be seen below, the Abyssinian episode is another 
prototypical example of this danger.
Finally, collective security can lead to the escalation of a minor 
crisis into a world war provoking precisely that event which it was 
created to preven t41 If each aggression involves the whole 
international community, in  a divided and polarized environm ent 
any minor conflict could -like in a universal domino- escalate into 
world war. If during the Cold War the superpowers had abided 
literally to collective security, there probably would have been a 
nuclear war. Every time that one moved its troops around -as in 
Afghanistan or Grenada- the other would have been forced to 
retaliate. Instead of an indivisible peace, there w ould have been in this 
case an indivisible war.
In the words of Hans Morgenthau:
"Wars between any two nations anywhere in the world is 
tantam ount to war among all or at best most nations in the 
world. [...] By the very logic of its assumptions, the diplomacy 
of collective security must aim at transforming all local 
conflicts into world conflicts. If this cannot be one world of 
peace, it cannot help being one world of w ar."42
If, as FDR maintained, wars are indeed like epidemics, 
sometimes they should be isolated to limit the contagion rather than 
globalized.
Collective security could also induce states not to intervene 
when they should. It can in fact bring about a process of adverse 
substitution.43 States could feel confident that the international 
community or an international organization will deal with a certain 
issue and could thus withhold their individual efforts. Collective 
security would become an alibi for inaction as well as a scapegoat for 
failure.44 According to Hedley Bull: "the attem pt to apply [...] the 
solidarist formula has had the consequence not merely that the 
attem pt to construct a superior world order is unsuccessful, but also
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that classical devices for the maintenance of order are weakened or 
underm ined".45
Why should states defend others w ith substantial expense of 
resources if collective security does just that? The existence of 
international organization could reduce the incentives for 
involvem ent For example, the UN activism after the Gulf War may 
have partially contributed to the major states' unwillingness to 
become involved in regional disputes. The public pressure to "do 
something" was in this way conveniently and cheaply appeased with 
a simple act of nominal or token support for the multilateral 
initiative.
However, if most states follow the same reasoning, 
international organizations would not be able to implement any of its 
precepts w ith no state actually supporting i t  N ot only this would 
render collective security impossible but it would also weaken 
spontaneous mechanisms. Even states which have some interest in the 
solution of the crisis m ight refrain from action if they see that the 
international community is already dealing w ith the problem. 
Incentives to involvement in a remote crisis are already small enough 
even w ithout the prospect of adverse substitution.
Since the allocation of responsibility is such a delicate matter in 
the international system, after the failure of the collective system, 
states would be left worse off than if the multilateral principles had 
never been applied. It may in fact be too late or too difficult to prepare 
an alternative -more unilateral- solution, also because states have to 
recover from the disillusion brought about by the failure. It would 
indeed be better if states knew clearly in  advance that they do not 
have no one to turn to for the solution of the crisis.46
States may also fall into the trap of m oral hazard.47 Collective 
security can be thought of as an insurance against aggression which 
may induce states to incur in irresponsible behaviour confident that 
they will be bailed out by their insurance48 States may actually 
facilitate and invite aggression by underpreparing in the hope that a 
collective reaction would support them even if they do not pay the 
costs for their own defence. Czechoslovakia in 1938 had the military 
capability to resist Nazi Germany. However, Prague preferred to rely
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on Anglo-French support and this allowed Hitler to conquer the 
Sudetenland bloodlessly.
By increasing the number of actors responsible for security, 
collective security may transform the private good of defence into a 
public good, thereby increasing the chances of its underproduction. 
Paradoxically, it is precisely when it is most credible that states will 
rely upon it and incur in the moral hazard of underm ining deterrence.
It is also worth to point out that sometimes the very logic of 
collective security imposes moral hazard even on states which w ould 
be willing to defend themselves. For example, the embargoes 
imposed on all combatants in the Bosnian W ar begun in 1992 forced 
the government in Sarajevo to rely on international support even 
against its wishes. Similarly, during the Abyssinian crisis Ethiopia 
was constrained in its defence preparation against the forthcoming 
Italian aggression by the fear of providing Rome with an excuse to 
appear as the aggrieved party.
Not only collective security will not operate under all 
circumstances, but it may even be dangerous if applied in the wrong 
instances. This means that collective security -contrary to the tenets of 
the maximalist conception- cannot replace traditional security 
mechanisms and bring about a new type of international order. The 
dream  of altering state behaviour by treaty w ithout changing either 
the internal composition of states nor their environment is destined to 
remain a chimera.
Maximalist collective security is plagued by the syndrome of 
those institutions which are too ambitious. By trying to do too much, 
it w ill risk to fail in those situations which it is not suited to tackle. In 
turn, this risks to underm ine confidence in the system as a whole and 
to erode support even in the type of multilateralism which could be 
effective. The utility of institutions is conditional by its very nature. In 
the case of collective security, given the sensitivity of the issue and its 
universal scope, it is especially so. Failure to recognize this may spell 
disaster for the institution as well as for the states that compose i t
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5. T h e  M e r its  o f  M in im a lism
i. The Utility of Minimalism
Although the conditions which allow collective security to 
work can by no means be guaranteed, they are also not impossible. In 
other words, even if it is certain that collective security cannot operate 
always, it may still w ork sometimes. In certain conditions the 
incentives to cooperate will be insufficient In other circumstances in 
which states are well disposed to collaborate they may very well 
suffice. Even if anarchy prevents general and irreversible forms of 
cooperation because there is no guarantee that conditions will not 
switch back to a harsher system, more partial, conditional and specific 
forms can be afforded and attained.
There is no reason why^heUlcf states who find themselves with 
a surplus of security should not be willing to invest it in a security 
system which may bring them some protection in the longer term. 
Diffuse reciprocity may sometimes be preferred to specific reciprocity. 
Similarly, there is no reason why states who have to confront a threat 
anyway should not be willing to face it w ithin a multilateral 
framework if this is more effective. The impossibility of a maximalist 
system is therefore not the whole story. If the mechanism cannot be 
100% effective, this does not necessarily meansr that its utility is OX.1
The problem with the radical critiques of collective security is 
that they test only an idealistic and maximalist conception of i t  Since 
this is unrealistic, they assume that the whole concept is flawed and 
unworkable. If states cannot trust collective security always, they 
should then revert -by default- necessarily and exclusively to the 
spontaneous mechanism of the balance of power. The radical critics 
discount the possibility that the system may be useful on a conditional 
basis.
Part of this idea stems from the fact that, since the prerequisite] $  
for collective security are so demanding, it can operate only very 
rarely and w hen it does so it is really an epiphenomenon of oHherj ^  
processes at work. If all the conditions are met -that is if the system's 
polarity, stability and m ilitary technology and if the states' intentions 
are conducive to a multilateral system- then the conditions, by 
themselves, suffice to bring peace and the multilateral system itself is
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redundan t In other words, collective security would be able to w ork 
only when it is unnecessary. For example, Shifter argues that "It may 
be said that, as far as the prevention of w ar was concerned, the 
League's successful functioning depended on conditions which, if they 
had existed, would have made the organization unnecessary".2
This claim is excessively harsh. The position claiming that 
"perfection is the only standard of evaluation" is too extreme.3 It is 
true that collective security cannot w ork w hen it is most needed, that 
is w hen the system is unstable an d /o r there are one or m ore 
virulently revisionist states on the verge of a major expansionist 
enterprise. However, it is also true that even when conditions are 
favourable, cooperation is not a foregone conclusion. It is therefore 
untrue that when it works, collective security is unnecessary. After all, 
if institutions did not have an impact on state behaviour, they also 
could not be counterproductive.
The same structural distortions which turn the good intentions 
of collective security into the perverse outcomes mentioned in the 
previous chapter also account for the difficulty of implementing a 
cooperative system even if preferences converge in that direction. 
Cooperation may in fact not result even if it is in everyone's interest 
If institutions tame free riding and facilitate cooperation, they 
contribute to bring about outcomes otherwise impossible. Although it 
cannot change -at least in the short term- the interests of states, 
collective security may still allow outcomes which, given states' 
preferences, are different than if it was not in place. In this way, it is 
not only cosmetic or epiphenomenal.
There is in fact always a temptation to defect and to let others 
pay for the costs of the collective good. Unlike the security of 
individual states, global security is in fact a public good -that is it is 
non-rival and non-excludable- and runs the risk of being 
underproduced. W ithout institutions, cooperation would be more 
difficult even if in the interest of all the parties because free riding and 
problems of collective action would take their toll. There are thus 
various functions which a minimalist conception of collective security 
can perform. On the one hand, it facilitates cooperation by decreasing 
transaction costs and by reducing the incentives to free ride. On the
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other hand/ collective security could in the long term influence the 
prevailing standards of behaviour in favour of stability.
It is somewhat paradoxical that those same scholars who 
highlight the circumstances in  which cooperation is impossible also 
assume that cooperation is automatic under the opposite 
circumstances. This is an overestimation of the capacity of cooperation 
to emerge spontaneously. On the contrary, it is precisely because 
cooperation is not a foregone conclusion that collective security has a 
role and a positive utility. The conditions outlined in the previous 
chapter are indeed necessary for cooperation to emerge in the 
sensitive security area, but they are not sufficient
A minimalist conception does not seek to change states' 
preferences but merely to facilitate cooperation w hen states are 
already willing to collaborate in the first place. As in last Century's 
Concert, collaboration is strictly on a conditional, selective and 
horizontal basis. There is no hierarchy between the institution and the 
members that compose i t  Counterproductive consequences should 
therefore be avoided because states could w ithdraw  their support 
from the regime if it clashes w ith  their national interests.4
In this way, collective security is marginal if conceptualized as 
an international order because it will fail precisely w hen it would be 
most needed; but it is not m arginal as an international regime because 
it can make a difference for a series of single episodes. A regime is a 
less ambitious institution than maximalist collective security because 
-instead of seeking to alter behaviour in favour of multilateral 
cooperation- it merely facilitates the attainment of cooperative 
expectations when these are already present Instead of a way of 
transforming the international order, collective security should be 
conceptualized as an institution within the existing order. It is 
therefore a complement, rather than a replacement, of traditional state 
policies.
This may not constitute a revolution in international relations, 
but it could still be an incremental and evolutionary improvement in 
the way states conduct international politics. Some restraint is better 
than no restraint at all. A regime may in fact be useful even if it 
worked intermittently and alongside other mechanisms. Rather than 
an unconditional surrender of sovereignty, such a conception implies
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only the more modest but more realistic and less demanding proviso 
that states may wish to cooperate on a case by case basis. Sometimes 
they w ould employ collective measures, other times they would find 
it wiser to retain more traditional practices.
The bottom line is that under anarchy collective security can 
operate only with the prior consent of states which cannot be given 
unconditionally. The effectiveness of institutions is subject to 
circumstances. If the situation is such that consent cannot be given, 
collective security will not operate at all. However, if the situation 
allows for the operation of collective security, then its utility may be 
significant as the outcome may be different than if it had not existed. 
In particular, collective security can be seen as a positive feedback on 
cooperation. If there is no will to cooperate, collective security is 
useless. If the will to cooperate is present, collective security may 
facilitate and amplify i t 5 In a w orld in which cooperation is so 
difficult especially in the realm of security, the functions performed 
even by the minimalist version of multilateralism are precious and 
still w orth pursuing.
ii. Collective Security as a Tool for Cooperation
Collective security offers a series of services to those states who 
w ant to cooperate but -in the absence of a w orld government- cannot 
guarantee each others' compliance. Specifically, it reduces transaction 
costs by setting up useful focal points and prearranged procedures and 
it strengthens the incentives to cooperate by introducing clustering of 
issues, reiteration, reciprocity, reputation and legitimacy 
considerations. These functions together facilitate cooperation by 
taming free riding and decreasing the risks and costs of collaboration 
which so heavily influence behaviour under anarchy.
One of the foremost theorist of transaction costs, the economist 
Olivier Williamson, has compared their role to the one of attrition in 
physics. Simplified models excluding the impact of attrition are 
necessary because they highlight certain fundamental processes. 
However, real physical elements interact in a world in which attrition 
exists. Similarly, social units m ust take into account the limits of 
rationality, the opportunistic nature of counterparts and the difficulty 
of converting resources from one use to another. Institutions and
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agreements ("contracts" in W illiamson's language) -on top of their 
specific merits- are necessary precisely because they allow states to 
forego transaction costs.6
First, collective security explicitly codifies w hat constitutes 
acceptable behaviour. "Collective security facilitates the identification 
of aggressor states".7 It is no longer left to each state's best judgm ent 
whether its actions are legitimate or not bu t this is determined by the 
international community in  explicit treaties. This reduces the risks of 
misunderstandings and misperceptions about the significance of a 
certain action, thereby reducing the risks of cooperation. In Oye's 
words: "explicit codification of norms can limit definitional 
am biguities".8 States cannot justify aggressive actions with defensive 
motivations if this is not explicitly allowed by the collective norms.
Even if states were in  good faith and did not try to exploit the 
normative void for their ow n selfish purposes, the absence of explicit 
rules could produce arguments about the appropriate response. If in 
the Korean and Iraqi instances the international community had to 
decide on a case by case basis whether an illegitimate act had been 
committed before taking action, the reaction would have been 
delayed so as to jeopardize its effectiveness. On the contrary, 
international sanctions could begin within days of the attack only 
because pre-arranged norms, procedures and rules of thumb had been 
established. In other words, collective security increases the amount 
of information available because it gives significance to state's actions 
and it reduces information asymmetries as each state can weigh 
another state's actions against a common normative framework.9
Interpretations become standardized throughout the whole 
system and transaction costs are accordingly reduced. An explicit set 
of rules about the use of force exploits economies of scale and spares 
the pain of negotiating an ad hoc interpretation every time an instance 
arises. For the international community as a whole, this means saving 
time and effort For individual states, it means that the collective 
norms can become a focal point for their expectations. Instead of 
negotiating from scratch all the details of an understanding, states 
would already have a ready set of norms to use as a b lueprin t Focal 
points are especially useful because states do not easily trust each 
other and therefore prefer to rely on a "neutral" set of rules.
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As a by-product, intentions are more transparent because 
certain actions become unequivocal decreasing "the likelihood of 
unintended spirals".10 If aggression is explicitly outlawed, states could 
no longer claim a defensive motive for a preemptive attack. This 
would not necessarily inhibit preem ption as a form of defence, but it 
would be easier to identify behaviour incompatible w ith the 
collective norms. Although, as we have seen, an operational and 
universal definition of aggression is not guaranteed to work, explicit 
rules can act as a prearranged guideline for the determination of a 
breach to the multilateral rules.
Given the limited capability of individuals and groups to 
process information and the consequent tendency to "satisfice", states 
prefer to converge to focal points rather than spending the effort 
required to find the best possible solution every time. "The 
alternative to [...] recalculation is to follow the established rule".11 The 
abandonment of an established arrangem ent implies sunk costs as it is 
much easier to maintain an existing state of affairs rather than to set 
up new one. Since it would be costly to consider the advantages and 
disadvantages of compliance every time it is called into question, 
institutional norms therefore become part of governments' standard 
operating procedures. In a word, institutions become a hab it
Secondly, collective security provides a framework for dealing 
w ith specific events. The institution envisages a meeting place for 
continuous contacts among states which may be conducive to 
mediated and negotiated solutions. The perm anent forum also 
provides prearranged procedures. This means that crises cannot 
simply be ignored because they are automatically brought up by the 
institutional schedules.
Moreover, formal decision making structures may assign roles 
which are more difficultly eluded w ith defection. An example is 
constituted by the restricted membership of the Security Council and 
in particular by its perm anent members, who are invested by 
responsibilities concerning the maintenance of international peace 
and security. Similarly, also the XIX Century Concert of Europe 
envisaged a privileged role for great powers.
The identification of roles may also be informal. Although 
there was no special rule specifying its responsibility, during the
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1930's it was clear that the main burden of enforcing collective 
security rested on Britain's shoulders because it was the only pow er in 
the League of Nations w ith the sufficient military and naval strength. 
After the Cold War, the United States have found themselves in a 
similar position. In the Gulf War, as well as in Somalia, Haiti and 
Bosnia, Washington has been placed in a leading role for the 
m ultilateral effort.
The assignment of roles is crucial because the struggle against 
free riding m ust begin w ith the identification of a culprit for inaction. 
If no special role were assigned, all states would be equally 
responsible and if no one intervened, nobody in particular could also 
be blamed. If on the other hand responsibility is only in few hands, it 
is easier to apply pressure on those states which are attempting to pass 
the buck onto others.
The identification of special roles helps to reduce free riding 
because it decreases the num ber of relevant actors necessary for an 
operation to be carried o u t  Smaller groups are more privileged than 
large ones because they have fewer problems of collective action. 
Even if the international community displays pathologies of 
coordination, a smaller group (K of N) may have the incentives and 
capability to supply the public good regardless of what the other 
states do.12 As shown above, the best situation is that of a hegemony, 
in which the decision of a single state suffices to provide the public 
good.13
This is w hy collective interventions usually take place when 
one state takes upon it shoulders the responsibility of leadership. As 
Lisa Martin has shown, in the more than 100 cases on economic 
sanctions in this Century, w ithout exception it was possible to identify 
a leading sender. It is in fact much more convenient to send a token 
participation once the operation has already been mounted rather 
than to shoulder a substantial share of the costs. In the three case 
studies examined below, it is also clear the leading role performed by 
Great Britain in the Abyssinian Crisis and by the United States in the 
Korean War and the Gulf War.14
A collective security regime can also strengthen the incentives 
to cooperate. Firstly, a multilateral framework allows cross-issue area 
linkages favouring agreem ent15 If the collective security institution
becomes a place for general discussion the increased num ber of actors 
and issues available compared to a w eb of bilateral negotiations 
allows creative agreements based on log rolling. States agree to 
comply in one issue area even if they do not have direct interests 
because they can receive compensations in other issue areas of their 
concern. In Keohane's words: "clustering of issues under a regime 
facilitates side payments among these issues: m ore quids are available 
for the pro".16
For example, during the Gulf War, the United States ensured a 
large support at the United Nations by a mixture of inducements and 
threats in other issue areas. In particular, promises of increased
foreign aid as well as menaces to reduce it were m ade to guarantee the
success of the international coalition. The cited w ork of Lisa Martin
also highlights the importance of side payments. In the case of the 
Falklands' War, the United Kingdom was able to convince its 
European Com munity^ partners to set up economic sanctions against 
Argentina because it made concessions over the EC bu d g e t The 
crucial role of this bargain is demonstrated by the fact that the EC 
sanctions were harsher and were imposed earlier than those of the 
United States and Japan, w ith whom London did not negotiate over 
other issues.17
Secondly, states are less likely to free ride if their future payoffs 
are affected by their present actions. As Robert Axelrod has masterly 
shown, the "shadow of the future" invites states to cooperate because 
today's increased benefits from defection may be offset by tom orrow 's 
j \  retaliation of the other actor||.18 Free riding is accordingly profitable
/ only if its effects on others' future behavior are contained or if states
heavily discount the future. Institutions, by putting each interaction 
into a wider perspective, increase the value of future interactions.
W ithout an institutional setting, states would prefer not to 
comply with their obligations incurring in certain present costs in 
exchange for less certain future benefits. However, the 
institutionalization provided by a collective security system ensures 
that the likelihood of being reciprocated increases. "In this way, 
international regimes help to link the future w ith the present".19 In 
other words, if states do not excessively discount the future, they may 
be prepared to shoulder some immediate burdens if they expect the
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system to be useful in future contingencies which may involve them 
more directly.
Institutions favour strategies of reciprocity which are conducive 
to cooperation.20 States who fear to become victims of aggression in 
the future may prefer to invest resources in a generalized system 
which -in theory- also covers them rather than to protect a remote 
state in  a specific agreement which does not promise future rewards. 
Since collective security is a universal agreement, it augments 
everybody's expectation of reciprocity. During the Korean War, most 
NATO allies contributed troops to the UN effort because they thought 
that if America stopped aggression in Asia, it would also have done so 
in  Europe where their immediate concerns laid.
In this sense, states would participate in a collective security 
operation because they w ould like to be defended themselves if they 
fall under attack. States support the multilateral regime because they 
fear that the multilateral system may not support them w hen they 
need i t  " If a member free rides on others in a conflict, it can be 
threatened w ith exclusion from the collective security umbrella or 
denied special benefits such as a role in determining when and how 
interventions will be conducted and how the final settlement will be 
structured".21 States therefore comply because they do not w ant to 
underm ine the regime in general even if they are not directly 
concerned w ith the particular issue in question.
Naturally, this w ill not be sufficient if states believe that 
compliance w ith  international norms will im peril their survival. 
However, w hen states dispose of resources in excess, they may want 
to invest them in the protection of multilateral norm s which they may 
later invoke in their own national in terest A certain degree of order 
in international relations is in fact desirable for many states which 
fear to become victims of aggression in the future as well as for others 
which need a stable international system to pursue their political or 
economic objectives. In less than radical situations, states may afford 
and seek a less specific and more diffuse kind of reciprocity.22
States may participate in a collective venture because they w ant 
to increase their reputation or because they are afraid to decrease i t  
Specifically, besides being interested in the construction of a 
multilateral system, states may be interested in accumulating an
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amount of political capital which they can then use for other purposes. 
Collective security is important as a source of reputation.
Reputation is not only a cosmetic, chivalrous, romantic and 
useless concept Prestige is sometimes a goal in its own right and 
leadership in a multilateral organization may be seen as a way to 
acquire recognized status in the international community. Classical 
<7 realisj^among others highlighted the importance of reputation in 
I international relations as "the shadow cast by power" which could 
amplify the effects of the stock of physical resources in the hands of a 
state. Power -like beauty- is in fact in the eye of the beholder.
However, more often reputation is a useful instrum ent for 
other goals.23 In a world where no government enforces agreements, 
states will look at each others' reputation before making reciprocal 
commitments. "Since governments w ith good reputation can more 
easily make agreements than governments w ith bad ones, 
international regimes can help to facilitate cooperation by making it 
both easier and more desirable to acquire a good reputation".24 To 
paraphrase Hobbes, w ithout the sword, the w ord counts "all the more 
so since there is no external guarantee that promises will be kept".25
By forcing free-riders to explicitly break their pledges, 
collective security increases the costs of defection. States run  in  fact the 
risk of being considered unreliable, and this will damage their ability 
to enter into advantageous agreements in all sorts of 
areas. Ultimately, they will fear to become pariahs emarginated from 
the family of nations.26 This is the reason w hy states do not like to 
break their word. Henkin has wisely remarked that, although there 
are very significant exceptions, "almost all nations observe almost all 
principles of international law and almost all of their obligations 
almost all of the time".27
States which are undecided about whether to intervene or not in 
a certain crisis may thus be convinced by the need to sustain collective 
security. After all, "ceteris paribus, a state is more likely to join an 
opposing coalition if it has made a commitment to do so than if no 
such commitment existed; states have at least some incentives to fulfill 
international obligations".28 Although the merits of the case in 
question may be insufficient on their own to motivate the 
involvement of troops, the commitment to the multilateral norm s
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m ay induce states to intervene to sustain their reputation w ithin the 
international community and the reputation of the international 
community itself.
In this sense, while alliances rest on previous interests which 
are exogenous to the institution, collective security can develop some 
endogenous interests which were not present when the institution was 
established in the first place. For example, the United States has 
considered intervention in the Bosnian War as unworthy of a direct 
commitment for the first three years after its outbreak in 1992. 
However, the blatant and continuous defiance of multilateral norms 
on the part of the Bosnian Serbs has pushed W ashington into a 
situation in which, despite its tangible interests were not at stake, it 
risked to lose its face. Consequently, in the Summer of 1995 it 
pressurized the United Nations and NATO into executing massive 
retaliatory air strikes despite the fact that it had previously declined 
any active military involvement.
The last effect on cooperation is less tangible but not less 
im portant The concept of collective security introduces the idea of an 
international community capable of articulating its own collective 
interests. This means that any action of any state can be categorized as 
compatible or incompatible with the goals of the international 
community. In a system exclusively based on unilateral and 
decentralized policies, this w ould clearly be impossible.
In other words, collective security implies an operational 
definition of legitimacy, which is expressed by the endorsement of 
states' policies by the international community.29 International 
legitimacy is here defined as a wide (or universal) consensus among 
states on the fundamental elements of the international system so that 
physical coercion for its operation is unnecessary because states take it 
for granted and do not use force to overthrow or challenge the 
existing order. Before the introduction of collective security, a system, 
and a state's actions within it, could of course be legitimate but there 
was no procedure for an explicit recognition of this.
The multilateral character of collective security provides such a 
procedure. On the one hand, the principle of the indivisibility of peace 
claims its own neutrality and impartiality, that is its nature super 
partes. On the other, the fact that collective security is a universal and
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inclusive institution reassures all states that they have a stake in the 
operation and preservation of the system. The legitimization is 
therefore provided horizontally, w ith the consensus of states which 
renounce the use of force to change the international system, rather 
than vertically imposed on states.
In a way, the global organization becomes a source of 
legitimacy because states do not find it threatening to their own 
interests. According to Inis Claude: "it authorizes and endorses in 
compensation for its inability to effectuate commands, and it 
condemns and deplores in compensation for its inability to prohibit 
and preveni". The result is that the institution "has come to be 
regarded, and used, as a dispenser of politically significant approval 
and disapproval of the claims, policies and actions of states".30 Even 
their very existence can be sanctioned, as the role played by the 
United Nations in the consolidation of the state of Israel or during the 
process of decolonization shows.
This does not means that the United Nations or other collective 
security organization can determine, like a domestic court, specific 
solutions because its decisions do not enjoy an immediate executive 
application. Drawing again from the Middle Eastern example, the 
relevant General Assembly resolutions did not bring about Israel's 
w ithdrawal from the occupied territories or the establishment of a 
Palestinian homeland. However, the conferral of collective legitimacy 
to a certain solution increases the chances of its application.
The explicit endorsement of a claim by the collectivity of states 
is not only a source of personal satisfaction, but is "an im portant 
stake. [...] Legitimacy not only makes states rulers more confortable, 
but makes them more effective, more secure in their possession of 
power".31 According to Weber "experience shows that in no instance 
does domination voluntarily limit itself to the appeal to material or 
effectual or ideal motives as a basis for its continuance. In addition 
every such system attempts to establish and to cultivate the belief in 
its legitimacy".32 Legitimacy -in short- far from being antithetical to 
power, is an important element of i t
For a small state, its legitimacy means protection under the 
collective security umbrella. This is demonstrated by the importance 
lent by developing states to their status as members of the United
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Nations. For great powers, legitimacy means increasing its influence 
beyond the mere calculation of its material resources. By definition, a 
"legitimate" state does not threaten the interests of the collectivity of 
states. A hegemonic power recognized as "benign" by the 
international community may not trigger a counterbalancing 
coalition.33 European states accepted American predominance 
whereas they resisted the prospects of Nazi or Soviet hegemony.
The legitimization accorded to an operation by the explicit 
endorsem ent of the collectivity of states, expressed through the 
deliberation of a collective security organization like the United 
Nations, can increase the level of domestic and international suppo rt 
W ithin domestic societies, collective security can count on 
sympathetic constituencies. During the Gulf War, the Congressional 
authorization to use force was approved by such a narrow m argin that 
w ithout UN endorsement its fate w ould have probabl^An jeopardy as 
m any Democratic senators had expressed their loyalty to the 
m ultilateral principles.34
Sometimes public opinion even favours multilateral doctrines 
to an extent which forces governments to justify national interests in 
universal terms rather than the other w ay around. President Roosevelt 
thought of the United Nations as a way to sway America away from 
isolationism more than as a useful institution in its own r ig h t "The 
only appeal which w ould be likely to carry weight with the US public 
[...] would be one based upon a world-wide conception".35 Given the 
rise of mass politics in the XX Century, this factor has become a crucial 
element in foreign policy.
At the international level, neutral or undecided states may 
decide to flock to one side of a conflict if this acts in accordance w ith 
the precepts of collective security.36 As will later be seen, the 
international coalitions fighting under the UN banner in Korea and 
the Gulf were supported by a number of countries unprecedented 
before or since. During the Korean War, the collective operation was 
supported even by non-aligned countries such as India. In the Gulf 
War, the deployment of Western troops in Arab countries m ight well 
have been impossible outside a UN framework.37
This is the main reason why governments spend so much time 
and effort trying to obtain favourable resolutions and to stop
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unfavourable ones. After all, "how are we to account for the 
willingness of major states to invest resources in expanding
international institutions, if such institutions are lacking in 
significance?"38 States may still act against the wishes of the
international community, bu t they prefer not to do so in fear of losing 
domestic and international support The reluctance of the superpowers 
during the Cold War to appear as violators of collective security was 
not grounded simply on their good manners.
The United States was prepared to pay a price for the attainm ent 
of a legitimate status, thereby demonstrating the importance of these 
aspects. During the Suez crisis, the United States opposed its closest 
allies -Britain and France- because they were challenging the 
Charter.39 Similarly, the quarantine solution endorsed by the 
Organization of American States during the Cuban crisis was also
influenced by the acknowledgment that the Soviet missile
deployment provided an insufficient rationale for an invasion of Cuba 
pleading a self-defense motivation.40 According to Downs and Iida: 
"the quest for UN bestowed legitimacy as a prelude to m ilitary 
adventures remains high and may even have increased".41
The maintenance of collective endorsem ent may even imply the 
tolerance of a degree of interference over national policies. As will be 
seen below, both in Korea and in the Gulf War, the United States was 
prepared to go out of its way in its strategic planning for military 
operations in order to appease its UN allies. Roberts and Kingsbury 
point out that commitment to collective security "brings valuable 
allies and political support on particular issues, but it also leads to a 
degree of entanglement which may propel states into involvements 
they might otherwise prefer to evade".42
In sum, although compliance w ith the legal guarantee cannot be 
guaranteed, it will be facilitated by the reduction of transaction costs 
and by the increased incentives to cooperate provided by issue 
linkage, reiteration, reciprocity, reputation and legitimacy 
considerations. A diminished range of expected behaviour should 
therefore reduce uncertainty in the international system. In these 
circumstances, we can expect the^under the appropriate conditions a 
reaction to aggression will be more likely and larger than if collective 
security was not in place.
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iii. Collective Security and the Abolition of War
Beside facilitating cooperation, the institution of collective 
security also enjoys a potential for influencing states' preferences in 
the longer term. Although its existence depends on the prevailing 
intentions of its members, once in place it can "strengthen and 
deepen" the foundations for cooperation. In other words, collective 
security may begin as an ad hoc mechanism for cooperation to be 
applied selectively, bu t it could end up  as an established and given 
feature of international politics capable of affecting behavior in its 
own rig h t
The analysis has so far concentrated on rational choice, bu t will 
briefly turn  to so-called reflectivist factors.43 Institutions can be 
considered as constitutive of as well as constraints on states' 
behaviour.44 It is in fact impossible to understand the significance of 
the concept of collective security w ithout considering its normative 
character, which is predom inant in the thinking of many of its 
proponents. However, one should be cautious about the use of these 
factors because it is difficult to detect them and to determine their 
causal significance.
Part of the difficulty in treating normative elements stems 
indeed from their very success. W hen they are at work, events 
contrary to their precepts should not come about. Since it is 
impossible to count and measure non-events, their effectiveness 
cannot be accurately estimated. In the case of collective security, the 
normative relevance of the concept -as opposed to its functional 
utility- could only be judged by knowing how many conflicts have 
not occurred which would have if the concept had not been 
introduced.
Nevertheless, although its precise significance is unclear, the 
normative character of collective security is far from unimportant. As 
Kratochwil and Ruggie have pointed out, institutions are necessarily 
characterized by an "intersubjective quality".45 For example, 
constructivist scholars claim that material power structures are 
meaningless w ithout shared understandings and practices constituting 
the "language" of state action. Normative frameworks are necessary 
to decipher state actions as "identities are the basis of interests. Actors
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do not have a portfolio of interests that they can carry around 
independent of social context".46
Even classical realist thinkers like Hedley Bull or Martin W ight 
accept the crucial role of norms as constitutive of an international 
system. The fact that the international system is anarchic does not 
m ean that it is an anomie.47 For Bull, the balance of power system 
itself would be based on ideas like sovereignty and independence as 
well as on spontaneous incentives.48 In a recent contribution, also 
Michael Doyle adheres to this view:
"the balance of power is not the default model of 
international systemic behaviour [...] It, too, makes particular 
demands on the character of statesmanship and international 
order. [The requirements for the balance of power] are not far 
short of those conventionally seen to produce collective 
security. But they only served to establish the conditions for 
balancing".49
Even without going as far as critical theorists who assert that 
ideas and social contexts are the main independent variable in 
international relations capable of determining outcomes such as peace 
and war, normative factors should be taken into account.50 It is in fact 
possible to highlight at least some of the contributions of collective 
security to the normative framework of international relations and 
the way they come about and operate.
In particular, collective security has contributed to the process 
by which w ar is decreasingly accepted as a legitimate instrument of 
state policy.51 When Frederick the Great invaded Silesia in the m iddle 
of the XVm Century, he needed no justification and could appeal to 
Prussia's rcdzon d' etat as his only motivation. On the contrary, w hen 
the Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovakia two centuries later, the 
Kremlin had to claim its defensive purposes and to devise the 
superficially multilateral "Breznev Doctrine" as a smokescreen 
despite the fact that Czechoslovakia lied in the USSR's recognized 
sphere of influence.52
State actions m ust indeed be inserted in their social context 
Italy was not considered dangerous to the stability of the international 
order when it declared w ar on the Ottoman Empire in 1911. On the
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contrary, Iraq was branded as a destabilizing threat for its invasion of 
Kuwait in 1991. Although the two actions were in  practice not very 
different, they triggered very different responses from the 
international community because the idea that aggression is unlawful 
has taken ground and renders any violation much more serious. 
Collective security has contributed to alter these "deep psychological 
beliefs" which influence the "conscience collective", that is the m oral 
consensus on which the cohesion of the international community is 
based.53
As John Mueller has suggested, the process of obsolescence of 
aggression may resemble the fate of other social institutions which 
have become anachronistic. Slavery and dueling have disappeared 
even if they were once considered as normal, appropriate or even 
necessary elements of life. Furthermore, these institutions have not 
disappeared simply because of their unlawfulness since they had 
thrived also in ages when they were already unlawful. W hat caused 
their demise was rather a change in social beliefs about their utility 
and relevance in  m odem  society.54
"W ar in the developed world may be following once- 
fashionable dueling into obsolescence: the perceived wisdom, 
value and efficacy of w ar may have moved gradually toward 
terminal disrepute [...] The conviction has now become 
widespread that w ar in the developed world would be 
intolerably costly, unwise, futile and debased".55 This "does not 
mean that conflict w ill vanish, bu t only that w ar and military 
force will not be used by important developed countries to 
resolve their conflicts".56
This process is influenced by the decreasing relevance of 
territory as an instrum ent of economic and military power which has 
accordingly diminished the advantages of conquest57 It is also 
influenced by the increasing destructiveness of m odem  weapons, 
which has reached a level in  which w ar has become counterproductive 
-if not catastrophic- even for the winning side. The diminished limits 
to destruction within w ar -the ius in bello- have accordingly led to a 
greater retrain in the resort to war itself -the ius ad bellumP8 Also 
collective security has a role to play.
According to Claude:
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"the point remains that the theory of collective security 
has inspired the growing recognition that war anywhere is a 
threat to order everywhere [...] and has stimulated the 
rudimentary development of a sense of responsibility to a 
world community on the part of governments and peoples".59
Although normative frameworks originate from states' 
practices and preferences, most states taken individually- do not have 
the capability of imposing their own standards of conduct. In other 
words, states generally perceive normative standards as part of their 
given environment.60 If states want to be accepted as members of the 
international community, they have to accept the rules of the game. 
International institutions "have the capacity to set aspirational 
standards, and to draw  upon [their] prestige and aura of standing 
above governments in order to achieve more than [their] material 
power and resources would otherwise allow. In these respect [they do] 
shape the values and behaviour of states and individuals and curb 
some of their excesses".61
The institutional setting of collective security could thus 
"transform the minimum political solidarity into an international 
community in which states share similar values and normative 
orientations. [...] Regular meetings and conferences allow ideas and 
values to cross national boundaries and circulate around different 
communities of elites. Similar values are conducive to compatible 
policy preferences".62 This process could in time moderate some of 
the effects of the security dilemma even more than the mechanisms set 
up to challenge aggression directly. The freedom of anarchy can be 
moderated only by a sense of common destiny constraining eventual 
abuses.63 The pacifist ideals may not be designed to abolish w ar by 
fiat, bu t to initiate a process that "over time, perhaps a long time, 
w ould bring behaviour into greater congruence w ith those ideals".64
This is especially true when new states emerge in the 
international system or w hen new systems emerge after the end of 
major wars. In these instances a process of socialization occurs in 
which states' define their policies in terms compatible with the 
prevailing view of w hat constitutes acceptable behaviour 65 At least, 
they feel obliged to pay lip service to the existing norms and the
-117-
continued profession of faith in  them may in the long run become part 
of their established belief. Like when a person is first invited to high 
society, states try to follow the precepts of etiquette.
The significance of these processes should not be exaggerated. 
Anti-social state behaviour is by no means restricted to newly 
developed states. A belief of this kind seems to have been expressed 
by the US Secretary of War, Stimson, when he remarked during the 
Manchurian crisis that: "the peace treaties of m odern Europe m ade out 
by the W estern notion of the world no more fit the great races of 
Russia, China and Japan who are meeting in Manchuria than a 
stovepipe hat would fit an African savage".66 Yet, only a few years 
afterwards those very same peace treaties were shattered not by 
Russia, China and Japan nor by African savages but by m odem  
Germany where Albert Einstein, Thomas Mann and Henry Kissinger 
were born.
The strength of norm ative constraints is relative under anarchy 
and relies mainly oh states' willingness to abide by them voluntarily. 
This willingness is always linked to the intentions of a state on which 
the international community has only limited influence. Many wars 
have been initiated not only when they appeared to be inconsistent 
w ith prevailing behavioural standards, but also w hen they were 
plainly incompatible w ith the national interest of the aggressor. 
Sensible predictions -like the ones exposed by Norman Angell in The 
Great Illusion, fatefully published the year before the First W orld 
War- that w ar was irrational due to the changed nature of 
technologies and societies have -so far- all been disproved.
Nevertheless, even if normative standards can go backwards as 
well as forward, the pedagogic function of collective security has 
contributed to an environment in which it is increasingly difficult to 
explain the rationale for aggression both to one's own public and to 
the international community. This indirect function of collective 
security, emphasizing more its normative and pedagogic nature 
rather than its mechanism for conflict management, may very well be 
one of its most useful elements.
The strength of the minimalist conception rests on its explicit 
acknowledgment that it is subject to other factors. It does therefore not
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incur in the danger of becoming counterproductive because -unlike its 
automatic version- it does not operate when it should n o t Like a fuse 
in an electrical system saves it from a short circuit because it cuts the 
power when there is a contact or a surge, so minimalist collective 
security simply shuts the multilateral system off w hen tension reaches 
critical levels. It is better that the lights go off than that the house 
catches fire.67 States themselves would decide when to apply it and 
would therefore avoid its use when it can be dangerous.
This does not mean that institutions are worthless. The fact that 
institutions cannot always work does not necessarily imply that they 
will never work. A few defectors do not underm ine laws even in 
domestic society, the question is rather to maintain compliance at an 
acceptable level. According to Herz:
"that collective security is based on trust and distrust 
simultaneously is true, bu t this is only an apparent paradox. All 
law is based on the possibility of law violation. It expects the 
citizen to be law-minded, knowing that there will be instances 
where the expectation fails. Without that failure law would be 
superfluous. W ith too much failure however it w ould be 
ineffective and unenforceable. Law, as a functioning institution, 
is suspended between a certain minimum and a certain 
maximum of effectivity".68
Institutions simply cannot remove the security dilemma from 
international politics, but they can indeed make it more manageable. 
Institutions cannot replace the prudent balancing mechanisms of 
alliances nor the domestic developments which bring about stable 
relations between nations. Yet, if they facilitate cooperation in at least 
some instances, they justify both their existence and the efforts to their 
improvements.
Contrary to prevailing views, this is not necessarily tied to high 
levels of institutionalization, which is not a positive development for 
its own sake but m ust instead be judged on its merits. An excessively 
institutionalized arrangem ent could in fact be counterproductive. The 
utility of the minimalist conception of collective security stems rather 
from the continued demand for mechanisms facilitating cooperation 
in a decentralized environment lacking the authority for effective 
enforcement of compliance. Despite their limits and conditionality,
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minimalist institutions are the main instrum ent for the management 
of cooperation in international relations. This necessity m ay even 
cause the regime to outlast the conditions which gave rise to it and to 
grow as a perm anent and acknowledged feature of international 
society.
As an ancillary function, also its normative standards for the 
prevention of w ar is also on dem and on the part of states which find 
war increasingly counterproductive for their own purposes. This 
indirect function on the intellectual milieu in which states operate may 
be one of its most im portan t Even if they may be insufficient to 
banish war, multilateral sanctions may therefore still be worthwhile 
because they perpetuate the idea that war is illegitimate and 
discourage aggression by imposing at least some costs on 
expansionist states. Even purely moral sanctions are sufficient for 
aggressors not to get away w ith it unscathed. This is clearly much less 
than w hat was expected from the institution by its most ardent 
proponents, but it is still a very precious constraints on the abuses of 
anarchy.
Yet, even these limited functions need a constant effort in order 
to be effective. Minimalism runs the opposite risk w ith respect to 
maximalism. If the institution was so hypoinstitutionalized that it did 
not constrain the behaviour of states, but provoked only their lip 
service, it w ould not make any difference whether it existed or n o t An 
excessive degree of selectivity and optionality could turn the 
institution into irrelevance and deprive it even of its value as an 
instrument of cooperation. Focal points are useless if everybody 
recognizes that they are never used; procedures and schedules become 
a nuisance if they are not respected and incentives to cooperate 
become misleading and fruitless.
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6. Th e  Or ig in  a n d  H isto ry  o f  C ollective Security
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*  *  *  *
i. The League of Nations
Collective security -despite the fact that the term was coined 
only in the 1930's- is not a novel concept and finds its roots in earlier 
schemes for the prevention of war. Its prehistory ties in the ancient 
Greek Amphytrionic Leagues and in the Mediaeval Councils which 
envisaged tight rules for the use of violence and the collective 
responsibility of all those subject to the rules for their 
implementation. According to the 1209 Council of Avignon, violators 
were to be excommunicated, attacked by all other princes and even 
their subjects should have rebelled against them.
After having been recuperated by Hugo Grotius,1 the 
intellectual high water m ark of the idea was during the 
Enlightenment, after the consolidation of the m odem  state system and 
at a time of fervour for rationalistic projects. William Penn proposed a 
Diet of European S overe ig^ to  act as a tribunal for international 
( disputes. The Due de Sully alleged that he had arranged a scheme for 
peace which commanded the hearts and minds of the British and 
French courts. The most famous scheme for collective security in this 
period was w ritten by a French delegate to the Peace of Utrecht, Abb£ 
de Saint-Pierre. His "Project du Paix Perpetuelle" stated th a t
"a sovereign w ho shall take up arms before the Union, 
has declared war, or who shall refuse to execute a regulation of 
the Society [of European states] shall be declared an enemy of 
the Society, and it shall make w ar upon him, 'till he be 
disarmed, and 'till the judgm ent and regulations be executed".2
At the Congress of Vienna, an embryo of a formal collective 
responsibility for the elimination of the causes of wars -then 
attributed mainly to revolution- was the Holy Alliance. Tzar 
Alexander proposed an ambitious agreement among all the great 
powers to support each other against external and especially internal 
threats. Britain and France, who were suspicious of Russian motives, 
did not join the scheme which was adopted in a much diluted form 
only by the three Eastern autocracies of Russia, Austria and Prussia. 
Instead of the maximalist Holy Alliance, the Congress of Vienna
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inaugurated a minimalist Concert of Europe, in which the great 
powers informally pledged to consult each other in case of crisis.
A watered dow n version of the Concert survived throughout 
the Century, but it was not until the First W orld War that the concept 
had any real chance of being actually applied in practice. The idea of 
an international organization to abolish w ar had already circulated 
before the outbreak of hostilities. Leon Bourgeois had published a
book entitled "Societe des Nationes" in 1908 while Professc Lowes (Z?
Dickinson had coined the term "League of Nations" in A u it 1914. 
These ideas were the natural continuation of the process of 
institutionalization of international relations begun after the 
Congress of Vienna and culminated w ith the two
Conferences at the turn  of the Century.
During the war, the British and French governments had 
therefore set up special committees to deal w ith  the planning for an
conflict they were fighting. In 1916, the British Foreign Secretary, Lord 
Grey, proposed a revitalization of the European Concert of the early 
XIX Century based on an Anglo-American core. Meanwhile, Robert 
Cecil sponsored w ithin the W ar Cabinet the establishment of the 
Phillimore Committee. The report, together w ith  other contributions 
such as a famous pam phlet authored by the South African Ian Smuts, 
was an important blueprint on which the later drafts of the League's 
Covenant were based. The French equivalent committee was chaired 
by former prime m inister Leon Bourgeois.
However, the impact of the Great W ar provided a catalyst 
which was to give a new flavour to this impetus. Firstly, the 
devastations of the w ar were largely attributed to a failure of the 
balance of power policies and to the lack of an institutionalized forum 
for dealing with international crises. Secondly, the w ar had witnessed 
the entry onto the w orld stage of America as a global power, w ith its 
peculiar political culture bent on optimism and on the rejection of the 
practices of the European tradition. The attempts to construct a new 
world order at Versailles cannot therefore be considered simply as a 
continuation of earlier efforts.
The end of a major w ar is a propitious moment for the 
establishment of a new institution. The memory of the w ar is still
organization which w ould have avoided a repetition of the great
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fresh in everyone's mind and it is an important incentive to find 
alternative solutions. The ground is also relatively free from 
obstacles. The major conflicts of interests have just in  fact been 
resolved by the w ar while new ones have not yet arisen. Moreover, 
the distribution of power and of interests are also in an ideal state. The 
victors have the power to impose new rules and are accustomed to 
cooperating amongst themselves while the losers have no choice but 
to accept the new principles.
The peacemakers at Versailles deliberately sought to find an 
unprecedented solution to the problems connected to anarchy. They 
had promised to do so to their own public opinions when they had 
justified the terrible costs of victory arguing that this would have been 
"the w ar to end all wars". It is difficult to justify to an electorate the 
immense sacrifices of a four-years w ar for less than ideal principles. 
Furthermore, the victors were also faced with the dangers brought 
about by the Bolshevik Revolution and w ith the possible spread of the 
revolutionary contagion to war-torn Central Europe. The grand vision 
of collective security was seen as an antidote w ith respect to the 
Leninist promises of a proletarian peace.3
The victorious powers were all liberal democracies and they 
found it congenial to introduce a mechanism for conflict resolution 
resembling the rule of law on which their internal politics was 
organized. An autocratic or dictatorial government would have draw n 
different conclusions from a domestic analogy. Furthermore, as they 
were in the m idst of their transition to mass politics they needed an 
aura of moral clarity and legitimacy in order to command domestic 
support for their foreign policies. The inherent normative nature of 
collective security was particularly appealing to governments which 
had to gather domestic consensus. A universal organization could be 
both the justification for past costs and the legitimating forum for 
future enterprises.
The birth of the League of Nations owes especially to the 
American President, W oodrow Wilson, who mentioned the idea of 
collective security as early as 1916, well before the United States' entry 
into the Great War. Wilson sincerely believed in the possibility of 
banishing war by international agreement and was in a unique 
position to impose his views at the Versailles Peace Conference. He
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completely dominated the American delegation while the United 
States enjoyed an enormous degree of prestige after they intervened 
as a Deus ex machina to save the fate of the old continent
At the prompting of the US President, the Conference decided 
to draft the Covenant of the League of Nations before discussing any 
other matter and to include it in the final treaty. Wilson wanted to 
offer the American Senate a "take it or leave it" choice at ratification 
between accepting the organization as part of the settlement or 
rejecting the two together. The Covenant was written in February and 
March 1919 by an ad hoc committee of the Peace Conference, chaired 
by Wilson himself, where the different positions of the various 
countries emerged.
Wilson was the most optimistic and radical about the cause of 
international institutions. He insisted that the Conference should not 
be influenced by the "odor of the Vienna settlement" and that an 
enduring peace was incompatible w ith the "turgid, selfish, greedy 
relationships of the old diplomacy".4 His scheme was certainly a 
maximalist one because the League was seen as a replacement of 
traditional practices. Wilson was determined to create a multilateral 
arrangement: "No special or separate interest of any single nation or 
any group of nations can be m ade the basis of any part of the 
settlement which is not consistent w ith the common interest of all".5
In Wilson's view, the peace settlement was to lead to the 
creation of states based on the principle of nationality and self 
determination. This family of civilized nations would then have 
joined into a universal League of Nations upholding peace and justice. 
America therefore proposed a m utual guarantee of independence and 
territorial integrity. Much reliance was based on the assumed good 
faith of self-governing nations. The mechanism of eventual 
enforcement was to be largely and rather optimistically based on 
publicity and public pressure. The League: "provides for placing the 
peace of the world under constant international oversight, in 
recognition of the principle that the peace of the world is the 
legitimate and immediate interest of every nation".6 According to 
Wilson, the policies of the Central Powers prior to the outbreak of the 
w ar would not have stood two weeks in the face of public scrutiny and 
moral condemnation.
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British proposals were less dramatic and reflected a desire to 
reconstitute an improved and permanently institutionalized Concert 
of Europe. More than on collective sanctions, the emphasis was on 
instruments of conciliation and with the connected "cooling off" 
period that such an arrangement w ould have provided in case of 
crisis. London based its views on its assessment of the causes for the 
outbreak of w ar in 1914, which was largely attributed to a breakdown 
in diplomatic communications and to the haste induced by the speed 
of military mobilizations. British views were more minimalist than 
America's. Diplomacy was not to be replaced but improved by the 
League of Nations.
Also im portant for Britain was the possibility of territorial 
revision. After Germany had lost its colonies and its navy w ith the 
sinking at Scapa Flow, London had already reached most of its war 
aims and could afford a flexible approach toward the German 
question. It .therefore acknowledged the German desire for an 
improvement of the territorial arrangements of Versailles and it 
looked with a certain scepticism to W ilson's proposals for a guarantee 
of the 1919 status quo. In Lloyd George's fateful view: "w ould we go 
to w ar qver Danzig?".7 More than a rigid collective security system, 
Britain sought a forum for great power consultation and discussion.
France's attitude toward the idea of a League was ambivalent 
After fpur years of devastation, the main problem was not 
international order in general, but security from Germany in 
particular. France was therefore interested in a League of Nations only 
as far as it could offer an effective guarantee against a German revival. 
For this reason, the French delegate Bourgeois favoured a radically 
maximalist approach. He proposed in various occasions the 
establishment of tight military sanctions and of a military 
organization endowed w ith a perm anent staff and international 
contingents capable "to overcome, in case of need, any forces which 
may be opposed to the League of Nations in the event of a conflict".8 
Since Germany was to be excluded from such an organization, the 
French proposal basically equated to the continuation of the war-time 
alliance against Germany.
The French Prime Minister, Clemenceau, did not share 
Bourgeois' faith in international mechanisms and preferred a more
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unilateral approach instead. He therefore insisted on two elements 
which underm ined the credibility of the League from the s ta rt First, 
he pushed for a very harsh treatm ent of Germany. Backed by Marshall 
Foch, the Allied Military Commander, he attempted to reduce 
Germany's frontiers to the Rhine and obtained a temporary allied 
occupation of its West bank in order to diminish France's structural 
vulnerability. Second, Clemenceau insisted for a traditional treaty of 
guarantee by Britain and the United States, thereby demonstrating 
that the multilateral security granted by the League was insufficient 
As Harold Nicolson, who was present in Paris, wrote: "the Treaty of 
Guarantee w ith France had dealt a blow to [Wilson's] Covenant from 
which that messianic doctrine was never to recover".9
In the event, the Covenant was drafted on the basis of the 
British and American proposals. The two delegations introduced a 
common draft -the Hurst-Miller proposal- which was used as the basis 
for discussion. The Covenant emerging from the Conference was 
therefore an hybrid between the maximalist aspirations of the United 
States and the less ambitious desires of the British Governm ent This 
was due both to British reluctance to enter open-ended commitments 
and to domestic political considerations in America which led Wilson 
to avoid a direct challenge to the prerogatives of Congress in 
declaring w ar and in disposing of US troops. After the President's 
brief return to the United States in March, the original draft was 
amended to appease Congressional worries about its loss of 
sovereignty. In particular, clear provisions were introduced by which 
states could withdraw  from membership and could resist League 
action on the basis of their exclusive domestic jurisdiction.10
In accordance w ith Wilson's wishes, members pledged in the 
preamble not to resort to w ar and to abide by international law. In 
Articles 12-15 members agreed to settle their controversies by 
negotiation or arbitration. W ar was not outlawed, but regulated so 
that it was illegal to use force before the settlement procedure and a 
"cooling o ff ' period had been exhausted. Furthermore, according to 
Article X, the League undertook a guarantee of all members' 
independence and territorial integrity. The following article invested 
the League as a whole of the responsibility for implementing the 
guarantee.
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However, the mechanisms of enforcement were left to the 
discretion of states. Article 5 determined that all substantive decisions 
were to be reached -despite the protests of France and the smaller 
powers- by unanimity. Article 16 introduced the notion of economic 
and military sanctions, but their application was not automatic nor 
mandatory and depended on the members' best judgm ent While the 
first draft of the Covenant read th a t "Should any Contracting Power 
break or disregard its covenant [...], it shall thereby ipso facto become 
at w ar w ith all the members of the League"; the final draft stated th a t 
a violator "shall thereby ipso facto be deemed to have committed an 
act of w ar against the members of the League".11 Clearly, the latter 
highlighted only the right of members to implement collective 
security if they so chose, while the former expressed their duty to do 
so.
The Covenant was presented to and approved by the Peace 
Conference in  April 1919 and became operational on January 10th, 
1920, w ith the coming into force of the Treaty of Versailles. Despite 
the ceremony and great hopes surrounding its birth, its weaknesses 
were clear from the s ta rt Two features in particular mined the edifice 
at its foundations. Firstly, the collective security provisions w ere both 
too ambitious and too vague. On the one hand, Article X invited -in 
principle- the League's intervention in any matter which was likely to 
threaten a change in the status quo. On the other hand, the 
discretionary and selective nature of sanctions ensured that the League 
did  not have the capability to achieve its objectives.
Secondly, the task was made even more impossible by the tight 
linkage -in the same treaty- of the Covenant w ith the territorial 
settlement of Versailles which ensured German and Soviet 
disaffection w ith a peace they did not like. More than peace in general, 
it seemed that the mechanism had been set up to protect the Versailles 
settlement in particular. While the first factor brought about divisions 
between the victors, the latter brought the perm anent enmity of the 
revisionist powers to the whole multilateral structure. Given these 
two premises, the success of the League was undermined from its very 
inception.
In the United States, a fierce battle arose over ratification 
between Wilson's supporters, who saw the League as an instrument
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for the United States to exercise its benevolent influence over 
European affairs in order to avoid the need for another armed 
intervention, and his detractors in Congress, who saw collective 
security as a threat to American independence. In the words of Senator 
Borah: "It is a deliberate attempt to sell our country to the domination 
of foreign powers".12
The argum ent of Republican senators, who commanded a 
majority in Congress, was two-fold. On the one hand, the United 
States was to avoid being entangled in any quarrel whenever it may 
arise. Senator Root explained that: "The people of the United States 
certainly will not be willing ten or twenty years hence to send their 
young men to distant parts of the world to fight for causes in which 
they may not believe or in which they have little or no in terest'.13 On 
the other hand, the United States did not wish to grant to the Old 
Continent the right to interfere in  the affairs of the New World. 
According to the leading reservationist, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge: 
"It is as im portant to keep the United States out of European affairs as 
to keep Europe out of the American Continents".14
The Republican majority in Congress was in fact willing to 
ratify the treaty and the annexed Covenant provided that the United 
States included a list of very tight reservations. However, Wilson felt 
that this would have tom  the League's spirit to pieces and preferred to 
reject a negotiated solution.15 The Senate therefore failed to ratify the 
treaty and it inaugurated an era of isolationism, depriving the League 
of a fundamental pillar. Not only the United States had contributed so 
much to the intellectual foundations of the organization, bu t also its 
presence was necessary -as it had been decisive during the Great War- 
for an adequate concentration of power on the part of the League.
The American withdrawal reinforced French suspicions that the 
League did not provide an effective guarantee against German 
revenge. While the commitment was too much for the United States, it 
was too little for France. Paris therefore begun a course of unilateral 
and traditional policies which were incompatible w ith the 
multilateral character of the Covenant Firstly, it negotiated a series of 
defensive alliances w ith Eastern European countries which replaced its 
traditional entente w ith Russia. Secondly, it made an ill-fated attempt
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at coercion of Germany w ith its occupation of the Ruhr in 1923, which 
countervened the spirit of collective security.
Aversion to the League was even greater in those countries 
which despised the Treaty of Versailles. Germany was in the forefront 
because it had been excluded from the negotiations and because it 
thought that the harsh settlement contradicted the idealistic 
statements -like the famous Fourteen Points- made by the allies before 
the armistice. Popular feelings were so dissatisfied w ith the "Diktat" 
that the association of the Weimar Republic with the signing of the 
Treaty was one of the chief motives behind its overthrow in the 1930's. 
The wisdom which brought the Quadruple Alliance at the end of the 
Napoleonic Wars to negotiate the peace together w ith France so as to 
give Paris a stake in its maintenance was not followed in 1919. 
Germany never accepted the status quo of Versailles and even w hen it 
became a member of the League for a brief spell between 1926 and 
1933, Berlin did not renounce to seek for a revision of its Eastern 
frontier which w ould have directly challenged Article X.16
The intellectual basis for Germany's disaffection w ith the 
organization at Geneva are well summarized by the work of Carl 
Schm itt According to the German scholar, the Treaty of Versailles was 
illegitimate because it rested on the presum ption of German guilt for 
the outbreak of the war which he rejected because between equal 
states there can be no jurisdiction: "w ar between sovereign states 
which mutually recognize themselves and which exercise their right 
to go to w ar cannot be deemed as a crime".17 Furthermore, the League 
was illegitimate because it was not grounded on a nomos, which is the 
"radical title" or the sovereign control of a territory. Schmitt rejected 
the idea of collective security on which the Covenant was based 
because aggression in a world of equals was a relative concept, 
implying that the revision of the status quo could sometimes be a 
legitimate justification for the use of force.18 The League was simply 
an attem pt by the victors to dominate the losers of the war:
The Treaty of Versailles "gave origin by no means to a 
new world order, but it left the w orld in its preceding disorder, 
suppressing two European powers, two pillars of the spatial 
arrangement which had existed until then, and promoted a new 
partition".19
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Schmitt's own solution, which sinisterly resembled the idea of 
Lebensraum, was of a world divided into regional blocs, each 
dominated by a great power endowed w ith a nomos. The scholar, w ho 
supported the Nazi movement, suggested that the precedent was the 
Monroe Doctrine and was advocating a German Monroe Doctrine for 
Europe.20
The same argum ent was echoed in Britain by E.H. Carr's 
judgm ent of the League. In his pathbreaking critique of idealism, Carr 
dismissed the universal principles of the Covenant as hypocritical and 
just an instrument in the hand of the victorious powers to perpetuate 
the Versailles settlem ent Even international law "cannot be 
understood independently of the political foundations on which it 
rests and the political interests which it serves. [...] Morality can only 
be relative, not universal. Ethics m ust be interpreted in terms of 
politics".21 Far from guaranteeing the interests of the international 
community as a whole, collective security was -according to Carr- an 
attem pt on the part of states which had built their favourable position 
w ith  violence, to remove the main instrum ent -force- by which that 
power could be eroded. Collective security was -in short- the 
expression of the particular interests of the status quo powers. Britain 
and France were not defending world peace but their own privileged 
position in the struggle with the revisionist states: Italy, Japan, 
Germany and the Soviet Union.
"International order and international solidarity will 
always be the slogans of those w ho feel strong enough to 
impose them on others. [...] International government is, in 
effect, government by that state which supplies the power 
necessary for the purposes of governing".22
Also Fascist Italy -despite its position as a victor at Versailles- 
considered itself as a dissatisfied power rejecting the notion of 
universal principles in a world of multiple states. In 1923, an Italian 
delegate at Geneva wrote th a t
"Italy cannot but see in the League a force antithetical to 
the vital necessities of her own future expansion. The League is 
an organism for the maintenance of peace: i.e. of the territorial
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integrity of all states, in  their present limits, while Italy is 
suffocated in its narrow and poor country. [...] It is only natural 
that England and France should seek to defend the League, 
standing as they do at the climax of their fortunes. It is equally 
natural that Italy, deprived as she is of the fruits of her great 
victory, should regard the League as an international 
instrument of her own repression".23
Bolshevik Russia was also naturally opposed to the League. 
After all, while the Covenant and the Peace were being negotiated in 
Paris, the same powers were intervening militarily in Russia against 
the revolution. The Soviet Union did not enter the League until the 
1920's because it saw it as an instrument of the imperialist and 
capitalist states to dominate the weaker states and the oppressed 
people.24 In the 1930's Moscow, frightened by the rise of Nazism, 
entered the League and fought for collective security -the very term 
had indeed been invented by Maxim Litvinov- alongside Britain and 
France. However, after the Munich Conference had shown all their 
lack of will, Moscow reverted to its own unilateral course and chose to 
appease Germany with the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact The last act of 
the League was indeed that of expelling the USSR for its invasion of 
Finland in 1939.
The League failed -in short- because it d id not command 
sufficient support among the great powers. Germany, Japan, Italy and, 
to a lesser extent, the Soviet Union were adamantly opposed both to 
the letter and to the spirit of collective security. France was 
disillusioned by the mechanisms of enforcement which it did not find 
reassuring enough. The United States found them too rigid instead 
and preferred to rely on an isolationist course. The only power which 
was left to uphold the multilateral principles was Britain. However, 
London d id  not have the willingness nor the resources sufficient to 
guarantee global peace on its own. According to the British Foreign 
Secretary on the eve of the Second W orld War, Viscount Halifax, the 
League "involves dangerously indefinite commitments quite 
disproportionate to the real security that these commitments give".25
Despite these structural shortcomings, the League of Nations 
did have a positive impact on international relations in its early years, 
when Britain and France enjoyed an artificial and temporary position
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of primacy. The optimism implicit in the concept was the birthmark of 
the discipline of international relations which begun after the 
Versailles Conference in the attempt to understand the causes of the 
Great War. The new institutes in London and New York and all the 
new chairs in the infant subject were mainly devoted to the study of 
international organization.
The multilateral rules introduced sufficient goodwill and clout 
to contribute to the solution of a number of regional issues, such as 
the Aland Islands dispute between Sweden and Finland in 1920; the 
Albanian-Yugoslav conflict of 1921, the Corfu incident between Italy 
and Greece of 1923; the conflict between Greece and Bulgaria in 1925, 
the w ar between Bolivia and Paraguay in 1928; the Mosul question 
between Irak and Turkey; the various clashes between Poland and 
Lithuania and between Poland and Czechoslovakia. In these instances, 
the League provided a forum for multilateral discussion, pressure and 
mediation which was useful to the resolution of the crises.
However, it was also clear during the same period that the 
League's domain was not universal. The three major events of the 
early 1920's were not dealt with at Geneva because one of the actors 
was not a League member. The Soviet-Polish War, the W ashington 
Conference on Naval Disarmament and the Ruhr occupation by 
France were precluded from multilateral action by the fact that the 
Soviet Union, the United States and Germany were not members at 
the time of the events. Even in the case of Corfu, the League simply 
deferred the matter to the Ambassadors' Conference, which was an 
informal organization arising from the war-time coalition. In the war 
between Bolivia and Paraguay, the League's effectiveness was heavily 
dependent on US support for its deliberations and the eventual 
economic sanctions. In any case, that war took 100000 lives before it 
stopped.
In the 1920's there were also various attempts to reform the 
Covenant and to improve its collective security provisions. In 1923, 
the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance -presented by Cecil- attempted 
to strengthen the sanctions regime of Article 16, to devolve to 
regional powers some of the responsibility for enforcement as well as 
to produce a genuine disarmament agreem ent The proposal was sunk 
by the Admiralty's reluctance to engage into w ider commitments:
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"the Naval Staff are opposed to portions of the Navy being practically 
at the disposal of the League for a series of campaign of indefinite 
duration and m agnitude".26 Also France was opposed because it 
resisted the idea of multilateral determination and verification of 
armaments' ceilings.
In 1924, the so called Geneva Protocol was introduced for 
members' discussion. The agreement sought to close the "gaps" in the 
Covenant which allowed w ar in the event the Council did not find a 
suitable solution to a crisis. The Protocol w ould have made arbitration 
obligatory and initiation of hostilities always illegal, even if the 
League's Council had reached no definitive conclusion. However, the 
most im portant part of the Protocol concerned economic and military 
sanctions, which -at the prom pting of France- were made automatic in 
case of a conflict Also the Geneva Pact was rejected mainly because of 
British reluctance to be draw n into every single conflict, even those 
provoked by an unjust status quo. Britain felt that -given its leading 
role- it would have had to pay a disproportionate price for collective 
enforcement and it wished to make sure that she w ould not have been 
involved in wars for the unilateral interests of smaller powers which 
were exclusively "consumers" of collective security.
The following year, the League reached its zenith because of the 
newly found agreement of the Western powers w ith Germany reached 
at Locarno. The agreement led to the only brief spell of international 
stability of the inter-war period and to Germany's entry into the 
League in 1926. However, even Locarno was not negotiated inside a 
League framework. The Italo-British guarantee of the Franco-German 
and German-Belgian borders reflected -yet again- France's 
disillusionment w ith the universal protection offered by the League 
and its preference for more specific and traditional formats. 
Significantly, Locarno also concerned only Germany's Western 
frontier, leaving the disputed areas in Poland and Czechoslovakia and 
the status of Austria outside the agreem ent
Given the failure of the Geneva Pact to strengthen the second 
component of collective security -that of the multilateral guarantee- 
the international community moved on to strengthen its first element, 
that of the renunciation of war. In 1928, the Briand-Kellogg Pact 
between France and the United States to renounce force in their
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bilateral relationship w as soon joined by 63 other states, including 
Germany, Japan, Italy and the Soviet Union. For the first time in the 
history of civilization, w ar was explicitly outlawed by an 
international agreement. Even if this unprecedented achievement 
represents the high point of League's idealism in the 1920's, the 
agreement did not concretely diminish the probability of a conflict In 
Carr's bitter words: "the Pact condemned all wars, but it punished 
none".27
When the Great Depression arrived, exacerbating international 
relations, the international community was no more prepared to face 
the forthcoming crisis than it had been before. The economic crisis 
weakened Britain and France, it further distanced America from the 
rest of the world and it facilitated the rise to power of radically 
expansionist regimes in Germany and Japan. When the revisionist 
powers begun the implementation of their imperial designs in 
Manchuria, Abyssinia, Albania, Austria, Czechoslovakia and Poland, 
the League powers simply did not have the strength to face these 
challenges simultaneously, as was later demonstrated by the string of 
Anglo-French defeats in the first two years of Second World War.
The first major challenge was the Japanese invasion of 
Manchuria in 1931. The action followed an incident in which some 
Japanese civilians were killed and which had been staged by the 
Japanese Army, although it was not known at the time. The first 
League's reaction was to resort to the conciliation mechanisms of 
Article 11 rather than to impose sanctions on Japan. The Council was 
in fact following its ow n wishful thinking that the outbreak of 
hostilities had been truly accidental. After Japan refused to comply to 
a call for ceasefire, the League decided to send a fact-finding League 
Commission under Lord Lytton in  January 1932. Military sanctions 
were excluded due to British weakness in region especially on the 
mainland and to American unwillingness to support League action in 
this instance. Meanwhile, the Japanese Army had overrun Manchuria 
and established the puppet state of Manchukuo in March. The Lytton 
Report was published at the end of the year and, despite it called for a 
restoration of Chinese sovereignty, it did not condemn the action of 
Japan and even recognized its influence in the region. Nevertheless,
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Japan withdrew from the League as soon as the report was adopted in 
early 1933.28
The Manchurian episode was not perceived as a terminal failure 
because the extent of Japanese ambitions was not clear at the time and 
because it had been difficult to identify a clearcut violation of 
collective principles. A different story was the Abyssinian crisis. 
Italy's aggression was clear and it appeared both premeditated and 
unjustified to all. However, as will later be seen in detail, the League 
failed to respond effectively because the main powers were reluctant 
to strike in Africa one of their allies in Europe. They therefore 
imposed limited sanctions which were sufficient to alienate Italy but 
insufficient to stop the aggression. The failure of the League was so 
complete that it never recovered and it hardly dealt w ith the 
following crises in Austria, Czechoslovakia and Poland which led to 
the Second World War.
The League was not simply impotent in front of the rise of 
revisionism, but it also contributed to the debacle of Western attempts 
to contain the multiple threats which emerged in the 1930's. Firstly, it 
forced Britain and France to antagonize Japan, Italy and, in 1939, the 
Soviet Union, while they would have preferred to ignore their 
misbehaviour in order to concentrate on the German th rea t The 
League's resources where already hopelessly overstretched and did 
not need further quarrels. In the Abyssinian case in particular, the 
League powers lost an ally in the containment of Germany which had 
proved useful in the two years between Hitler's rise to power and the 
crisis.
Secondly, the League fostered unrealistic expectations on the 
capacity of collective security to provide international stability. Public 
opinion in the West wholeheartedly supported the multilateral 
organization w ithout considering the costs that effective enforcement 
would have entailed. The hope was that moral condemnation and 
mild economic sanctions w ere sufficient to stop the dictators. W hen 
the League demonstrated its weaknesses over Manchuria and 
Abyssinia, the disillusion was such as to lower the WesF s guard and to 
jeopardize further attempts at multilateral or even unilateral 
containment. If governments and publics had known about their 
responsibilities in the first place, perhaps they would have gotten
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accustomed to them. Instead, the aftermath of the Abyssinian fiasco 
was appeasement; which was grounded in feelings of impotence and 
disillusion.
ii. The United Nations
Despite the shortcomings of the League, the idea of collective 
security was so resilient that the planning for a similar organization 
begi/n as early as 1941. The failure was seen as a stimulus to try harder 
rather than as a reason to abandon the enterprise. Months before Pearl 
Harbor, the United States and Britain stated in the Atlantic Charter 
that one of their objectives was the establishment of an international 
institution to promote peace. When the Charter of the United Nations 
was signed in San Francisco in 1945, hopes were no less high than they 
had been at Versailles.
There are various reasons for this resilience. Firstly, there was a 
renewed dem and for a mechanism to avoid war. The Second W orld 
W ar had brought devastations even greater than the preceding one 
and had ended w ith the first detonations of nuclear devices. If it was 
the greater interdependence of both peace and w ar to have prom pted 
the establishment of the League, this was even more necessary in 1945, 
w hen the fruits of world trade and the dangers of armed conflict were 
clearer than they had ever been before. In an atomic world, passivity 
and laissez faire on security matters were simply not considered as 
viable options.
It is also impossible to explain the resilience of the idea of 
collective security despite its own limits and failures w ithout 
reference to the domestic politics of the founders of the United 
Nations. As the end point of a process begun w ith the involvement of 
mass publics into politics at the beginning of the Century, an 
increasing num ber of countries adopted a democratic organization of 
domestic politics. As noted before, this had a profound impact on 
collective security as democratic countries value an international 
forum resembling their internal organization and offering legitimacy 
to their foreign policies. Public opinions calling for a "Parliament of 
mankind" were therefore a crucial influence in the establishment of 
the United Nations.
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Lastly, the United States even more decisive in the planning of 
the United Nations than had been the case in 1919. American might 
had been displayed w ith full force and it was clear that, unlike in 1919, 
it had arrived onto the world stage to stay. America had not lost faith 
in the capacity of international organization to deal w ith global 
problems as it had been sheltered by its own isolationism from the 
failure of the League. The peculiar ingenuity of the American 
approach to world politics seemed to have been frozen for two 
decades only to be defrosted by neo-idealists like the publisher Henry 
Luce who equated the "American Century" with a new "international 
moral order".29
The opinion of the administration, led and staffed by 
Wilsonians like Franklin Delano Roosevelt and his Secretary of State, 
Cordell Hull, was that the League had failed because collective 
security had not been applied correctly rather than because it was a 
mistaken concept in the first place. In other words, it was only 
necessary to try harder.
In the w ords of Vice-President Henry Wallace:
"Now at last the nations of the world have a second 
chance to erect a lasting structure of peace - a structure such as 
that which W oodrow Wilson sought to build but which 
crumbled away because the world was not yet ready."30
However, Roosevelt was not as idealistic as Wilson. He knew 
that public condemnation and moral sanctions were insufficient to 
stop a determined aggressor if they were not backed up by a credible 
threat to use military power. The United States had seen the League 
fail due to the impossibility of commanding sufficient support This 
time, the world organization was to have the "teeth" which could 
have averted the Second W orld War if used in good time. Deterrence 
was to have at least an equal role as conciliation in the plans for a 
future world order. W ashington wanted to avoid being drawn, for the 
third time, into a w ar which it could have done nothing to stop. The 
United Nations were therefore seen as cynically instrumental in 
obtaining the conditions for their own effectiveness: the involvement 
of the great powers and the agreement among them.
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In the first place, it was necessary to avoid a second American 
retreat into isolation which would have underm ined the possibility of 
gathering sufficient resources. W ashington was determined to use 
collective security to make sure that the United States could intervene 
before -rather than after- a conflict had started, thereby restricting the 
costs in blood and treasure. The United Nations offered the general 
framework for this involvem ent A case by case approach would have 
been painful and at the mercy of a revival of the isolationist spirit as 
public opinion disliked "entangling alliances" of a traditional nature. 
Collective security appealed to the American instinct for idealistic 
enterprises and to the taste for innovative institutions of a m ultilateral 
character. An ambitious and universal design more easily justified the 
psychological and physical costs of a proactive policy than narrow 
calculations of national in terest In the words of Charles Bohlen -the 
senior diplomat- the UN was "the only device that could keep the 
United States from slipping back into isolationism".31
Roosevelt wanted to secure US involvement in  world affairs 
from the moods of Congress. He therefore advocated the UN as a way 
to justify a certain freedom of maneuvre to the White House in 
foreign policy. He defended this idea using the metaphore of the 
police (the US executive) which should not ask the town hall 
(Congress) for an authorization every time it proceeds to an arrest He 
certainly did not w ant to render the commitment automatic or to 
transfer sovereignty to a w orld governm ent The veto proviso 
guaranteed both American autonomy and -as the prudent Hull 
maintained wishing above all to avoid a rejection of the Charter- the 
approval of Congress.
In the second place, the United Nations could be used to avoid 
the dissolution of the Grand Alliance after the demise of the common 
Nazi and Japanese threats. The only way to seduce the Soviet Union 
into a positive role in defense of the international order was by 
"offering Moscow a prom inent place in it; by making it, so to speak, a 
member of the Club".32 If the USSR was not reassured by its own 
position in the new system and was not given a stake in its protection, 
the tensions between the great powers would have rendered the 
world organization as powerless as the League had been.
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Above all, Roosevelt envisaged a more minimalistic 
organization than the League. The Wilsonian egalitarian principles of 
"one state, one vote" were to be formally retained in an Assembly, 
but the key role was to be that of great powers. "Roosevelt's concept 
of big-power domination remained the central idea in his approach to 
international organization throughout World W ar II".33 Initially, 
Roosevelt put forward the idea of "four policemen" -the United States, 
the Soviet Union, the British Empire and China- each keeping the 
peace in its own region. He then dismissed this original scheme as too 
similar to the antiquated idea of spheres of influence and settled for 
the concept of a great-power collective directorate. From its inception, 
the UN Security Council was therefore the pillar on which the whole 
organization rested. The great powers would be its perm anent 
members and their consensus was a prerequisite for any multilateral 
effort
American proposals dominated the planning for the United 
Nations. Of the other great powers, France and China were only 
nominal ones and it was becoming clear that even Great Britain would 
not stand on a par w ith W ashington after the w ar was over. 
Churchill's own solution resembled Roosevelt's "four policemen" 
scheme but his generic skepticism of multilateralism precluded a 
large role for London. The Soviet Union also preferred to concentrate 
on particular aspects of the organization rather than to set up its own 
comprehensive proposal. Moscow, not unlike France in 1919, was 
chiefly concerned on the specific settlement of the German problem 
and on its own status in Eastern Europe. It therefore attributed a lower 
priority to w ider questions about international order after the war.
The basis of discussion was therefore the American Outline 
Plan, drafted by Hull and approved by FDR in February 1944. The 
scheme envisaged a largely ceremonial General Assembly comprising 
all members and a Security Council composed of the great powers and 
a num ber of smaller states on a rotating basis. Roosevelt's idea of a 
directorate was essentially maintained. The great powers were 
endowed with a veto power, although its extent was unclear at this 
time, and would have provided the backbone of any collective effort 
It was in fact "a hybrid design: [...] a universal security organization 
grafted onto a concert of power".34
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The plan was discussed by an American, a Soviet and a British 
delegation at Dumbarton Oaks in the Fall of 1944, where m ost major 
issues were settled. An outstanding problem remained the question of 
the extent of the veto power. Britain wanted it to restrict it to those 
situations in which a member was not an interested party in a dispute, 
while the Soviet Union -fearing isolation- preferred an absolute veto 
rig h t An American mediation succeeded at the Yalta Conference the 
following February according to which the perm anent members 
maintained their veto powers even on those deliberations directly 
affecting them, but they could not use it on procedural matters. In 
other words, a great pow er could stop any collective action but it 
could not avoid a multilateral discussion of a certain issue. As part of 
the compromise, Moscow obtained two extra seats in the Assembly 
for Ukraine and Bielarus.
When the UN Conference m et in San Francisco in April 1945, 
the big three adhered to the Dumbarton Oaks and Yalta bargains and 
resisted amendments proposed by the smaller powers aimed at 
restricting the powers of the Council and at enlarging those of the 
Assembly. Instead, the minimalist character of the Charter was further 
reinforced as the early signs of the Cold War which followed were 
already affecting the enthusiasm for multilateralism. The United 
States suggested the insertion of the right to individual and collective 
self defence which -in its explicit form- suggested the idea that 
multilateral security m ight not always be applied. The Conference 
also excluded the concept of perm anent UN military forces and settled 
for the idea of ad hoc agreements w ith individual countries negotiated 
on a voluntary basis.35
Neither the League nor the UN were maximalist organizations 
as they did not fundamentally challenge the sovereignty of members, 
which is explicitly protected in article 2, comma 1 and 7, of the 
Charter. In general terms "the gap separating the League of Nations 
and the United Nations is not large".36 However, this does not mea
that there are no differences between the two organizations. For one 
thing, the United Nations was not coupled with the peace settlement 
in order to avoid the linkage between collective security in general 
and a particular status quo which had haunted the League in the inter­
w ar period. The UN was therefore endowed with an increased degree
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of flexibility which could be used to adapt the organization to 
changed circumstances.
The final version of the Charter was a more complex document 
than the Covenant Apart from the fact that the United Nations was 
entrusted with a wide range of political, economic and social duties, 
virtually unthinkable in 1919, even the collective security mechanism 
set up in San Francisco was elaborate and variegated. According to 
Article 39, the Security Council can either recommend members to 
take action against an aggressor or even mandate economic and 
military sanctions binding on all members. As in the League's 
document, states pledged in the preamble to renounce the use of force 
and to uphold this principle collectively. However, there are in 
Chapter VII of the Charter two different routes for implementing a 
multilateral peace.
Firstly, the Security Council can recommend or authorize the 
enforcement of its resolutions. Secondly, unlike in the Covenant, the 
Security Council could recommend measures by majority vote and 
could even impose to members to take economic or m ilitary 
measures, as stated by Articles 41 and 42. The implementation of 
multilateral policies is not optional or voluntary, but a duty for all 
members under Article 25 of the Charter. Furthermore, unlike in the 
League, there ptfz no proviso for w ithdraw ing from the organization. 
However, all crucial decisions of this sort are subject to the veto of any 
of the five perm anent members. No event triggers automatically a 
multilateral reaction as only the Security Council can determine the 
existence of a threat to peace. If there is no agreement in the Council, 
Chapter VII is simply inapplicable and all that remains are the 
traditional conciliation mechanisms of Chapter VI.
The philosophy of the two organizations can be described using 
the metaphors of the great classics of the social contract The Covenant 
was a Lockean document as it more heavily relied of the goodwill of 
members. Military sanctions were an extrema ratio and were left to the 
voluntary implementation of members which could w ithdraw  at will 
from the organization. On the contrary, the UN -designed after the 
disillusions of the inter-war period- was a more Hobbesian 
organization. The use of force is much more central in the Charter 
than in the Covenant States were obliged to comply to the
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deliberations of the Council and could not w ithdraw from the 
organization. Nevertheless, the Hobbesian nature of the UN was 
tamed by the flexibility ensured by the veto power, which could spare 
the organization an automatic type of reaction.
In a strictly minimalist fashion, the Charter determined that the 
United Nations could act if the great powers agreed but could neither 
manufacture that consensus nor act w ithout i t  When the Grand 
Alliance showed its first signs of collapse, the new organization had to 
adapt itself to the circumstances. Everything rested on the directorate 
of great powers, if these disagreed, there was little left for the United 
Nations to do. The edifice of the Charter itself was left unfinished as 
the Military Staff Committee composed of the Chiefs of General Staff 
of the perm anent members' armed forces collapsed while the 
agreements between members and the Security Council under Article 
43 for earmarking national troops for multilateral use were not 
concluded.
The disillusion w ith collective security is epitomized by the 
search of security relationship outside the multilateral framework 
which was undertaken by both sides in the years following 1945. 
Despite frequent references to the United Nations and to m ultilateral 
principles, the American initiatives for the containment of the Soviet 
Union culminating in the establishment of NATO as well as Moscow's 
responses, were all motivated by the traditional concerns of 
competition w ith an identified and specific adversary. The only article 
in Chapter VII which was widely used between 1945 and 1988 was 
Article 51, which expressed the right of individual and collective self 
defence and which therefore somehow contradicted the collective 
security spirit of the Charter. The UN was impotent in front of the 
bipolar struggle and w hat was originally thought to the exception of 
Article 51 soon became the rule.
The failure of the collective security system is also reflected in 
the intellectual academic and editorial debates. Whereas in the inter­
w ar years the infant discipline of international relations had been 
heavily influenced by the idealism of Wilson's ideas, after the Second 
World W ar a new breed of realist thinkers brought about a new and 
more skeptical consensus. The explanation for the failure of the 
League was not to be found in the mistaken application of collective
-147-
security, but in the concept itself. N ot only had the multilateral 
principles of the organization in Geneva been impotent in front of the 
fascist aggression, but they had been positively counterproductive as 
they had lured the Western powers into a false sense of security which 
had left them unprepared. It was the "lesson of Munich" which chiefly 
motivated this pessimistic view of the United Nations.
Some, like Walter Lippmann and George Kennan, condemned 
the characteristic legalism of the United Nations as a recipe for 
disillusion in an  imperfect w orld or even as a stimulus to dangerous 
moral stances w ithout the flexibility necessary in a world of sovereign 
equals. Others, like Hans Morgenthau, plainly attacked the 
proposition that the collective and national interests could be 
compatible and dismissed as self-defeating the idea that the first could 
or should prevail over the latter. Only a prudent defence of the 
national interest and a careful maintenance of the balance of power 
could hope to achieve a precarious peace.
The emergence of the Cold War and the consequent stalemate 
in the UN seemed to lend strength to this view. The United Nations 
was involved in the first crises of the Cold War, w hen an increasingly 
competitive relationship between the Soviet Union and the W est was 
determining the boundaries of the two blocs. The tensions in Iran and 
Greece were reported to the Security Council in January and May 
1946, respectively. However, the Soviet Union's predictable 
obstructionist tactics inhibited any decision. Both matters were solved 
outside the institutional framework and the latter was brought by the 
United States -in September 1947- to the General Assembly, where it 
became an item of propagandist speeches on both sides. It was 
immediately clear to all that the UN could not stop the Cold War.
From the beginning, the features of multilateral politics in the 
Cold War were set. Given the particular nature of bipolarity, in which 
all crises tend to become items of the central competition between 
superpowers because one's gain is the other one's loss, almost all 
security matters were beyond a decision by the Security Council. On 
no issue could the UN find its prerequisite of great power consensus 
and it was therefore impotent and incapable of substantive decision. 
However, the superpowers recognized the organization's potential for
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gathering political support for their policies and for embarrassing 
their adversary.
This was especially true for the United States, which had wanted 
more than any other state an organization for collective security and 
whose democratic politics encouraged at least a multilateral 
smokescreen for their policies. A stand for universalist motives was 
widely more popular w ith Congress and public opinion than a 
traditional "entangling" alliance w ould have been. The use of the UN 
on the part of Washington was also convenient given the large 
majority that the Western camp enjoyed in the organization's bodies 
in the early years of the Cold War. It was believed that Washington 
could count on 40 out of 51 votes then in the General Assembly. The 
United States was therefore willing to use the UN as a tool to 
strengthen its own coalition in the bipolar struggle.
As will be seen below, the zenith of this attitude was in the 
occasion of the Korean War, in which W estern troops fighting against 
the Communist aggression were formally placed under the UN 
banner. The Korean operation was not a classic case of collective 
security as both camps intervened in the crisis as expected by purely 
unilateral motives. Nevertheless, it was the only instance during the 
Cold W ar in which the provisions of Chapter VII were applied. Many 
neutral and non aligned nations supported the Western action in 
defence of South Korea and public and allied support for 
W ashington's stance was probably higher than it would have been 
outside a multilateral framework. Recognizing this, the Truman 
administration was careful not to erode the impression that the United 
States was fighting for collective security rather than against its 
communist enemy and -short of altering the fundamental tenets of its 
policy- was even prepared to go out of its way to do so.
The Korean War remained an exception because it had been 
possible only due to the fortuitous absence of the Soviet delegate from 
the Council. From then on, the collective mechanisms were allowed to 
work only when they suited both sides. The United Nations could thus 
perform a num ber of ancillary duties as when it sponsored and 
facilitated the negotiations on the status of Indochina at Geneva after 
the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu. Nor was collective security 
completely ignored even if it embarrassed the Western camp, as when
the United States led the multilateral condemnation of Britain and 
France over the Suez episode despite their alliance. Nevertheless, 
w hen an issue was crucial to the logic of the Cold War and it 
threatened a direct confrontation between the superpowers, the UN 
was excluded from central considerations. In 1956, in the occasion of 
the Soviet invasion of Hungary, US Secretary of State John Foster 
Dulles bitterly remarked: "Does anyone in his senses w ant us to start a 
nuclear w ar over Hungary?"37
A new turning point in the role of the organization in world 
politics occurred in 1960, w ith the entry of 16 new African states, soon 
followed by 10 more. The United Nations had dealt from the very 
beginning w ith the issue of de-colonization, when it was faced with 
the question of Palestine, Indonesia and the former Italian colonies in 
Africa. The erosion of the French and British empires gave new 
impetus to this vocation. UN membership became the end point of the 
process of independence. Later -under the pressure of third world 
majorities in the Assembly- the institution became a force in its own 
right in encouraging and supporting independence movements. 
Although this may have been a desirable process on its merits, the 
effect on the collective security function was more dubious. The 
General Assembly no longer reflected the realities of power in the 
international system. Since neither bloc could safely expect to gather a 
majority, they both chose to ignore the organization -and the 
resolutions passed by a non-aligned and often radical General 
Assembly- altogether.
The UN remained a forum for scoring propaganda coups with 
the non-aligned nations and w ith w orld public opinion, but it also 
remained hopelessly excluded from the crucial events of the 1960's 
and 1970's. For example, in the occasion of the Cuban crisis, the United 
States used a public and televised meeting of the Security Council to 
show the satellitary evidence of Soviet missiles on the island, thereby 
embarrassing the Soviet Union. Similarly, Moscow exploited the 
public forum during the Yom Kippur W ar of 1973 in the Middle East 
w hen it offered its troops to the United Nations in order to separate 
the Israeli and Egyptian armies. However, both crises were eventually 
solved outside the multilateral framework by the direct contact 
between the superpowers.
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Despite its irrelevance in the solution of major crisis, the UN 
was capable of adapting to the new situation and found itself a role 
suited to the Cold War. It was in fact in both superpowers' interest 
that regional crises did not escalate into global confrontations, as it 
had happened over Cuba and the October War. Instead of contributing 
autonomously to the resolution of a crisis, the United Nations 
concentrated on facilitating the solutions found by others, most 
notably the superpowers themselves. In doing so, it exploited its 
newly acquired status of impartiality, inconceivable when the United 
States and its allies dominated the votes in New York. In a way, the 
United Nations' very impotence was a guarantee of its neutrality and 
could be exploited to its own advantage.
Specifically, the UN could dispatch peacekeeping contingents 
which could not enforce a ceasefire, bu t could help maintaining one 
once it was in place. What the "blue berets" offered was a small and 
inconspicuous military presence guaranteeing a neutral and fair 
treatm ent of both parties. Peacekeeping was impartial and passive, 
and it therefore fell short of the hopes of collective security 
proponents, bu t it was nevertheless an innovative and creative 
multilateral m ethod of conflict resolution.
There were fifteen "Chapter six-and-one-half' missions (called 
so because they were military operations short of the active use of 
force of Chapter VII) during the Cold War, eight of which were 
simply observers operations. Five missions involved more than 3000 
troops and were: the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) in 
Egypt between 1956 and 1967; the United Nations Congo Operation 
(ON UQ between 1960 and 1964; the United Nations Force in Cyprus 
(UNFICYP) in place since 1964; the UNEF-E in the Middle East 
between 1973 and 1979; and the United Nations Interim Force in 
Lebanon (UNIFIL) established in 1979. These missions did not bring 
peace about as they required the consent of the parties in order to 
operate, but they enhanced the stability of a settlement as they 
guaranteed both parties and increased the political liabilities of a 
breech. Especially in the case of the three Middle Eastern operations, 
they have genuinely contributed to defuse potentially dangerous 
situations.
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In the mid-1980/s, the Cold War unexpectedly turned toward its 
end. Moscow could no longer keep up  the costs that the bipolar 
competition entailed and the arrival of a new leadership under 
Mikhail Gorbachev catalyzed the efforts to exit from the conflict 
which was bringing the Soviet Union to bankruptcy. 
Characteristically, the United Nations was not involved in this 
systemic change brought about by Soviet domestic conditions which 
forced a new leadership to pursue more cooperative policies. In 1986, 
the two superpowers in Reykjavik decided to scrap intermediate- 
range missiles, in the first agreement which actually reduced force 
levels since 1945. In 1988, Moscow unilaterally decided to w ithdraw  
from Afghanistan. Also in 1988, Gorbachev announced at the United 
Nations -which was involved as a mere audience- a reduction in its 
conventional forces w ithout expectation of an American reciprocation. 
Finally, the Soviet Union decided to withold from intervening to 
suppress the revolutions in  Easter Europe in 1989-1990, reversing 
previous decisions to bloc militarily any attempt at autonomy and 
reform in  the countries of the Warsaw Pact
However, also characteristically, the newly found consensus 
among the superpowers was reflected in an increased role for the 
United Nations. Although the UN is impotent if great powers disagree 
-as it d id  not stop the Cold W ar nor it actively contributed to its end- 
it becomes a useful instrum ent of conflict management once the great 
powers are already willing to collaborate. The high point of this 
process was the multilateral intervention in the Gulf in which the 
Security Council authorized a US-led coalition to use force to enforce 
UN resolutions. Iraq's aggression of Kuwait was successfully reversed 
and the world seemed ready for a new era of stability and 
cooperation.
A num ber of regional conflicts in which multilateral attention 
had been precluded by reciprocal vetoes could now finally be 
considered by the United Nations. Peacekeeping activities were 
therefore increased exponentially from five in 1988 to 17 in 1994. It 
was not only a matter of quantity. Traditional concepts of 
peacekeeping were stretched to include missions with multiple 
purposes not restricted to monitoring a ceasefire. Unlike before, UN 
personnel was also unprecedently engaged in domestic affairs as for
example in Cambodia where they took charge of large parts of the 
civil administration. Also the principle of the consent of the parties 
was abandoned. In Kurdistan, Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia, the UN 
authorized the use of force or intervened directly even w ithout a 
previous ceasefire and w ithout the invitation of the combatants.
However, the activism soon backfired. The operation to protect 
a safe haven in Kurdistan faced the increasing determination from 
Baghdad to avoid a secession. The intervention in Somalia failed 
because of the lack of an indigenous central government capable of 
controlling the situation. Food supplies were successfully delivered, 
but the unwillingness of the countries contributing to the operation to 
take charge of the administration of the country led to a prem ature 
departure of Western troops. The losses in Somalia also led to an 
increasing reluctance on the part of the United States to intervene 
abroad, as w as testified by the delays in the operation to restore 
democracy in Haiti.
Above all, the UNPROFOR mission to former Yugoslavia 
underm ined the optimism which had followed the Gulf War. The blue 
helmets were inhibited by the contradictory pressures of public 
opinion, which wanted a decisive resolution to the war, and the 
constraints of a peacekeeping and hum anitarian mandate, which 
forced the troops to maintain an impartial posture in a war-zone. 
After four years of difficulties, the deadlock was broken only when 
NATO planes decided to break the impartial outlook of the operation 
and pushed the Bosnian Serbs to accept a ceasefire in the Summer of 
1995. However, the inability of the United Nations to deal effectively 
w ith the crisis was a major blow to its credibility.38
"Coming on the heels of a United Nations involvement 
in Somalia that, rightly or wrongly, was seen as an example of 
UN ineptitude, the Bosnian episode, in which UN peacekeepers 
were chained to fences as hum an shields, deeply hurt the image 
of the organization as an effective tool for the maintenance of 
international peace and security".39
1995 was the 50th anniversary of the founding of the United 
Nations. The international community still seemed to be uncertain 
about the future of the organization and of its collective security
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principles. On the one hand, the UN remained prom inent on the 
foreign policy agenda of most countries. Following an invitation of 
the Secretary General, many countries have filed proposals for the 
reform of the organization with the aim of updating its form to 
contemporary realities and of increasing its effectiveness. On the other 
hand, states remained reluctant to commit their scarce resources to 
foreign interventions especially at a time, after the Cold War, in 
which public opinion demands to cash in the peace dividends. A stark 
example is the considerable debt which the United States has 
accumulated vis-a-vis the organization. All states favour the United 
Nations and its multilateral principles, but all also prefer that others 
pay for the costs of its functioning. 77 years after its introduction into 
the international system, collective security is still seen in the same 
way as it was then: a concept with an eternally promising future.
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7. T h e  A b y ssin ia n  C risis
i. History
The Abyssinian crisis marks the zenith and the nemesis of the 
League of Nations efforts to provide collective security in the inter­
w ar years. Never before had the expectations been so high on the 
capacity of an international organization to deal with a major crisis. 
The following disillusion was so great that the League never 
recovered from failure.1 "The blow suffered by the League was instant 
and fatal".2 Yet the crisis was the ideal test case for collective security: 
a member state -Italy- had committed a blatant and unequivocal act of 
aggression against another member of the League, Abyssinia. 
Furthermore, Italy's w ar effort was obviously vulnerable to sanctions 
given the enormous logistical difficulties entailed in a major military 
operations sustained from a m ainland thousand of nautical miles 
d istan t
The Abyssinian crisis was indeed an instance of collective 
security. It was in fact the only time that Article 16 of the Covenant 
was invoked. Although the measures adopted stopped short of war, 
the League did condemn Italy as the aggressor and sanctions were 
imposed in a multilateral fashion only because there was a collective 
security system to prescribe them. Not only did the major League 
powers -Britain and France- have no direct interest in Ethiopia, but 
Italy's condemnation was even against their interest because Italy was 
one of their allies. However, in the event, aggression was not stopped 
and Italy annexed Abyssinia in a fashion typical of earlier centuries.
Italian designs over Abyssinia were not a novelty. Italy had 
already attempted to colonize the country -which was the only one in 
Africa independent from European empires- at the end of the XIX 
Century but had suffered a humiliating defeat at Adowa in 1896. 
When Benito Mussolini decided to adopt a more expansionist policy at 
the beginning of the 1930's, Ethiopia was therefore an obvious choice.3 
The first serious plans for invasion were developed in 1932 when 
Fascism in Italy could be said to have established a stable hold over 
the domestic political landscape and w hen the Anglo-French 
hegemony over Europe -which had restrained Italy in the 1920's- was 
already being put in doubt.
In 1934 -after Hitler's rise to power had dramatically changed 
the flavour of international relations- Italian policy focused primarily 
on Europe and especially on Austria. The Austrian Prime Minister 
since 1932, Dolfuss, was a devout admirer of the Duce and his country 
was almost an Italian satellite looking for protection from a growing 
Nazi menace. The Austrian Nazi party had indeed been outlawed -on 
Italian advice- in 1933. The Austro-Italo-Hungarian agreement of 
March 1934 was an alliance which underlined Italian influence in the 
danubian area. When, on July 25th, the Austrian Nazis attempted a 
coup w ith German support and m urdered Dolfuss, Italy therefore 
reacted against the prospect of some kind of Anschluss between 
Austria and Nazi Germany. In a remarkable show of force, Mussolini 
sent two alpine divisions to the Brenner pass on the frontier between 
Italy and Austria and Vienna's independence from Germany was -for 
the time being- guarantied.4
The episode provided Mussolini w ith a great opportunity. He 
had accumulated a considerable amount of political capital because he 
had demonstrated to Britain and France the utility of Italy in the 
containment of an aggressive Germany. Mussolini concluded that the 
time was ripe for the African adventure he had been planning. 
Germany was strong enough to keep the Western allies preoccupied 
to keep a good relationship with Italy while it was not strong enough 
to represent an immediate threat to Austria. A t the end of 1934 Rome 
therefore took the decision to invade Abyssinia.
A t the end of November a frontier incident occurred between 
Italian and Ethiopian troops at the Wal Wal wells which were situated 
in a disputed area between Abyssinia and Italian Somaliland. On 
December 14th, Ethiopia reported the dispute to the League of 
Nations. Italy used the incident in stead as a casus belli. In a secret 
m em orandum  of December 30th Mussolini informed the Chiefs of 
Staff that Italy would have initiated hostilities against Abyssinia "as 
soon as our military preparations will give us the certainty of 
victory".5 Mussolini explained that Italy should seek the complete 
annexation of the country and should seek it before the window of 
opportunity in Europe was closed.6
The memorandum also spelled out the importance of obtaining 
British and French acquiescence to the enterprise. Italian diplomatic
preparations were intensified. In January 1935 Mussolini m et in Rome 
with the French Foreign Minister Pierre Laval.7 In exchange for Italian 
support in  case of German rearm am ent which included plans for joint 
staff talks between General Gamelin and General Badoglio to be held 
in the summer, Mussolini obtained a statement of French lack of 
interest in Ethiopia. According to E.H. Carr: "France stood so much in 
need of Italian friendship in Europe that she was prepared to make 
almost any concession in Africa."8 Although Laval may have been 
ambiguous, Mussolini took the results of the talks as a "green light" 
for the operation. According to the diary of a major Italian diplomat, 
the final decision for the invasion was taken only after the meeting 
and it was "a decision which puts at stake the future of the regime".9 A 
similar approach was attempted w ith Britain when the Italian 
Ambassador to London, Grandi, saw Vansittart on the 29th of January, 
although the British reception of Italian intentions was cooler.10
On the 16th of March Ethiopia reiterated its request to the 
League's Council to deal w ith the dispute but -again- it was turned 
down.11 The main focus of diplomacy returned to Europe because on 
the same day Hitler unilaterally declared that conscription was to be 
reintroduced in Germany, despite the fact that such a measure had 
been explicitly forbidden by the Treaty of Versailles. Britain, France 
and Italy met at a conference in Stresa in April condemning the 
German move and declaring their intention to resist to further 
violations of Versailles and of Locarno.
Exploiting his new position as a fundamental pillar of European 
peace, Mussolini sought further assurances for his plans over 
Abyssinia. When the discussion moved to the necessity of proclaim ing 
the determination of the three powers to protect international 
stability, Mussolini stressed that the stability under consideration was 
circumscribed to Europe. He then took the following silence as further 
proof of Western acquiescence. In Carr's words:
"The British delegates [at Stresa], preoccupied w ith  
Europe, were doubtless unwilling to sound a discordant note 
by mentioning the unwelcome Abyssinian problem. But their 
silence in face of undisguised Italian preparations for w ar was 
interpreted by Mussolini to mean that Great Britain, like
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France, was content to regard his African venture w ith a 
benevolent, or at least an indifferent, eye."12
Mussolini was blackmailing the W est into tolerating his African 
ambitions w ith  the threat of w ithdrawing his support for their 
European policy.
In the meantime, the Ethiopian dispute had again reached the 
Council in Geneva where Italy refused m ediation by the international 
organization and offered bilateral negotiations instead under the 
Italo-Ethiopian agreement signed in 1928. Italy, being the stronger 
power, preferred a direct confrontation in  which she could exploit the 
disparity to her advantage. In the hope that the two countries 
involved found an agreement, the League of Nations preferred not to 
intervene in a dispute which at the time did not seem necessarily to 
lead to the use of force. This decision was confirmed in a meeting in 
May in which the formula of arbitration was preferred to that of open 
discussion in the Council. It was not until the end of July -eight 
months after the initial Ethiopian appeal- that the League did not 
directly consider the matter.13
Despite Mussolini's hopes, which had led in May to an 
intensification of military preparations in East Africa,14 Britain had 
not given Italy a free hand on Abyssinia. Nevertheless, London 
wished to avoid upsetting Italy and preferred a negotiated outcome. 
At the end of May, the British Ambassador to Rome, Sir Eric 
Drummond, proposed a protectorate solution on the blueprint of the 
arrangem ent regulating British influence in E gypt15 At the end of 
June the Minister for League of Nations Affairs, Anthony Eden, w ent 
to Rome w ith a compromise plan. Italy would annex the province of 
Ogaden and gain extensive economic rights in the rest of the country. 
Meanwhile, Britain would compensate Ethiopia with the port of Zeila. 
Mussolini dismissed the offer because he wanted at least all the non- 
amharic areas and because Abyssinia would gain access to the sea and 
protection from Britain. Eden returned to London empty handed.16
June was a crucial m onth for the crisis. Firstly, the consolidated 
relationship between France and Britain showed the first signs of 
strain. The new Baldwin government was beginning to take a tougher 
line after the failure of Eden's mediation proposal. This was also due
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to the publication of the results of the so-called Peace Ballot at the end 
of the month.17 The initiative was a very large survey concerning the 
League of Nations sponsored by the private League of Nations Union. 
Almost 40% of British citizens over 18 participated and the 
overwhelming majority expressed its support for the League and its 
collective security machinery. The British position paper on Ethiopia 
-the Maffey report- was accordingly changed from a statement of "no 
interest^ in Abyssinia to one of concern for Italy7 s aggressive 
intentions.
The French, who did not wish to lose Italy's support against 
Germany, just reinforced by a meeting between the Chiefs of Staff 
Badoglio and Gamelin on military collaboration, objected to this new 
British stance. Paris was also extremely preoccupied by the Anglo- 
German Naval Agreement which demonstrated the willingness -on 
the part of London- of tolerating a limited am ount of German 
revisionism. In June it seemed that while Britain was prepared to close 
an eye on Germany to concentrate on frustrating Italian designs, 
France was taking exactly the opposite view. The tension between the 
two Western allies was also highlighted by the fact that Eden's offer 
had been proposed w ithout prior consultation w ith Paris.18
Germany came into the game in another im portant respect On 
June 11th an Austro-German agreement was signed in which German 
influence over Vienna was clear and preluded  ^ //fu rth e r convergence, 
Italy, eager to obtain diplomatic support for her African designs, had 
not objected. The previous January Mussolini had given his approval 
to closer German-Austrian relations in a meeting w ith the German 
Ambassador to Rome, Von Hassel, and even mentioned to a personal 
envoy of the Fuhrer his intention of forging an ideological alliance 
with Berlin against the "bourgeois" powers.19 The tough containment 
line of 1934 had been completely reversed.
In July the British government reconsidered its position. By 
now it was recognized in London that a w ar between Italy and 
Abyssinia was a distinct possibility and it was therefore necessary to 
prepare for that contingency. On the 3rd and again on the 22nd 
sanctions against Italy in the eventuality of aggression were discussed 
by the Cabinet. Yet, although the pressure of public opinion for 
collective security -made salient by the Peace Ballot- was great, the
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government decided in another two Cabinet meetings on the 24th and 
on the 31st that it would have renewed its efforts to find a diplomatic 
solution in concert with France. The League of Nations provided the 
occasion when it appealed to Britain and France -as signatories to the 
1906 Tripartite Agreement w ith Italy on East Africa- to negotiate.20
The three parties m et in Paris on August 16th. The British and 
French proposed to put part of Abyssinia under an Italian protectorate 
and to find an arrangement for the economic and political penetration 
of the res t However, the whole scheme was to be put under the 
supervision of the League. The Western powers could not allow Italy 
to receive a straightforward m andate and therefore offered a face- 
saving solution. However, for Mussolini this was not enough and, for 
the third time, he rejected a solution which was largely favourable to 
Italy. An American offer of mediation -triggered by a personal appeal 
of Haile Selassie to President Roosevelt- was also turned down.21 The 
Fascist regime had mobilized such expectations in Italy that a 
negotiated compromise would be seen as a defeat On August 14th the 
Italian Chief of Staff had expressed his reservations about w ar since 
Italy could not withstand a British retaliation. Mussolini had replied 
to the East African Commander De Bono on the 20th that w ar with 
Abyssinia w as by now inevitable. The Duce would settle for nothing 
less than a military victory in the field.22
The failure of the Tripartite meeting m ade the prospect of war 
closer and induced the British government to prepare for the w orst 
On August 22nd part of the Home Fleet was sent to the Mediterranean 
in order to be able to respond to an eventual Italian retaliation to 
sanctions. The 144-ship-strong reinforcement was sent as 
precautionary measure. The admiralty was not eager to engage in 
combat w ith Italy but it was felt that the Mediterranean Fleet was not 
sufficient for eventual enforcement operations. On the 24th, the 
Cabinet decided that it would react -short of war- to a direct challenge 
to the League. The dispute between Italy and Abyssinia had become a 
confrontation between Italy and Britain.23
However, London had not lost hope for a peaceful way out to 
the crisis. The League of Nations' arbitration of the Wal Wal 
controversy had been concluded w ith a solomonic result at the 
beginning of September, blaming neither party. The British
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government then shaped a double track policy. On the one hand 
Britain was prepared to defend the collective norms of the League. The 
Home Fleet arrived in the M editerranean theatre on the 12th. The day 
before Foreign Minister Hoare delivered a speech in Geneva 
emphatically pleading Britain's intention to uphold its obligations 
under the Covenant On the other hand, Britain sought to persuade 
Italy -supposedly softened by Britain's military preparations- to 
negotiate. On the same day of Hoare's speech Laval and Hoare himself 
decided that there should be no w ar between the Stresa allies.24
This strategy did not impress Mussolini, who turned down yet 
another solution proposed by a League committee composed by 
Britain, France, Spain, Poland and Turkey. The plan envisaged an
Britain. Despite the fact that the Duce's mo dvisers were
in favour of acceptance, Mussolini preferred to raise the stakes. He had 
certainly been informed of the secret meeting between Laval and 
Hoare. He was probably also influenced by reports of the Italian 
secret service which indicated the Admiralty's unwillingness to 
provoke a w ar with Italy.25
The next step was the invasion of Abyssinia. Hostilities were 
initiated on October 3rd by a very large Italian force of 400000 men 
equipped w ith m odern weapons and supported by a conspicuous air­
force of 350 planes. The Italians were confronted by only 250000 
Ethiopians.26 The response of the League was swift and -initially- 
remarkably decisive. Four days after the invasion Italy was 
condemned as the aggressor and within the next two weeks a first 
contingent of economic sanctions was imposed. The Council also 
formed a committee -the Committee of Eighteen- to deal w ith the 
enforcement of the embargo. It really seemed that this time a 
collective response would work.27
However, while the public stance of Britain was adamant, 
behind the scenes it continued its double track policy. A t the insistence 
of France -who wanted a negotiated solution in order not to 
jeopardize the Stresa front- the Foreign Office specialist on East Africa, 
Peterson, entered talks w ith his French counterpart, Saint Quentin, to 
find a settlement acceptable to Italy.28 France even resisted for some 
time the British request to use port facilities in the Mediterranean for
Italian m andate over part of Abyssinia guarani i4d by
) L
France
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the Royal Navy. Only at the end of October did France agree to a 
meeting of the Chiefs of Staff to discuss military contingencies with 
Britain.
In November, after the capture of Makall£, the Italian offensive 
slowed down. Mussolini w as seriously worried about the possibility 
of a long war imperiled by the effects of sanctions. The Lira had to be 
devalued at the end of November by a quarter of its value. Mussolini 
therefore relieved the Fascist commander De Bono and replaced him 
w ith the charismatic Badoglio. However, the Italians, despite their 
superiority, suffered an Ethiopian counteroffensive which forced 
Badoglio into retreat Meanwhile, Mussolini intensified his telephonic 
contacts with Laval because he was concerned about an upgrade of the 
sanctions regime. He also sent General Garibaldi to London at the end 
of the month to send feelers about a possible compromise.
Britain's double track policy continued. The government r^n  Ck
the campaign for the November general elections on a sanctionist f
platform and Baldwin was returned in  office w ith a large majority. At 
the same time, the contacts with France continued both to produce a 
proposal for settlement and to prepare to stop Italy should the 
proposal fail. The government had in fact acknowledged -on the 
advice of the Chiefs of Staff- that any hostilities should be sustained 
w ith the active help of the French. Paris was asking for a high price for 
this possibility: in exchange for French help against Italy, France 
demanded concrete support on the Rhine against Germany. As Britain 
had resisted a perm anent military commitment on the continent since 
the end of the Great War, such linkage left the British perplexed.
The climax of the crisis and of London's double track policy was 
reached in December. On the 2nd, the Cabinet m et to discuss the crisis.
Ten days later the Committee of Eighteen -who had gathered a 
momentum of its own- was scheduled to discuss the tightening of 
sanctions and especially the introduction of an oil embargo which 
-given Italy's complete dependence on imported fuel- w ould have 
crippled Rome's war effort The oil sanction would most probably 
have forced Mussolini to back down.29 The Cabinet agreed that a last 
attempt to negotiate should have been tried before the oil sanction, 
which was likely to provoke a "m ad dog" act of retaliation of Italy 
against Britain.
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The ground was set for the Anglo-French talks which brought 
in extrem iisjo the Hoare-Laval plan, concluded in Paris on the 9th and 
cleared by the British Cabinet on the same day. The plan envisaged 
the Italian outright annexation of three provinces -Tigrai, Dankalia 
and Ogaden- with the addition of vast zones for economic exploitation 
in the South and West of Abyssinia. When it was leaked by a French 
paper, public opinion was enraged. The proposal rewarded aggression 
by offering to Italy more than any other plan draw n up prior to the 
invasion.30 Furthermore, the government had not publicized the 
negotiations and the public felt it had been double-crossed. 
Meanwhile, Mussolini had postponed his answer and the plan was 
killed, before a deal could be struck, by the reaction of the public.31 
Hoare resigned and was substituted by Eden, who had earned himself 
the reputation of an uncompromising supporter of the League. The 
Hoare-Laval plan was the last attem pt to find a negotiated settlem ent
The new year opened w ith bad news for Italy which brought 
Mussolini on the verge of depression and despair. The Ethiopian 
counteroffensive w ent on and the Italian troops, after suffering a 
defeat in the first battle of Tembien, were in  some sectors pushed back 
until Eritrea.32 Secondly, the League of Nations resumed discussions 
on an oil embargo, which had been delayed by the Hoare-Laval 
initiative. Thirdly, Mussolini lost an important ally when Laval fell 
out of power and was replaced by Flandin in a government headed by 
Herriot.
However, Flandin's policy did not differ substantially from 
Laval's. When oil sanctions were discussed on January 20th, France 
asked for a committee of experts to be formed and to assess their 
effectiveness and technical feasibility. Mussolini had gained a new 
lease of life. Moreover, the situation on the ground was improving for 
Italy. Badoglio, also with the widespread use of poison gas and 
indiscriminate air bombing, regained the initiative and launched the 
final offensive. On February 15th the Amba Aradam bastion fell to the 
Italians who also w on the second battle of Tembien.33
On the 12th of February, the League's committee of experts 
presented its repo rt oil sanctions would be effective due to Italy's 
extreme vulnerability. Britain therefore again seized the initiative and 
on February 25th the Cabinet decided to endorse oil sanctions, which
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were finally to be decided upon on March 2nd. Mussolini then used all 
the diplomatic weapons he had to avoid such a prospect w hen victory 
in the w ar seemed to be w ithin his grasp. On the 24th and again on the 
27th of February Italy therefore threatened France to repudiate the 
Mussolini-Laval and the Badoglio-Gamelin agreements if oil sanctions 
were introduced. In Abyssinia, Badoglio intensified the final 
offensive.34
Further sanctions were thus again postponed on March 2nd 
after a personal appeal by Flandin. They were never to be discussed 
again because on March 7th Hitler, seizing the opportunity provided 
by the divisions within the Stresa front, remilitarized the Rhineland, 
breaching yet another clause of the Versailles Treaty. The attention 
shifted again on Europe and Britain -and even less France- were no 
longer prepared to get distracted in Africa. On May 5th Badoglio 
entered Addis Ababa. On the 9th Mussolini in Rome proclaimed the 
establishment of the Empire. In June, the British Cabinet -stimulated 
by the Chancellor of the Exchequer Neville Chamberlain- decided that 
sanctions on Italy should be lifted. In July sanctions were indeed 
terminated and the Home Fleet was recalled from the M editerranean 
to attend more pressing duties in the North Sea. The Abyssinian crisis 
was over. The League of Nations had helplessly watched Italy 
swallow another member state.
ii. Italian Motivations
There are various interesting questions raised by the 
Abyssinian crisis, some of which are relevant to the discussion on 
collective security. The first one is w hy was Italy not deterred by the 
League's machinery. This leads us to inquire about Italy's m otivations. 
On this matter there are various interpretations, which in tu rn  refer to 
various levels of analysis. Following a traditional typology of 
international relations theory, such levels (or, in W altz's terms, 
"images") are three: the level of the individual decision makers, the 
domestic political level and the level of the international system.
Some historians have explained Italian foreign policy in terms 
of Mussolini's personality.35 They see the Fascist regime as a one- 
man-show. Since their assessment of the Duce is negative, they also 
give a negative account of Italian policy in that period. Mussolini was
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an egomaniac obsessed w ith his own personal position. Foreign
/ policy was simply a tool to increase his prestige leading to improvised and amateurial initiatives. Abyssinia was not the outcome of a thought-out plan but the result of Mussolini's attempts to exploit 
opportunistically each contingent situation to boost his image. Like 
Mann's apprentice warlock, Mussolini unleashed forces which he 
could not control. Once the enterprise had been launched, he could not 
back dow n because otherwise he would have lost his face.
At the opposite end of the spectrum, many other (mainly 
Italian) historians explain Italian policy in the Abyssinian crisis as the 
result of third image factors.36 While in domestic politics Fascism 
presented distinct characteristics, in foreign affairs it was "normal" 
and no different from other countries. Mussolini was therefore 
motivated only by international political considerations such as the 
"w indow of opportunity" opened by the special situation in Europe. 
Mussolini would have settled also for limited objectives and the 
blame for the outcome rests on Britain and its lack of a clear policy. 
For Italy, Abyssinia was indeed a "political masterpiece" as it 
strengthened the regime internally and brought Italy to empire 
resisting the pressures of a large part of the international community.
Finally, second image considerations point to characteristics of 
the domestic political system. Expansion in  Abyssinia w ould therefore 
have been brought about by such reasons as Fascist ideology and the 
need to divert public attention from domestic problems. International 
political factors m ay have been im portant for the timing of Italian 
policy but the real motivations lay elsewhere.
Some highlight the importance of ideology. Fascism was 
guided by a revision of Marxism in which the Nation replaced Class 
as the basic unit of analysis. The dialectical notion of struggle, taken 
from Marx and Sorel, was coupled w ith the antimaterialistic vision of 
the nation of Nietzsche and Oriani. In the fight between the 
"plutocratic" democracies and the young "proletarian" nations such as 
Italy for a place in the sun, w ar to conquer vital space for the growth 
of the nation was necessary and even desirable. Mussolini therefore 
wanted w ar because it was consistent w ith his view of the world and 
because it could fulfill the ultimate mission of Fascism.37
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War was for Fascism the true test of manhood and nationhood. 
According to Mussolini: "W ar alone brings up to the highest tension 
hum an energies and puts the stamp of nobility upon the people who 
have the courage to meet i t  War is to man w hat maternity is to the 
woman. I do not believe in perpetual peace; not only do I not believe 
in it, but I find it depressing and a negation of all the fundamental 
virtues of man". It would otherwise be difficult to explain w hy Italy 
spent a proportion of national income on defence twice as big as that 
of France.38 The League of Nations and its mechanisms for peaceful 
dispute were seen by Mussolini only as instruments in the hands of 
the weak and corrupt Western satisfied powers to prevent the rise of a 
new Roman Empire. Far from intending to respect international 
norms, the Duce thought that only violence could revise this situation. 
To a major Fascist exponent, Mussolini remarked in December 1935: 
"A revolution is not such if it does not play at the global level. And 
the only way it can do so is by war".39
Even more influential domestic factors can be found in the 
inherent domestic weakness of dictatorships. The lack of established 
institutional procedures and of elections deprives the regime of ways 
to test its legitimacy, which is thus an unknown quantity. Dramatic 
moves in foreign affairs are therefore a way to increase the regime's 
prestige and to divert possible discontent either for economic distress 
or for the repressive policies on the opposition. Federico Chabod 
writes about "the fatal law of dictatorships: success externally is 
doomed to compensate the loss of liberty internally".40 Lowe and 
Marzari agree: "The conventional explanation of the conquest of 
Abyssinia as an exasperated nationalism seeking to divert internal 
discontent into foreign adventures is certainly correct".41
These interpretations suggest that Mussolini was motivated by 
reasons which closely related the very survival of his regime rather 
than the international position of Italy. "Mussolini's main motive 
appears to have been both political and personal: a demonstration of 
Italian power to the glory of the regime" 42 According to Winston 
Churchill: "his rule, his safety, depended upon prestige". 43 The need 
to bolster his prestige was therefore neither vanity nor a "normal" 
foreign policy. If motivations were laid at the domestic political level 
rather than at the international one, then a modification of Italy's
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international environment -short of compellence- would not have 
entailed dramatic consequences. If Mussolini w anted a public military 
victory for prestige's sake, he also w ould not have been interested in a 
negotiated settlement even if it was advantageous for Italy. As the 
Duce said to an important industrialist in November: "We cannot 
accept compromises before a military victory".44
Clausewitz's maxim that "aggressors always love peace" does 
not seem to hold in this case. Mussolini wanted w ar for w ar's sake 
because only total victory in the field could provide him w ith the 
glory which he felt he needed. Northedge writes that "Mussolini did 
not w ant to be prevented from conquering his victim by anything 
short of superior force. The conquest of Abyssinia was too im portant 
in his foreign policy; he had invested too much money, too m uch of 
his own political future in it" 45
The evidence seems to confirm this last argum ent Mussolini 
refused all the plans for peaceful solution which would have spared 
him the risks of a military adventure and would have allowed him to 
maintain good relations w ith Britain and France. Mussolini was after a 
public and explicit military victory for domestic reasons rather than 
for the benefits it concretely entailed. All other considerations were 
therefore secondary. The League powers failed to recognize this and 
wrongly assumed that the Duce was negotiating in good faith.
Mussolini never appeared to give serious considerations to any 
of the peace plans. The approaches of Drummond in May, Eden in 
June, the Tripartite proposals in August and the League's ones in 
September were all turned dow n immediately without offering clear 
counteroffers. The only time in  which Mussolini declined to give an 
immediate answer was in the occasion of the Hoare-Laval plan. In this 
case the Duce sent the plan to the Fascist Grand Council for approval. 
However, it is important to point out that the Ground Council's 
advice was unnecessary and in fact it was not even asked in October 
when w ar was declared. Rather, this appears like a move to play for 
time until the plan was w ithdrawn, given the fact that the public's 
reaction was already clear when the proposal was presented to Italy.
Further evidence of Mussolini's eccentric agenda is provided by 
the repercussions of the Abyssinian crisis on Italy's European 
situation. If Italy had a clear national interest it was that to keep
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Austria independent and benevolent towards Rome. Austria was a 
valuable buffer protecting Italy's most vulnerable North-Eastern 
frontier. The Anschluss would have reduced Rome's freedom of 
maneuver because it would have brought a major revisionist power as 
a neighbour. This prospect had moved Mussolini to oppose a Nazi 
takeover in Vienna in 1934.
Italy's Austrian policy was reversed at the beginning of 1935, 
when Mussolini was planning for the Abyssinian adventure and was 
anticipating the international isolation which would have ensued. In 
January, the Duce cleared the way for the June 1935 Austro-German 
agreement which put the Alpine republic under Germany's sphere. 
This was reinforced in the 1936 Pact of Steel in which Mussolini again 
confirmed his acquiescence to Germany's influence over Austria in 
exchange for Berlin's recognition of the Italian conquest of Ethiopia. In 
1938, when the Anschluss actually took place, no protests were raised 
from Rome. As one historian of Fascism puts i t  "in one stroke, m ost 
of the strategic gains from the First W orld W ar were lost".46
In other words, Mussolini was prepared to forego one of Italy's 
most supreme national interests, that of protecting its most vulnerable 
flank. In purely foreign policy terms, this was not worth the candle 
but clearly a disproportionate premium on an enterprise w ith  little or 
no economic or strategic value. In Martin Wight7s words: "Abyssinia 
was a desperate act of self-assertion".47 The consequences of the 
Ethiopian crisis weakened Italy's international position because it 
alienated her from Britain and France and pushed her into the 
dangerous embrace of a Germany strengthened by the Austrian quid 
pro quo. In East Africa Italy fatally overstretched its own scarce 
resources. Far from being a masterpiece, the Ethiopian episode was 
therefore motivated by considerations beyond the m ere foreign 
policy goals and rather were at the core of the regime's position 
within the Italian political scene.
Italy's motivations in 1935 were therefore heterogeneous with 
respect to the common practice of diplomacy because Italy was 
prepared to run disproportionate risks to its strategic position in 
order to reach a prestigious victory in Abyssinia. It follows that, since 
Mussolini was not following traditional objectives, traditional 
methods of deterrence w ould not work. Although economic sanctions,
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public condemnation and diplomatic isolation would be sufficient to 
restrain many states, such measures were insufficient to deter Italy. 
The international cost of sanctions simply did not match the domestic 
benefits of victory. Once Mussolini's prestige and that of his regime 
-his param ount goal- were at stake, probably nothing less than the use 
of force would have forced him to change his mind.
In this sense, m ilder sanctions like those actually imposed were 
even counterproductive because they allowed the Duce to exploit 
-with a masterful use of propaganda- a "rally around the flag" effect 
In front of Italy's isolation, even prom inent anti-fascist figures like 
Benedetto Croce supported the regime for nationalistic reasons. 
Pirandello devolved his Nobel Prize to the national cause. Although 
sanctions did impose a cost on the Italian economy, their effect on 
Italian domestic politics was one of strengthening the hold of Fascism. 
The regime's popularity reached its peak in those days. In this 
particular respect, the Abyssinian adventure was indeed a success for 
Mussolini and his associates.
The problem is that collective security would be useful 
precisely in those situations in which a state is not deterred by 
conventional methods. It is no use to relegate Mussolini's Italy in the 
field of exceptions because it is especially against those exceptions that 
international security has to be preserved. Collective security through 
economic sanctions may be useful in many situations. However, it is 
insufficient to stop a state which -for whatever reasons- is determined 
to run high risks for the attainment of its goals. It is indeed one of the 
major problems of collective security that it exposes a deep 
motivational gap between the culprit, which has high stakes in play, 
and the would-be enforcers, which by definition have only a 
tangential and indirect interest in the dispute.
iii. Britain's Policy
This leads us to the question of the behaviour of the League of 
Nations in  the crisis. After all, it seemed at the time that if ever 
collective security was to work, this was i t  Abyssinia was a m em ber 
of the League and it had appealed to Geneva for protection. Italy's 
aggression was blatant, unprovoked and could not be disguised as a 
preventive intervention w ith defensive motives. Furthermore, Italy's
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w ar effort was vulnerable to sanctions as Italy w as heavily dependent 
on imports for energy and the long supply lines from the mainland to 
the theatre of operations could easily be choked off by closing the 
Suez canal.
To examine the reasons why the League failed to stop Italy one 
needs to look especially at British policy. The effectiveness of 
collective action was in fact dependent upon the Royal Navy's 
capability and willingness to enforce i t  The smaller powers did 
contribute to economic sanctions and their armed forces were 
included in the contingency planning for an eventual military 
confrontation w ith the aggressor.48 However, the ultimate w eight fell 
on British shoulders as only Britain could credibly sustain an Italian 
reaction in the Mediterranean. Although it may not have been 
sufficient, British contribution was certainly necessary, and so it 
seemed at the time. The League's reactions w ere thus largely driven 
from London.
British policy w ith regard to the Abyssinian crisis can be 
divided into three phases. In the first one, which lasted until June 1935, 
Britain preferred to ignore the possibility of conflict in the hope that 
Italy would content itself with a diplomatic victory. Secondly, when it 
was clear that w ar was likely, Britain adopted the double track policy 
of trying to negotiate a solution w ith Italy while not renouncing to 
uphold the principles of the League. In the third phase, after the 
failure of the Hoare-Laval plan, Britain reluctantly and unsuccessfully 
tried to tighten the sanctions regime until the Rhineland crisis shifted 
the attention away from East Africa.
London's diplomacy brought the League into a cul-de-sac. 
Churchill's comments are sarcastic: "The Prime Minister had declared 
that sanctions meant war; secondly, he was resolved there m ust be no 
war; and thirdly he decided upon sanctions. It was evidently 
impossible to reconcile these three conditions".49 Trying to save both 
the Stresa front and the League of Nations Britain lost both.50 The 
double track policy was not sufficient to stop Italy but it was sufficient 
to alienate her.
Certainly, this was partially caused by a misperception of 
Italy's motives. Britain thought Italy would not jeopardize its position 
in Austria. "W hitehall's evaluation was that the Italian position in
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Europe and Africa was very weak and that Mussolini was therefore 
vulnerable to international pressure [...] and would find it necessary to 
accept British terms".51 Decision makers in London were seriously 
intrigued by a m odem  country which refused a compromise solution 
and risked diplomatic isolation to conquer a distant territory whose 
worth was -at least- dubious. Foreign Minister Hoare remarked in a 
meeting w ith the High Commissioners of the Dominions at the end of 
July: "If Signor Mussolini w ould only go slow and proceed by the 
road of economic concessions and similar securities, he would get all 
that he could w ant in a comparatively short time".52
The double track policy may well have succeeded w ith a less 
determined adversary. As John Herz has pointed out, even m ild 
sanctions almost forced Mussolini to give up.53 The problem was that 
Mussolini was "unappeasable" and that Britain chose not to 
acknowledge this fact However, there were other and deeper reasons 
which led to British indecision. On the one hand Britain could not risk 
a w ar w ith Italy w ithout eroding core strategic interests. On the other 
hand it could not completely and publicly abandon the League of 
Nations. Given these two constraints, the double track policy was 
almost a foregone conclusion.
Britain wanted to avoid an open military confrontation both for 
psychological and for material reasons. The public was opposed to 
w ar in general as the Great W ar had left a bitter memory. Writers such 
as Remarque had well captured the pacifist mood depicting w ar as a 
futile and senseless enterprise. This attitude was compounded by the 
widespread fear of m odem  warfare. Pacifist societies were as common 
before the Second W orld W ar as militaristic leagues had been before 
the First one. The Labour Party, which had reached majority levels 
twice, had a strong pacifist wing. In 1934, in the East Fulham by- 
election a pro-rearmament Tory was defeated by a pacifist Labour 
candidate with a 40% swing. Meanwhile, the Oxford Union voted a 
motion affirming that under no circumstances it would have fought 
for "king and country".54
Even with a different predisposition toward the use of force, 
Britain had structural material weaknesses which inhibited its 
involvement in a League war. Britain simply did not have the 
resources to preserve the Versailles settlement when this fell under
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the attack of multiple revisionist powers. A part from Italy -which 
until 1935 had never been considered as a threat- Britain had to deal 
w ith the Japanese challenge in the Far East and the latent danger from 
Germany. As the first two years of the Second W orld W ar 
demonstrate, this was too much for Britain to handle. According to 
W ight "It was fear of German action in Europe that inhibited Britain 
and France from preventing the Italian conquest of Abyssinia".55 Even 
in 1936, Hitler successfully exploited the Abyssinian crisis for the 
remilitarization of the Rhineland.
As Inis Claude and Raymond Aron have remarked -stressing a 
point already made by Arnold Toy bee at the time- the conditions for 
collective security were not met.56 Apart from Italy, two other major 
powers -Germany and Japan- were dedicated to the overthrow of the 
international system. A t the same time the United States was on the 
sidelines and the Soviet Union -which also had a revisionist 
programme- was excluded from Anglo-French diplomacy. The 
distribution of power simply did not concede any security surplus to 
invest in East Africa.
Although the admiralty was confident that it could successfully 
manage a w ar in the Mediterranean, it was strongly opposed to such a 
prospect A w ar would have depleted precious resources especially 
given Italy's feared (and over-rated) air-force and the Royal Navy's 
inadequate air-defences. A war would also have absorbed future 
forces in policing the Mediterranean sea lanes from Italy while the 
most pressing threats were in  Asia and in the N orth Sea. Not only was 
London therefore w orried about losing an ally but also about 
enlarging the enemy camp.
The naval build up in the Summer was more a bargaining chip 
in diplomatic negotiations, an insurance against a "m ad dog" act by 
Italy and a demonstration to public opinion of the government's pro- 
League policy than a real preparation for war. Of the two measures 
which would have dramatically stopped Italy and were likely to 
trigger her reaction, the closure of the Suez canal was never 
contemplated while the oil sanction was seriously considered only too 
late and when all attempts at mediation had failed.
While Britain had to confront multiple threats and was reluctant 
to engage its scarce resources into confronting one of them, it also had
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problems finding support from its allies, most notably France. In a 
multipolar situation, it is easy that states pass the buck of containment 
onto each other. In this case Britain and France strained their 
relationship to the point of crisis a t least three times. Firstly, when at 
the end of October the imposition of sanctions led to contingency 
planning in the event of an Italian retaliation, France delayed the 
necessary meetings of the Chiefs of Staff. Secondly, when the League 
was scheduled to discuss the oil sanctions in December, Paris pressed 
for a further extreme attem pt at conciliation which culminated in the 
ill-fated Hoare-Laval plan. As Hoare explained to the House of 
Commons, this "was the minimum basis on which the French 
government was prepared to proceed".57 Finally, w hen Britain 
unilaterally decided at the end of February that it would have gone 
ahead w ith the oil embargo and France opposed this.
France was obsessed w ith the German threat and was contrary 
to any enterprise which w ould have weakened its diplomatic or 
military position. Under no circumstances w ould France alienate Italy 
from the Stresa front or the Laval-Mussolini entente which spared 
France from deploying 18 divisions on the Franco-Italian border. 
Mussolini skillfully exploited this situation. "Laval was the key and 
Mussolini worked hard to keep him  in  line".58 T h e o n lv  n o ss ib ilitv
tangible help on the Rhine, whicn London was not prepared to 
concede.59
either disclaimed any responsibility for the enforcement of its 
decisions or even opposed them. The problem was that in a 
m ultipolar system Britain and France had different agendas and 
perceptions on the relative intensity of the various threats. Each 
preferred that the costs for the maintenance of stability would have 
been paid by the other. Military action against a determined Italy 
entailed too high a cost and too little an interest especially if Britain 
and France held diverging views. As Haile Selassie bitterly remarked 
at the 16th Assembly of the League, w hat was lacking was not the 
capability to stop Italy, but the will to do i t
would have been if Britain was
While not openly disconfessi League, France therefore
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"At no time, in no circumstances, could sanctions that 
were intentionally inadequate, intentionally ill-applied, stop an 
aggressor. This is not a case of impossibility, but of refusal to 
stop an aggressor."60
Yet, Britain did not bow completely to the exigencies of the 
balance of power and never openly abandoned the goal of fulfilling 
Geneva's directives. Indeed, after the Hoare-Laval plan had failed, 
Britain decided to proceed w ith tougher sanctions even without 
French support and was dissuaded only by the outburst of the 
Rhineland crisis. The reluctance to abandon collective security 
altogether m eant that sanctions -even of a m ild nature- wjfcre in fact 
imposed on Italy which retaliated by seeking a closer relationship 
with Germany. The reasons behind this reluctance demonstrate that 
institutions do matter and that they can influence the behaviour of 
states even when this is damaging to their national in terest Despite 
its halfheartedness, the British upholding of principles during the 
crisis meant the loss of an ally in the containment of Germany. This 
happened despite the fact that -as the original Maffey report had 
stated- Britain had no major interest at stake in Ethiopia.
On the one hand, Britain could not wholly abandon the League 
of Nations because of the very nature of collective security. The 
credibility of the whole system relies on each single operation 
because it is geared to all aggressions irrespective of geographic 
location. If Britain left Abyssinia to its own destiny, it would have 
weakened stability also in Europe and elsewhere. In Walters' words: 
"If the Covenant were to be tom  up in Africa, it would equally cease 
to provide security in Europe".61 According to Northedge: "Hoare, 
conscious of the implications of the dispute for the more serious 
challenge of the status quo, feared that, if the League failed in this test 
case, British people would conclude that it was certain to fail in the 
German case and accordingly would w ithdraw into isolation".62
Bpth Germany and Japan -as in fact they did- would have 
inferred that the Western powers lacked resolve and w ould have 
acquiesced even in further aggressions. The primary target of 
sanctions was indeed Germany.63 According to Speer's memoirs, 
Hitler convinced himself after Abyssinia that the West was weak and 
indecisive.64 Paradoxically, the Nazi threat was therefore an
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ambiguous stimulus. On the one hand, if aggression went unchecked, 
deterrence w ould be undermined. On the other hand, also a w ar with 
Italy would have weakened the W esf s capacity to contain Germany.
Secondly, the League of Nations was very popular w ith public 
opinion, which was "alm ost unanimous in calling for action in 
restraint of an Italian attack on Abyssinia".65 The Peace Ballot had an 
impressive turnout and a vast majority expressed itself in favour of 
the collective security provisions of the Covenant Despite the fact that 
most of the establishment in  London held little faith in the League, no 
democratically elected government could openly disregard its
popularity. Baldwin's Conservative government ryn  the campaign to A*
the November 1935 general elections on an' openly sanctionist 
platform. The public outrage when the Hoare-Laval compromise was 
publicized was sincere and it forced the government to sacrifice its 
Foreign Minister. According to Churchill, the news of the Hoare-Laval 
compromise "shook Parliament and the nation at its base."66
Although it is by no means clear that public opinion would 
have been enthusiastic about a war w ith Italy, an open rejection of 
collective security would have costea Baldwin dearly in domestic 
political terms. The constraints set by public opinion on the 
Conservative government were therefore extremely demanding. On 
the one hand it pressed the government to "do something" about the 
rape of Abyssinia. On the other it wanted the government to do so 
w ithout jeopardizing the security of the Empire or spending blood 
and treasure in a war w ith Italy.
This highlights one of the major contradictions of collective 
security. Since its popularity stems from a willingness to solve the 
question of war, it is not easily reconciled with the fact that in practice 
it may actually involve a state in more conflicts than if it was not in 
place. As Hoare remarked to the House of Commons in his defence of
the Hoare-Laval Plan, this contradiction the very heart of the /
League, which imposed the task "of trying to find a basis of settlem ent 
for this unfortunate dispute" while at the same time pushing states "to 
take the full share in collective action".67
The double track policy which resulted from this set of 
constraints "falling between the stools, truncated collective security 
and left Britain and France with the w orst of both worlds".68 Britain
did not save Abyssinia and the credibility of the League but she still 
lost Italy as an ally. The alienation of Italy from the Stresa camp m eant 
that Germany had broken its isolation and found a major power on its 
side. Since the Big Four of Versailles had lost yet another member 
after America's w ithdrawal into isolation, the settlement was no 
longer tenable. The application of collective security in this particular 
case was counterproductive for general stability.
The failure of the Baldwin government to make these ends meet 
and to recognize that it faced "two mutually exclusive options" 
provoked the complete breakdown of the League of Nations collective 
security system which was never again invoked in the crises which 
followed.69 Even more damaging may have been the disillusion tied 
to the unrealistically high expectations which had been p u t on the 
League at the beginning of the crisis. Such disillusion was certainly a 
factor in the passivity of the Western governments in the Spanish civil 
w ar and in the set of policies which is remembered under the name of 
" appeasem ent
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8. Th e  Ko r e a n  W a r
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i. History
The Korean W ar at the beginning of the 1950's is one of the 
most important turning points in  post-war international relations. It is 
the only instance to date of a ho t w ar between two great powers since 
1945. The Korean W ar is also the only time in which the principles of 
collective security have been applied during the Cold War. To be sure, 
Chapter VII enforcement was not m andatory for UN members and the 
use of force to counter aggression was only recommended and 
authorized.1 Furthermore -as will be argued below- many more of the 
requirements for an "ideal" collective security operation w ere not 
m et Nevertheless, the forces under the United Nations Com mand 
were officially fighting under the auspices of the world organization, 
a fact that was greatly emphasized at the time and was never repeated 
again during the Cold War.
UN involvement was not decisive as probably the United States, 
which supplied the overwhelming majority of the troops for the 
operation, would have intervened anyway even w ithout m ultilateral 
recommendation. However, the UN was far from irrelevant in  the 
crisis as it strengthened American resolve and provided legitimacy 
useful at the domestic and international levels. These advantages were 
accompanied by a set of constraints on American policy w ith regard to 
the military means employed and the diplomatic objectives sought 
for. Even if it was not the single most im portant factor in the crisis, as 
enthusiasts of collective security would maintain, the UN was in 
certain respects an element w hich could not be ignored. In this limited 
respect, the Korean War can be depicted as a qualified success for 
collective security.
The immediate origin of the w ar -the division of Korea into two 
distinct entities each claiming to represent the whole country- was a 
by-product of the Cold War. The wartime conferences had concluded 
that Korea was to be unified and independent after the defeat of Japan. 
However, the worsening status of Soviet-American relationships in 
the closing days of the Second World War had prom pted the US Army 
to improvise an unplanned occupation of the country up to the 38th 
parallel in order to avoid the complete loss of the peninsula to the Red
Army. Nevertheless, until 1947, the occupation and the ensuing 
division were considered to be temporary.
Only the emergence of the Cold W ar w ith its full virulence 
convinced the United States to support the establishment of the 
Republic of Korea south of the parallel under the leadership of 
Singman Rhee. The division crystallized in 1948 after the failure of the 
United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea to get access to the 
Soviet-occupied areas to arrange for an all-Korean election. The 
founding of the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the parallel birth of the 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in the north did not 
settle the issue. The two governments were engaged in a covert w ar 
culminating in 1949 in a series of border incidents and in a guerrilla 
campaign in the south bloodily defeated by Seoul in the winter of 
1950.2
Contrary to American estimates at the time, the North Korean 
attack was not instigated by Moscow but the initiative came from the 
DPRK's leader Kim H Sung.3 Nevertheless, the Soviets knew and 
approved of Pyongyang's intentions as they provided the weapons 
and the training necessary for the forthcoming offensive. Recent 
document have indeed underlined Moscow's encouragement of North 
Korea.4 In this sense, the w ar was more an international than a Korean 
affair. Moscow acquiesced to Kim's plans because after the split with 
Yugoslavia it was more sensitive to its allies' requests and above all 
because it expected a quick victory unobstructed by American 
intervention.5 This idea rested on the fact that the United States had 
w ithdraw n their troops from South Korea in June 1949 and on a public 
statement by Truman's Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, which placed 
Korea outside the American "defensive perimeter" of vital interests in 
the Far East running "through the chain of islands fringing the coast of 
Asia".6
Acheson's January statement at a Press Club lunch, which 
echoed a previous declaration in a similar vein by the Supreme 
Commander Allied Forces-Pacific, General Douglas MacArthur, was 
based on the fact that the United States was at the time planning for a 
general war in which Korea's strategic value was not significant 
compared to other crisis points such as Berlin, Turkey or Iran where 
American defences were thus concentrated. Acheson remarked in May
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1950: "We cannot scatter our shots equally all over the world. We just 
haven't enough shots to do th a f '.7 W ashington simply did not 
contemplate a limited attack by a proxy on a peripheral in terest8
While the Soviets interpreted American pronouncements as 
evidence of its lack of interest in Korea, when the attack actually came, 
its blatant nature forced W ashington to question its previous 
assumptions and prom pted the United States to intervene.9 In 
particular, in a domino vein, the United States thought that its 
credibility was at stake and that if this particular aggression was left 
unchecked, others w ould follow su it  Incidentally, Acheson had 
specified that, although the US would not defend South Korea directly, 
its security would anyway be guaranteed by the UN. It is ironic -given 
the aftermath- that this contingency was not considered credible by 
the aggressor.
"Should an attack occur -Acheson stated in the 'perim eter 
speech'- the initial reliance m ust be on the people attacked to 
resist it and then upon the committments of the entire civilized 
world under the Charter of the United Nations".10
When the North Korean attack was unleashed, the American 
response was -probably to Moscow's surprise- swift and decisive. A t 4 
AM on June 25th, 135000 North Korean troops equipped w ith heavy 
weapons crossed the 38th parallel into ROK's territory. On that same 
morning, the State and Defense Departments were already 
recommending military action to oppose North Korea. That 
afternoon, meeting in the fortuitous absence of the Soviet delegate 
Ambassador Malik,11 the Security Council condemned in Resolution 
82 the North Korean invasion and dem anded an immediate ceasefire 
and the return to the status quo ante. In an evening meeting at Blair 
House President Truman endorsed Acheson's suggestions for US 
response. The 7th fleet was to move between Taiwan and mainland 
China to shield the Nationalist Chinese from a Communist attack 
while US Navy and Air Force units were to be employed in support of 
Seoul.12
On June 27th, the Security Council m et again and voted an 
American resolution (Res. 83) urging members to support the 
government of the ROK against the North Korean invasion and "to
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return peace and security to the area".13 After the fall of Seoul on the 
28th and in the face of a rapidly deteriorating military situation 
uncovered by a visit of MacArthur to the frontline on the 29th, US 
ground troops were committed to the war. On July 7th the Security 
Council (Resolution 84) requested the United States to designate a 
commander for all the forces being offered by UN members. 
However, despite the arrival of two divisions by July 18th, the 
situation on the ground was not improving and by the end of the 
month ROK and US troops were besieged at a small bridgehead on the 
peninsula around the port of Pusan. A fierce battle followed in August 
in which, before repulsing the North Korean attack, the American 
commander of the VIII Corps at Pusan even contemplated evacuation.
After the stabilization of the Pusan perimeter, the UN forces 
staged on September 15th a daring and almost reckless landing at 
Inchon 240 kilometers behind the enemy's line. The operation was 
authorized only at MacArthur's insistence and despite the doubts of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff.14 In the event the gamble' succeeded and 
MacArthur's bold strategy completely devastated the N orth Korean 
troops caught between the advancing VHI Army and the X Corps 
landed close to the 38th parallel. By September 27th Seoul was 
liberated and the fortunes of the w ar had been -for the time being- 
reversed.
It was in the atmosphere of euphoria generated by these 
victories that the most crucial decision of the entire w ar was taken. 
Truman, eager to punish aggression and to score a clearcut political 
success against Moscow and his domestic Republican opponents, 
authorized MacArthur to cross the 38th parallel at the beginning of 
October w ith the aim of unifying Korea. On October 7th, the UN 
General Assembly, bypassing the Security Council which was 
deadlocked by the threat of a Soviet veto (Malik had returned to his 
post in August), voted a resolution recommending that "all 
appropriate steps are taken to ensure conditions of stability 
throughout Korea".15 Unification of the country, a long-standing goal 
of the UN, was now w ithin reach. On the same day, MacArthur's 
troops entered North Korea and advanced rapidly occupying 
Pyongyang on October 19th.
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Military opportunity was thus fatally allowed to precede 
political considerations. The US, blinded by its own successes, did not 
expect either a Soviet or a Chinese reaction to this more ambitious 
objective.16 The United States had not considered that Western troops 
on the Manchurian border would be considered by China as a threat 
justifying intervention. China was considered too weak to act as it was 
recovering from decades of internal and external strife. Furthermore, 
MacArthur estimated that China did not possess the logistics to cross 
en masse the Yalu river on the border. W hen the UN Commander 
exposed his assessment to Truman at the famous meeting on Wake 
Island on October 15th, no-one present from the State Department, the 
Defense Department or the Joint Chiefs of Staff contradicted him.
The Chinese had in fact explicitly w arned the US that it would 
consider the crossing of the 38th parallel as an act of war.17 The Indian 
Ambassador met in Peking w ith Nieh Jung-chen -Chief of Staff of the 
People's Liberation Army- on September 25th and w ith Premier Chu 
En-lai on October 3rd and both made it clear that China was ready to 
intervene.18 Chou warned th a t "American intervention into North 
Korea w ould encounter Chinese resistance."19 W ashington dismissed 
such warnings as a bluff. Even w hen UN troops approaching the Yalu 
were attacked in strength by Chinese troops at the beginning of 
November, the United States underestimated the danger of this 
extreme warning. The US refused a British proposal for the 
establishment of a demilitarized buffer zone south of the Chinese- 
Korean border and preferred to seek a decisive military victory 
instead.20
MacArthur was therefore authorized to proceed with an "end 
the w ar" offensive launched on November 24th but immediately 
blunted by a massive Chinese counterattack which forced the UN 
forces to face "an entirely new war".21 While the US had estimated 
that about 50000 Chinese troops were in  Korea, there were in fact 
300000 Chinese "volunteers". The result was "the longest retreat in the 
history of the US Army" until then. On October 5th the Communist 
forces retook Pyongyang; on Christmas day they crossed the 38th 
parallel and on January 4th they recaptured Seoul.
This was the moment of highest tension during the war. The UN 
Commander fell into a state of panic while W ashington had to rethink
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its whole strategy. It was at this time that pressure mounted (from 
MacArthur and others in the Pentagon) for an expansion of the war 
both geographically and in terms of the military measures employed. 
In particular, it was advocated that American fighters could fly over 
Chinese airspace in "hot pursuit" of Communist planes; that 
Nationalist Chinese troops be used in Korea and that the bridges on 
the Yalu be bombed. MacArthur even envisaged the use of atomic 
bombs and submitted on Christmas' eve a list of targets for 26 such 
devices.
The Truman administration decided not to take any of these 
measures in order to avoid the risks of escalation. Firstly, Washington 
feared that an escalation w ould trigger a Soviet reaction bringing 
about W orld War HL The erroneous American assumption that 
Chinese troops had acted under the Kremlin's direction substantiated 
these fears and reversed previous optimistic assessments.
Secondly, especially since global tension was high, the US did 
not wish to deplete its scarce resources in a conflict w ith China while 
its main interests and threats lay elsewhere, mainly in Europe. 
Acheson w arned that it would be a mistake to enter into a major 
confrontation with "the second team". The Chairman of the JCS, 
General Omar Bradley, stated that a w ar with China would be "the 
wrong war, a t the wrong place, at the wrong time and with the wrong 
enemy".22
Thirdly, such an expansion w ould not have commanded allied 
support For example, British Prime Minister Clement Attlee asked for 
an urgent meeting with Truman after the latter had mentioned at a 
press conference on November 30th that the use of nuclear weapons 
had been under active consideration. The two leaders met a t the 
beginning of December Attlee m ade clear that Britain could not 
tolerate the use of nuclear weapons and did not favour the 
enlargement of the war.23 The limited w ar strategy employed after 
the Chinese intervention was therefore more the outcome of external 
constraints rather than the result of deep American convictions. In 
other words America, traditionally eager to obtain unconditional 
victories, resolved to pursue limited means and objectives by default.
The peak of tension was overcome in the first months of 1951 
when the situation on the ground markedly improved. The new
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commander of the VIII Army, General Matthew Ridgeway, managed 
to stop the Chinese offensive in the first week of the new year and 
regained the initiative. Seoul was retaken, for the last time, on March 
15th. The Chinese, instead of settling for a prestigious limited victory 
fell to the same temptation which had bewitched MacArthur and, 
stretching their supply lines beyond their limit, launched a final 
offensive which ended disastrously.
Meanwhile, the diplomatic situation at Lake Success and in the 
major capitals had evolved. The Commonwealth countries and some 
Asian neutrals like India sponsored a Draft Resolution for a ceasefire. 
The initiative was not welcomed in W ashington because it hinted to 
subsequent discussions on other Far Eastern issues, like the status of 
Taiwan or the PRC's UN seat, on which the US did not w ant to concede 
as it w ould have been tantamount to rew arding aggression. However, 
Washington decided to support the resolution in order not to isolate 
itself from its UN allies by appearing uncompromising. The United 
States voted in favour also in the ardent hope that the offer would be 
rejected by the Chinese,24 which is w hat happened on January 17th 
because Peking wanted the political issues settled before, rather than 
after, a ceasefire.
W ashington capitalized on this success by introducing a new 
resolution branding China as an aggressor. Initially, W ashington 
wished to attach a series of harsh sanctions to the resolution. 
However, when its UN allies m ade clear that they were not in favour, 
Washington preferred a watered dow n resolution without automatic 
sanctions rather than unilateral action. On February 1st China, despite 
the fact that its forces were fighting as "volunteers" and that no formal 
declaration of w ar had occurred, was condemned by a large majority 
of the UN General Assembly (44 to 7 w ith 9 abstentions) as the 
aggressor.
Soon afterwards the difference of opinion between General 
MacArthur and President Truman became unsustainable. The UN 
commander did not accept the concept of limited w ar and wished to 
expand the w ar to China as an occasion to deal a decisive blow to 
international Communism. The problem was that the General was 
expressing his views publicly and to the extent of insubordination. 
Already in August 1950 he had gone to Taipei promising to the
Kuomingtang a degree of support for which he was not authorized. 
Later in that month he had sent a statement to the veteran 
organizations in support of Taiwan in open disregard of the 
government's policy to avoid excessive entanglement w ith the 
Nationalists. On March 24th 1951, he issued an unauthorized radio 
message to the Communist commanders suggesting direct 
negotiations on the field. Finally, the straw which broke the camel's 
back was the publication of a letter to a Republican congressman 
criticizing the Truman administration's concept of limited w ar and its 
whole Asian strategy. The President was enraged and decided to 
substitute him with General Ridgeway.
Once the United States had decided that it would neither expand 
the w ar nor pull out and it had achieved a favourable position on the 
battlefield, it was ready to send feelers to the other side. Before 
Inchon, W ashington felt too weak to negotiate; after Inchon, it felt too 
strong; after China's intervention, again it felt too weak. Only after 
the failure of China's spring offensive were both sides reasonably 
certain that they could not gain m uch by fighting nor lose too much 
by compromise. At the end of May, George Kennan, who was on leave 
from the State Department, met Ambassador Malik in order to explore 
the basis for a ceasefire. After two meetings on May 31st and June 5th, 
on June 23rd Malik announced that an agreement was possible.
The two sides m et at Kaesong on July 10th. However, the 
negotiations soon stalled and proceeded slowly and intermittently, 
producing an agreement only 24 months later. Once resigned to a 
conditional victory, neither side renounced using confrontational 
military and diplomatic measures to obtain the best possible deal. The 
Chinese counted on w ar weariness and on the fragility of domestic 
support in America for a w ar in a remote area while the United States 
counted on its superior firepower to impose a level of punishm ent 
which China would find unbearable.
In a sense, a limited w ar is m ore difficult to resolve because by 
definition there is not a clearcut identification of w inner and loser and 
therefore of who imposes and who makes concessions. All possible 
solutions are by their nature negotiable, and without decisive 
victories it is difficult for either side willingly to concede. Only when 
both sides have either exhausted themselves, or when they have
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realized that they cannot obtain further gains w ith  the amount of force 
they are prepared to use, can negotiations be brought to a fruitful 
conclusion. This can be a very long and cumbersome process. The US 
lost 45% of their casualties after the beginning of negotiations.25
It took three months to agree upon a venue of the talks, moved 
in October from Kaesong to Panmunjon, and on their agenda. The 
issue of what was to be the ceasefire line was resolved in November 
1951 in America's favour as the present line of contact which was a 
defensible one, rather than the 38th parallel. In May 1952 China 
renounced its demand that the Soviet Union be included in the 
Neutral Supervisory Commission. The only outstanding question 
remaining, which took another 14 months to resolve, was the one of 
the prisoners of war.
The United States, wishing to show that they were fighting in 
the name of freedom, and remembering the miserable fate of the 
prisoners transferred to the Soviet Union after the Second World War, 
introduced the principle of non-forcible repatriation. China, after it 
became known that only 70000 of the 132000 communists in UN hands 
was willing to return home, soundly rejected the idea. However, 
Washington w anted a propaganda victory and at least on this topic it 
did not w ant to give in, attributing to the issue a symbolic 
importance. Moreover, mounting domestic opposition to the 
administration's supposedly soft handling of the w ar (especially from 
the Republican right) did not leave the Truman administration much 
room for maneuvre.
Given the stalemate in the negotiations, the United States 
reviewed its policies. Firstly, it stepped up military activity in an 
attempt to bring the talks to a favourable conclusion. W ashington also 
wished to teach China a lesson while it could, avenging the defeats of 
December 1950. In 1951, the United States had already relaxed the 
restrictions on "hot pursuit" and even authorized the bombing of 
Manchurian air bases if a communist air attack imperiled the UN 
troops, although such measure was never actually taken.26 The 
following June, Operation Pressure Pump was launched which 
destroyed the power installations on the Yalu. In August, Pyongyang 
was flattened down. In October, UN forces performed a mock 
amphibious landing at Wonsan, deep in the enemy's rear. In Autumn,
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Nationalist Chinese troops launched a series of commando operations 
on the off-shore islands.27 These measures raised fears in allied 
capitals that the United States was deliberately trying to provoke the 
Chinese into a w ider war. In the Summer of 1952, the State 
Department tried to invoke the aggressor's resolution in order to 
impose an embargo of China but this initiative failed because of the 
allied reluctance to escalate the conflict
Secondly, W ashington begun planning for an enlargement of 
the conflict in  case the negotiations brought nowhere in a reasonable 
amount of time. The administration was growing impatient w ith an 
increasingly unpopular w ar and it had never completely resigned 
itself to the prospect of negotiations w ith a government which it did 
not even recognize. In December 1951 NSC 118/2 sketched out 
American initiatives in such an even t In particular, UN troops were to 
advance to the narrow "waist" of Korea north of Pyongyang; US naval 
and air forces were to bomb Chinese territory and block its lines of 
communications while Nationalist Chinese troops were to be 
supported in  covert operations against the mainland.
W hen negotiations were indefinitely recessed in October after 
the rejection of yet another American offer, General Mark Clark (who 
had succeeded Ridgeway) was authorized to prepare OPLAN 85/2, an 
operational plan for the directives of NSC 118/2. However, the plan 
was not implemented because of the unavailability of the three 
further US Army divisions which General Clark had requested and 
because of the impending presidential elections.
The last act of the Truman administration was instead a 
diplomatic one. Towards the end of 1952 many countries at the UN 
were trying to find a compromize solution to the problem of the 
POWs. For fear that its own uncompromising attitude underm ined 
UN support just when an expansion of the w ar became a possibility 
and in order to avoid a transfer of the negotiations from Panmunjon 
to the uncontrollable General Assembly, W ashington was forced to 
acquiesce.28 In particular, the United States supported an Indian 
motion introducing the idea of entrusting the prisoners unwilling to 
return home to a neutral country, although it managed to set a three- 
months deadline for such procedure.
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However, apart from UN activity, the Truman adm inistration 
had already reached a consensus on the fact that the actual or 
threatened use of military force was the most effective way to 
conclude an armistice. As Marc Trachtenberg has pointed out, this idea 
rested heavily on the success of W estern rearmament which had 
begun after the North Korean attack. An almost quadrupled military 
budget had changed America's perception of its own strength and had 
transformed a "window of vulnerability" into a "window of 
opportunity". The possibility of Soviet intervention, an important 
constraint in the winter of 1951, was by the end of 1952 heavily 
discounted. If the Soviets had not attacked when America was weak, 
W ashington believed it would certainly not do so now that America 
was strong. In this sense, there is m uch more continuity w ith the 
Eisenhower administration than the traditional accounts concede.
Yet, certain crucial differences existed between the Eisenhower 
and the Truman administration which enabled the former to pursue a 
more aggressive policy in 1953. Firstly, Eisenhower had an entire 
presidential term to look forward to as he had just been elected by a 
landslide.29 Certainly, also the new President had to deal w ith 
domestic opposition but his popularity allowed him a m uch larger 
freedom of maneuvre than that enjoyed by his predecessor, who had 
seen his approval ratings decrease steadily since the beginning of 
inconclusive negotiations. Moreover, Eisenhower's military prestige 
was enormous. When, during the electoral campaign, he stated (rather 
defensively) that he would "go to Korea" to assess the situation, many 
equated this w ith the certainty of victory as the old General was 
associated with the successes of World W ar II.
Secondly, certain attitudes of the new administration 
contributed to the adoption of a tougher policy. In particular, there 
were less constraints to plan the use of nuclear weapons. Both the 
President and his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, repeatedly and 
publicly declared that they thought about the atom bomb as "just 
another weapon".30 In this case, the cost in blood and treasure of both 
breaking the communist lines and of bombing China proper would be 
drastically reduced and an expansion of the w ar therefore became 
feasible. The fear of a Soviet retaliation had also diminished since 
Stalin's death had inaugurated a softer line on the part of the Kremlin.
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Of course, Eisenhower's willingness to use nuclear weapons was 
never put to the test Nevertheless, the movement of the newly tested 
tactical nuclear weapons to the theater of operations in the spring of 
1953 and their inclusion in  the military plans for an eventual offensive 
indicate that their employment was by no means out of the question. 
If the war had dragged on into 1954, there is a strong possibility that a 
drastic escalation would have occurred in  American military strategy. 
Eisenhower later attributed the achievement of a ceasefire to the 
possibility of an American atomic attack.31 Dulles agreed that the 
armistice was linked to the fact that the United States "had already 
sent the means to the theater for delivering atomic weapons. This 
became known to the Chinese through their good intelligence sources 
and in fact w e were not unwilling that they should find o u t"32
The new administration was also less constrained by the 
attitude of the allies, which had forced Truman to rule out the use of 
nuclear weapons and other types of escalation. The Eisenhower 
administration was more conscious of Europe's dependence on the 
United States. European doubts w ould eventually have been 
overcome by a swift and decisive US victory in the Far E ast Initial 
scruples w ould give way to the reassurance of a powerful American 
ally. W ashington was therefore ready to embark on a more 
unilateralist policy certain that consensus would later be regained.33
This does not mean that Eisenhower wanted a war w ith China. 
He knew that above all the American public wanted an end to the 
conflict Yet 1953 witnessed a significant change in preferences. While 
a ceasefire remained the most valued goal, the expansion of hostilities 
in search of a decisive victory was -unlike w ith the previous 
administration- thought of as a preferable alternative to the indefinite 
protraction of the stalemate. In short, American patience with the 
Korean w ar had reached the Em it
The familiar strategy of increased military pressure to bring the 
negotiations to a climax while planning for an escalation should the 
negotiations fail was therefore pursued w ith increased vigour. 
Between April and May, six new ROK divisions were activated. 
Meanwhile, the US Air Force proceeded to the bombing of dams and 
rice fields w ith the deliberate intent of provoking a famine. On May 
20th, the National Security Council decided to expand the w ar to
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China if a last American offer was rejected. Two days later, Dulles 
communicated to Nehru the novel American resolve. On May 25th the 
American ultimatum was delivered at Panmunjon: either a ceasefire 
agreement was reached w ithin a week or negotiations would be 
terminated.34
China complied and the discussions proceeded swiftly from 
then onward. On June 8th, the question of the POWs was settled. On 
June 17th a revised demarcation line was settled. On the same day, in 
an attempt to sabotage an agreement, South Korea unilaterally freed 
20000 North Korean prisoners who did not w ish to be repatriated. 
However, after a brief resumption of hostilities, on July 27th the 
armistice was signed at Panmunjon. After more than three years and 
hundreds of thousancj/of casualties, the w ar was finally over w ith the 
two sides of Korea divided more or less where they had been before 
the invasion.
ii. China's motivations
The Korean w ar was hailed at the time as a clear instance of 
collective security: the international community standing, under the 
UN banner, up to the North Korean aggression. Yet the reality of the 
war was quite different from the ideal of collective security. Not only 
the "international community" was represented chiefly by the United 
States and its allies but also the "aggressor" was not quite as isolated 
as it would usually be expected from theoretical accounts. In this way, 
more than "all against one", the Korean War appeared similar to the 
traditional "some against some" in which the identity of either side 
can easily be forecasted before the crisis actually breaks out being 
determined by particular alignments rather than universal principles. 
Far from being isolated by the international community, North Korea 
was indeed saved from disaster by Soviet supplies and China's 
intervention. It is therefore convenient to analyze more closely 
developments on the communist side.
American assessments of Soviet and Chinese reactions ranged 
throughout the w ar between fear of full scale intervention and 
confidence that North Korea would receive only token support, but 
nobody held the illusion that Moscow or Peking would have taken the 
South Korean side as their obligations under the UN Charter dictated.
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The logic of bipolarity excluded such an eventuality. According to 
Martin W ight "the Korean War was a struggle between the two great 
coalitions in which international society was divided" rather than a 
genuine collective security operation.35
UN involvement had indeed been possible only due to the 
coincidences of Soviet absence from the Security Council in protest of 
the PRC's exclusion from Lake Success and of the fact that China's seat 
had not yet been assigned to Peking. According to Max Hastings: "the 
UN intervention was a fluke of history, m ade possible only by the 
unique accident of the Russian boycott".36 If either of the communist 
powers had been present on the day of the invasion, it w ould certainly 
have vetoed any direct multilateral involvem ent When the Soviet 
delegate returned to his post in August, Washington was forced to 
bypass the Security Council and to refer exceptionally to the General 
Assembly for a resolution authorizing the crossing of the 38th 
parallel.
Later on, not only did the communist powers not join the 
collective effort, but China even intervened -albeit under the disguise 
of volunteers- on the side of the aggressors. In this sense, the UN 
forces had to face a negative contribution. It is also worth to point out 
that China did  not intervene because of radically expansionist reasons, 
but because it felt threatened by the UN forces' advance toward its 
own territory. The Chinese crossing of the Yalu was only a defensive 
move. According to the classic account of the event "the final step 
seems to have been prom pted in part by general concern over the 
range of opportunities w ithin China that m ight be exploited by a 
determined, powerful enemy on China's doorstep. [...] Contrary to 
some beliefs, the Chinese communist leadership did not enter the 
Korean W ar either full of self assertiveness or for primarily 
expansionist goals" 37 Clearly, China did not concede to the US-led 
UN effort the aura of impartiality which is connected to collective 
security operations. Perceiving a conflict between the precepts of the 
w orld organization and its own national interest, China chose to 
follow the latter w ithout remorse.38
W ashington grossly misunderstood Chinese intentions. After 
the communist victory in China, the Truman administration expected 
the new regime to acquire "Titoist" tendencies and to resist becoming
-197-
a Soviet satellite.39 However, as soon as the N orth Korean aggression 
occurred, American perceptions changed. The attack was considered as 
directed by Moscow and every move by any communist country was 
seen in this lig h t A Chinese autonomous intervention was therefore 
ruled o u t Either the Soviet Union intervened en masse or it would stay 
out of the conflict and its allies would do likewise. A Chinese 
intervention was even more discounted given Peking's weakness after 
the Civil W ar as well as its eagerness to obtain its UN sea t
The United States therefore underestim ated the power of the 
will of a state to protect its borders. China was indeed absorbed by the 
overwhelming problems of reconstruction but it saw American 
policies as a direct threat to its very existence which therefore took 
absolute priority. The immediate American linkage between the 
Korean question and the problem of Taiwan w ith the sending of the 
VII Fleet had already worried Peking. The approach of MacArthur's 
armies to the Yalu was deemed unacceptable despite, and not because, 
the Soviet Union which wanted to m aintain a low profile.40 Despite 
the fact that Stalin urged China to intervene, the Soviet Union did not 
meet its promises of active support for fear of a dangerous 
escalation.41
The casus belli was the crossing of the 38th parallel. When the US 
advance had seemed inevitable, on October 2nd, Mao wrote to Stalin 
th a t "We have decided to send some of our troops to Korea [...] to 
fight the United States".42 Nevertheless, China would have been 
interested in a peaceful solution as late as October 3rd, when Premier 
Chou told Indian Ambassador Pannikkar th a t "We advocate that the 
Korean incident be solved peacefully."43 Peking issued the order of 
intervention on October 8th, the day after American troops advanced 
into North Korea. Truman's attem pt to reassure Peking on November 
16th that the United States would respect the Chinese border was 
insufficient. Peking wanted the preservation of a North Korean entity 
as a buffer to protect its border and this was not granted by 
Washington.
America misperceived -in naive good faith- the extent to which 
its own armies were considered as a threat by Peking and it chose to 
ignore the warnings delivered to Ambassador Pannikkar as well as 
the limited Chinese intervention at the end of October.44 Assuming
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that a UN operation would be seen as super partes, W ashington 
wrongly presumed that if China had no expansionist aim then it had 
no reason to intervene at all. Peking had in fact stronger and more 
traditional motives to intervene than global revolution. This mistake 
cost the Americans dearly. On the first two days of the main Chinese 
offensive at the end of November, UN casualties amounted to 11000.45
The active opposition of a great power and the passive one of a 
superpower altered the nature of the collective endeavour. The 
operation could not in fact collect overwhelming force against the 
aggressor. Instead of resembling a police action, the w ar was almost a 
contest among equals in which an objective could be achieved only if 
sufficient force could be gathered. The final outcome was a 
compromise which more or less restored the status quo ante rather 
than punished aggression. So m odest an outcome was, according to 
Aron, "little coherent w ith the spirit of a sanction".46
Paradoxically, MacArthur's eagerness to destroy North Korea, 
although i t  aroused the strongest reaction from W ashington's UN 
allies, was more in  line w ith the uncompromising principles of 
collective security than the limited w ar strategy of the Truman 
administration. However, the methods necessary to obtain the 
objectives which MacArthur advocated (which included the extensive 
use of nuclear weapons against China) would probably have 
provoked a global w ar and therefore sent shivers down the spines of 
the international community.
iii. US Policy
The most relevant aspect of the case study to collective security 
is of course the attitude of the United States which was by far the 
leading member of the United Nations' effort The classical accounts 
are divided into two groups. Enthusiasts of collective security point 
out the importance of the first military action under the UN flag. On 
the other hand, realist writers dismiss the UN involvement as 
cosmetic and describe the w ar as a purely American operation. Both 
positions are extreme. Certainly the leading role was played by the 
United States, which was following also its own national agenda. On 
the other hand however, the role of the United Nations cannot be 
ignored and had significant consequences on the unfolding of events.
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The role of the UN was not overwhelming because the most 
fundamental decisions of the w ar w ould have been taken by 
Washington even w ithout UN involvement. The UN commander 
reported only to Washington and even the negotiators at Panmunjon 
were doing so. The first American response to the news of the 
invasion envisaged US involvement and took place before the 
Security Council m e t Truman's Secretary of State admitted that 
"American action, said to be in support of the resolution of June 27th, 
was in fact ordered, and possibly taken, prior to that resolution".47 
The United States intervened because of the Cold War rather than 
because of its obligations under collective security 48 As Wolfers has 
put i t
"Because the resort to force against N orth Korea served 
to maintain and even, to strengthen this country's power 
position relative to its major national adversary, it cannot be 
considered the kind of break w ith tradition earlier defined as a 
prerequisite of effective collective security".49
Collective security reinforced the conviction that something 
had to be done bu t did not bring it about Washington saw the 
aggression in Korea as part of a major test of its credibility by 
Moscow.50 According to Aron, the US intervened "not to save South 
Korea but to preserve their honour".51 In Acheson's own account, at 
stake was "prestige, by which I mean the shadow cast by power".52 
Korea was not considered strategically significant prior to the w ar as 
is demonstrated by the w ithdrawal of American occupation troops in 
June 1949 and by Acheson's remarks in January 1950. The fact that the 
United States did not intervene because of Korea's intrinsic 
importance but for other strategic reasons only appears to coincide 
with the tenets of collective security.
The crucial point is that in the first half of 1950 the United States 
had shifted its Cold War strategy from a selective policy 
distinguishing vital interests (like Europe and Japan) from peripheral 
ones (like Korea) to one in which each Soviet challenge had to be 
resisted. The perimeter strategy had been rejected. The symmetry 
inherent in such an approach resembled the automatic reaction 
inherent in the UN Charter, but it was caused by particularistic, rather
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than universalis^ motivations. In this way, it was more US action 
which involved the UN rather than the other way around.
The key document of this period is NSC 68 of April 14th, 1950 
-the most significant review of American strategy after the "loss" of 
China, the Berlin crisis, and the Soviet detonation of an atomic bomb- 
which pessimistically argued that America could no longer afford to 
lose positions with the Soviet Union.53 The uncertainty of "natural" 
indigenous forces resisting Soviet pressure and the belief that the 
Soviet Union would soon gain a military advantage prompted 
W ashington to a more active type of containment before the balance 
of power was damaged beyond repair. The document advocated 
American rearmament in  order to regain a clear military edge vis-a- 
vis the Soviet Union and to be able to stand up to communist 
challenges wherever they arose. Korea epitomized this globalization 
of American commitments, which was therefore decided well before 
Pyongyang challenged the principles of the Charter.
American commitments were not geared towards aggression in 
general, but against Soviet aggression in particular. According to 
Bernard Brodie, the foremost American strategist at the time, "the 
indivisibility of peace everywhere depended very much on who was 
breaking it somewhere".54 The identity of the aggressor, unimportant 
for collective security, was instead crucial in Washington's 
calculations. It would have been extremely difficult to envisage a 
similar American response if the aggression had been committed by 
the Republic of Korea at North Korea's expense, a prospect described 
by Osgood as sheer "folly".55
The fact that the United States were reacting against the Soviet 
threat rather than against the North Korean action is also 
demonstrated by the fact that the defence of Korea was immediately 
linked to the protection of Taiwan (where the VII Fleet was sent), of 
Indochina (where aid to France increased) and especially of Europe 
(where the bulk of American rearmament took place). The Korean 
War almost quadrupled the defence budget, but only a fraction was 
due to the fighting on the peninsula.56 America entered the war with 
only one commitment (NATO) outside the Western hemisphere; by 
the end of the decade, it had 20 security pacts outside Latin America 
and 450 military bases abroad distributed in 36 countries. In an
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unprecedented step, a unified military command was established for 
NATO. The impact of the war was so relevant only because it was 
placed in the midst of a fundamental and gigantic strategic review 
which was already taking place anyway. US and UN interests largely 
coincided in 1950, but they were far from identical.
The same reasoning is also valid for the other turning points of 
the war. The decision to cross the 38th parallel w as taken in NSC 81/1 
of September 11th, almost a month before the General Assembly 
resolution demanding the unification of Korea. There was a 
considerable consensus in W ashington (broken only by the timid 
objections of the Policy Planning Staff)57 that North Korea should be 
punished for its aggression in order to show to the Kremlin American 
resolve and to avoid the perpetuation of an unnatural division of the 
country which would entail the indefinite guarantee of the presence of 
US troops. Washington wished in fact to escape such a demanding and 
open ended commitment In Dulles' words:
"It would be folly to allow the North Korean Army to 
retire in good order and reform behind the 38th parallel. [...] To 
perm it that would mean [...] the maintenance by the United 
States of a large military establishment to contain [it]".58
The success of the Inchon landing was so clear that Washington 
and its allies were then swept by the military momentum.
After China's intervention had forced the United States to settle 
for limited objectives, the American view that these would have to be 
pursued by military means prevailed over the UN view (embodied in 
the ceasefire resolution of January 1951) that a settlement needed 
political concessions to China over its UN representation or the status 
of Taiwan.59 Finally, after negotiations had begun, W ashington again 
unilaterally planned for the expansion of operations if the 
negotiations failed. Despite the doubts of the UN allies, there is no 
indication that the United States would not -if necessary- have pursued 
an escalation as envisaged in NSC 118/2 or in  the NSC meeting on 
May 20th, 1953 prior to the issuing of the final ultimatum to the 
communist forces.
Although these crucial decisions were taken by W ashington 
quite independently, the role of the United Nations was still far from
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irrelevant W ithout the Charter, there w ould have been a Korean War 
but it would have been a very different ope. The blatant nature of the 
N orth Korean aggression and the fact that it directly challenged the 
UN Charter reinforced the Truman administration's determination to 
intervene. Ambassador Philip Jessup recalled that Truman kept 
repeating "we can't let the UN down, w e can't let the UN down" at the 
crucial Blair House meeting on the night of the invasion.60 In 
Neustadt's opinion, Truman "wanted to affirm that the UN was not a 
League of Nations".61 In sho rt "Both Moscow and Peking had failed 
to understand the role of values in America's approach to 
international relation".62
Nor was the multilateral contribution merely symbolic as when 
the UN flag, rather than the American one, was raised when Seoul was 
liberated. The legitimacy inherent in the multilateral endorsement of 
Western actions produced considerable domestic support both in the 
United States and in the allied countries. According to Brodie, the 
popularity of the operation was "enhanced by the protective 
coloration afforded by significant UN participation".63 In America, 
77% of the public declared itself in favour of Truman's actions.64 Even 
Republican opponents of the President had to yield. In London, British 
participation was also overwhelmingly supported. Even the Labour 
left was in favour of w hat it saw as the first operation of collective 
security. One of its foremost leaders, Michael Foot, remarked that the 
"North Korean aggression was an international crime of the first 
order".65 Unlike Vietnam, Korea was a popular w ar and even the 
critics in the later stages attacked the administration for not doing 
enough rather than for doing too much.66
Moreover, the fact that US troops were fighting under the UN 
flag allowed the President to bypass a congressional authorization 
(despite the fact that this had been requested by some Republican 
Senators like Taft).67 This became relevant when Truman's policy fell 
in disgrace and Congress could not threaten to withdraw  an 
authorization which it had not granted. In this way, 15 years before 
the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and 23 years before the War Powers 
Act, the Korean War represents -thanks to the UN- the zenith of the 
imperial presidency.
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However, the most im portant consequences were at the 
international level. Despite the fact that the United States was by far 
the leading member of the coalition, its effort was supported by a 
level of allied contribution unrepeated until the Gulf War. 29 other 
countries contributed troops. Britain sent two brigades; Canada and 
Turkey one brigade each; Australia sent two battalions; France, 
Philippines, Holland, Ethiopia, Colombia, Belgium and Greece 1 
battalion; Italy, India and the Scandinavian countries sent medical 
units. In Kissinger's words: "Though indifferent to the fate of Korea, 
these countries supported the principle of collective action that they 
m ight later invoke in their own defense".68
Although these military contributions were not crucial, their 
political significance was.69 After all, it was to maintain American 
credibility with its allies that Washington intervened in the first place 
and allied consensus was therefore paramount. Acheson stressed this 
point forcefully at the congressional hearings which followed 
MacArthur's dismissal: "The power of our coalition to deter an attack 
depends in part upon the will and the m utual confidence of our 
partners".70
Multilateral legitimacy was therefore important for United 
States policy both for its own self-image and for its diplomatic 
position. A democracy finds it difficult to divorce self interests from 
ideals and when it does so it still uses the language of one to justify 
the other. "President Truman and his advisers clearly perceived [...] 
that the legitimacy of US policy in the Far East rested heavily upon 
maintaining the concept that a w ider cause and greater principles than 
mere US national interests were being contested in Korea, and were 
being upheld by a family of nations".71 Given the fact that legitimacy 
brought domestic and international support, it was a key element of 
power.
It would otherwise be difficult to explain the reason why 
American policy makers w ent to such length to obtain favourable 
resolutions and to reject unfavourable ones at Lake Success. Both 
before the involvement of ground troops in June 1950, before the 
crossing of the 38th parallel and when it chose to brand China as the 
aggressor, Washington successfully sought UN resolutions welcoming 
US initiatives. Similarly, it would also be difficult to explain why,
-204-
after his initial absence, the Soviet delegate to the Security Council 
rushed back to the United Nations to stem further Security Council 
involvement.
However, the advantages of UN endorsement came at a price 
for the United States. "UN involvement in Korea had some results that 
W ashington clearly did not intend".72 The fact that the multilateral 
legitimacy was not unconditional further demonstrates that the role of 
collective security was not insignificant In particular, the influence of 
the UN allies was instrumental -together w ith other factors such as the 
limited availability of resources and the fear of Soviet reactions- in 
W ashington's decision to maintain the limited character of the war. 
According to Acheson, both the Secretary of Defense George Marshall 
and himself believed that the United States should remain agents of 
the UN rather than entering in a Sino-American war.73
The European allies, especially France and Britain, were 
weakened by the war and by imperial problems and therefore wanted 
to concentrate their scarce resources on Europe. Furthermore, Britain 
believed that Peking could be taken away from Moscow's embrace 
and was therefore reluctant to take an uncompromising stance.74 On 
the other hand, the non-aligned and neutral nations which had 
supported America's involvement in the name of collective security 
were unwilling to antagonize the Communist camp to the extent of 
effectively becoming W ashington's allies.75 Even those which had 
unilateral reasons to contain Peking, like India, were afraid of the 
possible consequences of a large conflict in Asia. All of America's 
partners therefore, both in  Korea and at Lake Success, wanted to 
pursue a more restrained policy.
The United Nations grouped all these nations together. Ganging 
up, the European countries and the Afro-Asian bloc pooled their 
diplomatic resources. The institutionalized framework was therefore 
crucial in cementing a large coalition of states which wanted to 
restrain the United States as well as support them. Although 
W ashington always enjoyed the initiative, the diplomatic pressure 
was therefore increased by the fact that America could not isolate its 
allies one by one but had to confront them altogether at Lake Success. 
W ithout the mechanism of the UN, it is difficult to envisage such a 
pervasive influence on US policy.76
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The traditional accounts overestimate the degree of America's 
self-restraint during the Korean War. 77 Allied advice and allied 
protests were decisive in changing crucial American strategic 
decisions which would have risked to expand the conflict "The 
Truman's administration's aim of maintaining the support of its 
Western allies, coupled w ith the realization that any significant push 
into North Korean territory would encounter stiffer enemy resistance, 
encouraged a tampering of American objective".78 As in any collective 
endeavour, the common effort was limited to the lowest common 
denominator.
In November 1950 America limited its bombing of Yalu bridges 
to the Korean half w ith considerable military distress, reiterated its 
refusal to employ Taiwanese troops and revoked -despite all major US 
decision-makers' opinion- the hot pursuit order. In December, Attlee's 
visit to Washington contributed to American reluctance to employ 
atomic weapons. Finally, on the question of sanctions to China, 
culminating in the summer of 1952, the allies frustrated US efforts to 
impose a total embargo.79 In sho rt "American allies, especially the 
British, deserve much credit for US restraint".80
Finally, apart from the military constraints, UN involvement 
influenced US policy also on the diplomatic side. In order to maintain 
UN support, W ashington was forced to show that its negotiating 
stance was sincere, reasonable and sensitive to the views of other UN 
members. In November 1950, the United States endorsed a resolution 
proposed by France to reassure China that the UN would respect the 
Manchurian border, even if it managed to water it down before it was 
voted. Also in November, the United States only narrowly succeeded 
in sinking a British proposal for the establishment of a dem ilitarized 
zone south of the Yalu. However, at the end of the year W ashington 
was forced reluctantly to accept the ceasefire resolution which 
envisaged negotiations on outstanding political questions only in the 
ardent hope that China -as it did- would reject i t 81 In December 1952, 
in order to avoid the transfer of the negotiations from Panmunjon to 
the uncontrollable General Assembly, America even voted in favour 
of the Indian resolution on POWs.
In sum, the UN role was ancillary to that of US policy and the 
Korean War cannot therefore be classified as an ideal case of collective
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security. Nevertheless, the Korean W ar was different from all other 
Cold War crises because of the unprecedented international moral and 
material support to the United States due to UN involvement and 
because of the constraints that this entailed. Aggression was stopped 
and, even if the UN was unable to repeat a similar performance until 
the end of the Cold War, the reputation of the institution was not 
eroded irrevocably as it w ould have been by a failure. In this limited 
and minimalistic sense, the Korean episode can be seen as a qualified 
success for collective security.
-207-
NOTES:
1 Anthony Clark Arend and Robert J. Beck: International Law and the Use of 
Force. Routledge, London, 1993, p. 53
2Max Hastings: The Korean War. Michael Joseph Ltd., London, 1987, p. 28-9. 
Peter Lowe: The Origins of the Korean War. Longman, Harlow, Essex, 1986, pp. 
43-68
^Sergei N . Goncharov, John W. Lewis and Xue Litei: Uncertain Partners: Stalin, 
Mao and the Korean War, Stanford University Press, Stanford CA, 1993, p. 214. It 
is even possible that the Soviet Union was surprised by the timing of the 
invasion since the Kremlin took 36 hours before releasing a statement and since 
the Soviet delegate to the United Nations -Ambassador Malik- was not present at 
Lake Success. Cfr. Robert Simmons: The Strained Alliance: Peking. Pyongyang, 
Moscow and the Politics of the Korean Civil War. Free Press, New York, 1975, 
chap. 5.
4IHT
5William Stueck: The Korean War as International History, Diplomatic History, vol. 
10, n. 4, Fall 1986, pp. 292-4; Geoffrey Warner: The Korean War, International 
Affairs. 1980, p. 101
6Dean Acheson: Present at the Creation: My Years at the State Department. 
W.W. Norton, New York, 1969, p. 357. Department of State Bulletin, XXII, 
January 23rd, 1950, p. 116
7Quoted in John Lewis Gaddis: Drawing Lines: The Defensive Perimeter Strategy in 
East Asia, 1947-1951; in The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold 
War. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1987, p. 76.
8In the words of a student of the Cold War: "the decision to defend South Korea 
was not based on a reconsideration of South Korea's military importance, but on 
a recognition that something had occurred for which American military planning 
had not been prepared" Morton Halperin: The Korean War, in Robert J. Art and 
Kenneth N. Waltz: The Use of Force: International Politics and Foreign Policy. 
Little Brown, Boston, 1971, p. 221. Cfr also Henry Kissinger: Diplomacy, p. 475. 
^Gaddis: Drawing Lines, p. 97 
l^See footnote 5
The USSR was boycotting the Security Council because of the question of the 
People's Republic of China' UN seat and would have otherwise have vetoed any 
action.
1 ^ Hastings, op. cit.. p. 56
l^Leland M. Goodrich: Korea: A Study of US Policy in the United Nations. 
Council on Foreign Relations Press, New York, 1956, p. 222. 
l^Dean Acheson: Present at the Creation, p. 447 
1 ^ Goodrich: op. cit.. p. 130
l^It was correctly assumed that the Soviet Union would not intervene directly in 
the war. The bombing of the oil complex at Rashin, only 17 m iles from the Soviet 
border, the strafing of a Soviet aerodrome and the accidental downing of a Soviet 
warplane did not elicit more than mild protests. Meanwhile, the Soviets 
demonstrated their concern by initiating informal contacts in the UN sketching 
out a potential ceasefire agreement. Cfr. Rosemary Foot: The Wrong War: 
American Policy and the Dimensions of the Korean Conflict. 1950-1953. Cornell 
University Press, Ithaca NY, 1983, pp. 77-8 
1 ^ Hastings, op. cit.. pp. 152-9
^Unfortunately, the lack of direct diplomatic channels between the US and the 
PRC proved fatal. Ambassador. Pannikkar was in fact considered unreliable by 
Washington.
1 ^ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, VII, p. 884, October 4th
-208-
2°Foot, op. cit.. pp. 92-3
21ln the haste of the offensive, UN troops had been divided into two parts in 
order to reach the planned objectives as soon as possible. However, this allowed 
the Chinese "volunteers" to attack them separatly with maximum effect.
22 US Senate Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations: Military 
Situation in the Far East. Washington, 1951, 82nd Congr., pp. 731-2 
23Foot, op. cit.. pp. 127,129 
24Acheson, op. cit.. p. 513
23From the American point of view , it was probably a mistake to stop its 
advance when negotiations started. As Kissinger rightly points out, probably the 
crucial reason why the Chinese accepted to enter talks was that an American 
offensive was under way. Truman's decision to stop at the American preferred 
ceasefire line and to apply pressure frump there with tactical counterattacks and 
with air bombing was probably not the m ost appropriate strategy to convince 
China to concede. The PRC did not in fact value casualties as highly as the 
Americans and could therefore sustain a considerable amount of attrition. It 
would probably have reacted differently had the American advanced towards 
the Yalu because the reason they entered the war was to protect its borders. 
2 6 A 1 s o  in 1951, the refinery complex at Rashin was bombed and air 
reconnaissance of Manchuria were flown.
27Meanwhile also the fighting on the frontline was intensified in fierce tactical 
battles such as Heartbreak Ridge, Vegas Hill, Bloody Ridge, Carson Hill and 
Reno Hill. Hastings, op. cit.. p. 353
2®Acheson in explicit on this point: "Not being eager for further UN  initiatives, it 
was incumbent upon us to devise our own. [...] One conclusion w e shared 
unanimously: that exploration through the public procedures of the UN [...] 
would be fatal". Acheson, op. cit.. p, 531
2^Mueller notes that unlike the Vietnam War, in the Korean one popularity and 
confidence in the government's policies resumed after a negative peak.
3®Nuclear "New Look" cfr. Freedman: The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy 
Foot, op. cit.. pp. 214, 230; Betts: Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance. 
Brookings, Washington, 1987, pp. 38, 47 
^Foreign Relations of the United States. 1952-4, V, p 1811
33The difference was one of emphasis. While Truman believed that American 
credibility would be maintained if it respected its committments, Eisenhower 
stressed the fact that credibility depended on the capacity to act free of 
entanglements. From this derived the difference between Truman's symmetrical 
containment and Eisenhower's asymmetrical "New Look".
34Foot: op. cit.. pp. 205-13
33Martin Wight: Power Politics. Penguin for the Royal Institute of International 
Affairs, London, 1978, p. 227 
3^Hastings, op. cit.. p. 51
3 ^ Allen S. Whiting: China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean 
War. New York, MacMillan, 1960; p. 159. Cfr. also Stueck, op. cit.. p . 295 
3®If China had any offensive m otive, the best time for intervention was at when 
UN forces were circumscribed and under siege in the Pusan perimeter rather 
than when they were victoriously advancing beyond the 38th parallel.
3^Even the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Alliance had not drastically changed this 
assessment since it took Mao almost two months to convince Stalin to sign. 
40Moscow/s prudence was indeed probably a factor which undermined the Sino- 
Soviet relationship.
-209-
44 International Herald Tribune, December 21st, 1995. Goncharov et al.: 
Uncertain Partners, p. 216. Stalin urged China to intervene and claimed that the 
Soviet Union could eventually even enter the war and defeat the United States. 
However, Stalin did not really seek war with the W est as the subsequent Soviet 
prudence demonstrates. Whet he wanted was a Chinese-American War which 
would have deepened the conflict between China and the West as w ell as 
depleting US forces.
42Mao to Stalin, October 2nd, 1050, in Goncharov et al.: op. cit.. p. 275 
48Chou to Pannikkar, October 3rd, 1950, in Goncharov at al.: ibid.. p. 278 
44Robert Jervis: Perception and Misperception in International Politics. Princeton 
University Press, Princeton NJ, 1976, p. 352.
4^It is worth to point out that also for what the Soviet Union is concerned, it 
appears that the only time that intervention was contemplated was in case of a 
complete Chinese defeat. Even for the USSR therefore, US intelligence was 
mistaken. Later, the US estimated (wrongly) that a harsh policy against China 
would have strained the Sino-Soviet alliance by demonstrating Soviet selfishness. 
However, the pressure on China in the short-term naturally drew it closer to 
Moscow.
4^Aron: Peace and War, p. 825 
42Acheson, op. cit.. p. 408
4 8According to Osgood: "American action was determined, independently of the 
UN, by the rapidly developing military situation". Robert Osgood: Limited War. 
1950-1. p. 166
49Am old Wolfers: Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics.
Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1962, p. 175
^H astings, op. cit.. p. 51
^A ron, op. cit.. p. 881
^A cheson, op. cit.. p. 405
53john Lewis Gaddis: Strategies of Containment, pp. 89-126. Marc Trachtenberg: 
History and Strategy. Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ, 1991, p. 107 
4^Bemard Brodie: War and Politics, MacMillan, N ew  York, 1973, p. 62 
^O sgood, op. cit.. p. 168. Wolfers points out that: "Despite the popularity that 
collective security undoubtedly enjoyed in 1950, American military action 
against a member of the Soviet bloc cannot be taken as evidence that this country 
would be prepared to follow the same road in the case of an aggressor who was 
not a member of the Soviet bloc, or had attacked a member of that bloc". 
Wolfers, op. cit.. p. 175 
^H alperin, op. cit.. p. 217 
^A cheson, op. cit.. p. 450
^Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, VII, p. 386. Quoted in Warner, op. 
cit., p. 102
^H astings, op. cit.. p. 353 Foot
^Q uoted in Gaddis: Drawing Lines, p. 97. Truman's own account also stresses 
the relevance of the world organization and his w ill to avoid a "Far Eastern 
Munich": "Communism was acting in Korea just as Hitler, Mussolini and the 
Japanese had acted ten, fifteen and twenty years earlier. [...] If this was allowed 
to go unchallenged it would mean a Third World War, just as similar incidents 
had brought on the Second World War". Harry S. Truman: Memoirs, vol. II: 
Years of Trial and Hope. Doubleday, Garden City, N ew  York, 1956, p. 333 
61 Richard E. Neustadt: Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership. John 
Wiley and Sons, New York, 1960, p. 126.
62Kissinger, op. cit.. p. 476
-210-
^B rodie, op. cit.. p. 58 
^Foot, op. cit.. p . 63 
^H astings, op. cit.. p. 71.
66john Mueller: War, Presidents and Public Opinion, John Wiley and Sons, New  
York, 1973
^7See Acheson, op. cit.. p. 413 
Kissinger, op. cit.. p. 478 
^A ccording to Rosalyn Higgins: "in the political field, consultations with the UN  
and some contributing members were more frequent" qp84 Max 
^Q uoted in Foot, op. cit.. p. 137 
^H astings, op. cit.. p. 220 
77Stueck, op. cit.. p. 307
7:*Acheson, op. cit.. p. 471. In particular, Marshall "suggested that the UN would 
deteriorate into a mere forum for debate if the US acted alone in Korea". 
Hastings, op. cit.. p. 223
^K enneth W. Thompson: Collective Security Re-examined, American Political 
Science Review, vol. 47, September 1953, p. 766 
75Hastings, op. cit.. p. 225 
7^Stueck, op. cit.. p. 307
77Foot, op. cit.. "The line between lim ited and expanded war was finely 
balanced", p. 23
78Rosemary Foot: A Substitute for Victory: The Politics of Peacemaking at the 
Korean Armistice Talks. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 1990, p. 1. 
cfr. also p. 208. Cfr. also Osgood, op. cit.. p. 176 
79Foot, The Wrong War, pp. 127-9,155, 241 
80Stueck, op. cit.. p. 304
81M.L. Dockrill: The Foreign Office, Anglo-American Relations and the Korean War, 
June 1950-June 1951, International Affairs, vol. 62, n. 3, Summer 1986, pp. 446-7
-211-
9. Th e  G u lf C o n flic t
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i. History
The first preliminary signs of tension from Iraq emerged in 
May 1990 when Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi leader, denounced the Gulf 
states of keeping the price of oil artificially low in order to hurt his 
country. Iraq, which was heavily indebted toward Kuwait and the 
other oil sheikdoms, was only just recovering from the effects of the 
eight-year w ar w ith Iran in the 19807 s and needed to maximize its oil 
revenues for paying its reconstruction bill. Although the accusations 
did not catalyze international attention, more serious seemed the 
explicit threats which Baghdad delivered to Israel in the Spring. Iraq 
was announcing its newly acquired chemical weapons capability and 
its intention to use it -if necessary- against the Jewish state. "By God 
-the Iraqi dictator had said- w e will make the fire eat up half of Israel 
if it tries to do anything against Iraq".1 The threat triggered 
worldwide negative reactions but no active measure was taken.
Meanwhile, the quarrel w ith Kuwait reached a new level of 
escalation in July. On the 15th, the Iraqi Army begun massing troops 
and tanks near its Southern frontier. In four days, three armoured 
divisions were already fully deployed and by the 27th 100000 men 
from 8 divisions w ere in place. The following day, the Iraqi Foreign 
Minister Tareq Aziz, delivered a m emorandum to the Kuwaitis which 
had the aura of an ultimatum. Baghdad demanded $2.4 billion in 
compensation for the alleged use by Kuwait of the disputed Rumaila 
oil field; $12 billion in compensation for the low price of oil induced 
by Kuwaiti (and others') overproduction; the forgiveness of Iraq's war 
debt of $10 billion and the lease of the strategic island of Bubyian 
which controlled Iraq's access to the Persian Gulf.2
The general impression at the time, both in Washington and in 
the region, was that Iraq was using its military prowess to exact 
diplomatic concession from the Kuwaitis rather than to prepare for a 
full-scale invasion. W hen the two sides -following a mediation effort 
by Egypt's president Mubarak- met in Jeddah on July 31st, the 
Kuwaitis did not give in to Baghdad's dem ands and attempted to 
negotiate. The Iraqi delegate left the meeting in anger the next day. 
On August 2nd, Iraqi troops crossed the border and occupied the
whole of Kuwait -which could count on an army of merely 18000 men- 
within twelve hours.3
The United States had failed to deter the Iraqi move because it 
had underestimated the gravity of the situation and it had therefore 
sent mixed signals to Baghdad. Its diplomacy of deterrence was 
"inconsistent, incoherent and unfocused".4 On the day of the Aziz 
memorandum, Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney had reiterated 
the American committed to the defence of Kuwait but his position was 
retracted on the same evening by the Pentagon's spokesman.5 On July 
24th, the Department of Defence declined to answer to journalists' 
questions on whether the US would defend Kuw ait
When W ashington finally took notice of the Iraqi build-up, 
thanks to compelling intelligence reports, it announced joint military 
exercises w ith the United Arab Emirates on July 24th. However, when 
the following day Saddam Hussein called the American Ambassador 
to Baghdad for an explanation, he received yet another unclear 
answer. Ambassador April Glaspie, according to the transcript 
released by the Iraqis in September, stated that "w e have no opinion 
on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with 
Kuwait".6 This soft stance was confirmed in  a cable by president Bush 
to Saddam on the 28th. It was only on August 1st, when the CIA was 
predicting an attack within 24 hours, that the United States warned 
Iraq and expressed concern over the situation in the Gulf.
Even if the invasion took everybody by surprise, the 
international reaction was swift and remarkably decisive. The United 
States sent an aircraft carrier group toward the Persian Gulf and 
another toward the Eastern Mediterranean. Due to the fortuitous 
coincidence of a visit by the Secretary of State -James Baker- to 
Moscow, the United States and the Soviet Union issued a historic joint 
statement in which they condemned the Iraqi aggression. The 
improvement in superpower relations also allowed the United 
Nations to vote a resolution (Res. 660) w ithin hours of the invasion 
demanding an immediate and unconditional Iraqi w ithdrawal and the 
return to the status quo ante.
The reaction was not limited to verbal condemnations. 
Washington was not prepared to underestimate Saddam again and 
preoccupation arose about the fate of Saudi Arabia. Satellite pictures
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showed that some of the units which had spearheaded the invasion of 
Kuwait were being deployed in an offensive formation along the 
border w ith Saudi Arabia. There had been three serious border 
incursions by Iraq. Although Baghdad was probably only trying to 
scare the Saudis into acquiescence, if Iraqi troops did not stop in 
Kuwait they could have reached Riyadh in a matter of days, allowing 
Saddam to dominate the region and control 40% of the known world's 
reserves of oil. This w ould have constituted a dramatic shift in the 
balance of power in the Middle East and, according to a CIA report a 
threat to international order. On August 4th, the National Security 
Council meeting at Camp David decided to commit American ground 
troops to the theatre.7 The following day Bush emotionally responded 
to reporters that: "I view very seriously our determination to reverse 
out this aggression. [...] This will not stand. This will not stand, this 
aggression against Kuwait".8
The deployment was to be initially limited to a defensive 
mission on the basis of Operations Plan 90-1002, which had been 
prepared by CENCOM, the US command responsible for the Middle 
East and South West Asia. The operation was denominated Desert 
Shield and involved the deployment of more than 200000 troops 
within 17 weeks. The United States simply did not have the capability 
to perform an offensive operation against Iraq before 8-10 months and 
it therefore let the tail w ag the dog.9 After all, Iraq had a very large 
and well equipped army of 1 million men hardened by the w ar w ith 
Iran. The possibility of single retaliatory air strikes was ruled out 
because if it failed it d id  not encompass any back up and because it 
exposed Iraq's neighbour to retaliation. However, more forceful 
actions were not ruled out at a later stage.10 In the meantime, the 
dimension of the force w as not publicly released in order to minimize 
the contingent's vulnerability, which was considerable in the first 
weeks given the logistic difficulty in transporting units so far.
The problem was that Saudi Arabia jealously cherished its 
independence and, as the leader of the conservative Muslim world, it 
could not easily allow Western troops on its soil. For this reason, 
Washington reassured King Fahd of its intention of sending troops 
only on a temporary basis. Cheney flew to Riyadh to show the 
satellite images of Iraqi deployments and to ask Saudi Arabia for
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permission to send US troops. King Fahd, concerned at least as much 
as the United States by Saddam's expansionism, unexpectedly gave his 
approval. His only doubt was on the seriousness of the American 
committment as he did not w ant to provoke his m ighty neighbour 
only to be later abandoned by the Americans to his own destiny. As 
National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft remarked: "It's a chicken- 
and-egg problem. They can't go out front until they know whether we 
can be counted on".11 Once Cheney had guaranteed him that the 
United States intended to send a contingent of 200000 men, he 
willingly gave his assent to the American request Egypt and Morocco 
also agreed to send troops. To everyone's delight, the American 
contingent was therefore going to be part of a larger m ultinational 
force.
Baghdad's reaction was the annexation of K uw ait Iraq had a 
long-standing but dubious claim to the sheikdom originating in the 
uncertain demarcations within the Ottoman Empire but had not 
emphasized it during .the July crisis.12 A t the time of the invasion, 
Saddam was probably thinking of setting up a puppet government in 
Kuwait City and then retreat the m ain bulk of his army after the 
satellization of the country. However, the reaction of Kuwaitis to the 
aggression was not enthusiastic at all and they rapidly organized a 
brave and fierce resistance. Above all, the unexpected international 
reaction had increased the costs of a climb-down as it would have 
appeared that Iraq was frightened. The stakes were simply too high 
for an Iraqi pull o u t
Neither the international community nor the Arab world could 
tolerate the outright annexation of a whole state by another. Meeting 
in Cairo on the 10th, the Arab League condemned the annexation and 
decided to send an inter-Arab force to Saudi Arabia. Leading states in 
this drive where Egypt and Syria, which had their own private reasons 
to loath Saddam Hussein. Both Damascus and Cairo were concerned 
about Iraq's bid for hegemony over the Arab world and both had 
reasons to seek American friendship. In particular, Syria gained 
acquiescence for a final drive against its opponents in Lebanon while 
Egypt obtained the cancellation of its debt of $7 billion.
America's successful alliance diplomacy w ent beyond the 
Middle East Moscow's unprecedented and most precious political
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support was guaranteed from the beginning and continuously 
cultivated by intense consultation. Soviet diplomacy had internalized 
the fact that Gorbachev's Perestrojka needed a stable international 
environment and W estern financial help. Britain was W ashington's 
closest ally throughout the crisis, and Prime Minister Thatcher went 
even beyond the United States in advocating a tough stance. France, 
even if somewhat more cautious because of her traditional gaullist 
suspicion of US motives and her close ties to Iraq, was also supportive. 
A number of other nations condemned the invasion and followed the 
American line at the United Nations. The only disappointments were 
Germany and Japan, which felt constrained by their constitutions in 
their use of military force and were absorbed by domestic problems.
Saddam was encircled by a formidable coalition led by a 
determined United States. In an attem pt to break the siege and weaken 
the regional members of the coalition, Saddam Hussein therefore 
played the Palestinian card. On August 12th, Baghdad introduced the 
concept of linkage between its w ithdrawal from Kuwait and the 
solution of the outstanding problems in the M iddle East, including the 
question of the territories occupied by Israel in the 1967 war. 
Counting on the anti-Western and anti-Israeli sentiments of Arab 
public opinion, he was trying to mobilize domestic opinion against 
the policies of Riyadh, Damascus and Cairo. However, apart from 
encountering the enthusiastic support of Jordan and the PLO, the 
proposal was rejected by both Western and Arab members of the 
coalition.
Iraq also m ade a dramatic move to break its isolation by 
offering a very advantageous peace to Iran. After the ceasefire in 1989, 
no formal peace had been agreed with Tehran and Saddam was 
therefore risking a two-front confrontation. On the 14th, Baghdad 
proposed to the Iranian president Rafsanjani to settle outstanding 
questions on an advantageous basis for Tehran. The offer was to 
restore the status quo ante, releasing captured Iranian territory, in 
order to stabilize Iraq's Eastern border. The gains of the 8-year w ar 
had been almost instantly dissipated in anticipation of the coming 
crisis.13
The main instrum ent of international pressure in the early 
stages of the crisis was economic sanctions. On August 6th, the
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Security Council had voted Resolution 661 asking members to refrain 
from trading w ith Iraq. However, there were doubts about the 
effectiveness of such a voluntary regime. In particular, many vital 
supplies were slipping through via complacent Jordan and its Red Sea 
port of Aqaba. Washington, supported by London, was initially 
inclined to instruct its considerable naval task force in the Gulf to 
enforce the embargo. However, allied opposition, especially from 
Moscow, induced the United States to seek authorization for the 
enforcement w ith a UN resolution (Res. 665) passed on the 25th. 
Sanctions had effectively turned into blockade. It was the first time 
that the United Nations had authorized units not under a UN 
command to use force in defence of its resolutions. This was "an 
extraordinary diplomatic victory for the [Bush] administration".14
Iraq's response was the hostage crisis. Foreign nationals -12670 
of which were Westerners- were held in good conditions but were not 
allowed to leave and it was suggested that Iraq would worsen their 
treatm ent.proportionally w ith the damages of the embargo or would 
alternatively deploy them as shields at strategic locations in order to 
deter an air attack. Hostages also fulfilled a political function for 
Saddam. They could in fact be used to induce some states in the 
coalition to negotiate. Baghdad was visited by a num ber of foreign 
dignitaries including Kurt Waldheim, Jesse Jackson, Willi Brandt, 
Edward Heath, Yasuhiro Nakasone, Mohammad Ali and others, each 
departing with a handful of hostages thereby increasing Saddam's 
prestige.
But the m ain targets of the hostage policy were the 
governments of the USSR and especially of France, which had a 
reputation of negotiating to free its own nationals.15 Saddam wanted 
to tailor a privileged status for his old friends in order to induce 
reciprocal concessions. On September 18th, the PLO announced that all 
French hostages were to be shortly released. However, Paris was 
more embarrassed than pleased by Saddam's special attentions and 
was angered by Iraq's violation of the French Embassy in Kuwait 
City. Nevertheless, its own Arab policy and its traditional diplomatic 
competition w ith the United States brought France to engineer a 
diplomatic initiative anyway. In his statement before the UN General 
Assembly on September 24th, President Mitterand without previous
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consultation w ith his allies, for the first time endorsed linkage 
suggesting that the Iraqi w ithdraw al could be coupled with a 
comprehensive Peace Conference on the Middle East
The Soviet Union, which had always upheld the idea of a 
general conference on the Arab-Israeli conflict, also attempted its own 
negotiation. On October 4th, Gorbachev's envoy Eugenji Primakov 
flew to Baghdad for talks w ith the Iraqi dictator. Also the Soviets were 
proposing to endorse linkage in exchange for the Iraqi withdrawal. 
However, Saddam rejected both initiatives, because they were 
proposing the Conference after the w ithdraw al and not viceversa, as 
Iraq wanted. Baghdad was already announcing to its soldiers the 
forthcoming "m other of all battles".16 When Mitterand and 
Gorbachev m et in Paris a t the end of October for the CSCE Meeting, 
they could only acknowledge that their attempts had failed.
However, even these failed initiatives were sufficient to raise 
preoccupation in Washington. The Bush administration feared that 
after having sent 200000 troops to the Gulf, it would have had to 
retreat them in exchange for an uncertain negotiation in  which any 
concession of the kind proposed by Moscow and Paris would have 
rewarded Iraqi aggression and turned Saddam into a hero of the Arab 
world. After the debacle in Iran in 1979 and the unsuccessful 
expedition to Lebanon in 1983, the United States certainly did not wish 
to see their credibility evaporate further in such a strategic theater.
Furthermore, the sanctions did not seem to lead to a quick 
resolution of the crisis despite the tight enforcem ent Experts 
estimated that it would take at least two years for sanctions to have an 
impact.17 In the meantime the Iraqi regime could even be 
strengthened by justifying the economic mismanagement with the 
scapegoat of international sanctions. It is actually remarkable how 
ineffective seemed the first weapons that both sides used to influence 
the outcome. Sanctions did not soften Iraq but neither did the oil 
weapon influence the international coalition. Baghdad hoped that the 
turmoil in the Gulf and its control of over 7% of global production 
after the occupation of Kuwait would produce an oil shock 
comparable to the one of the 1973 war. However, although the price of 
oil reached $35 in September from its pre-crisis level of $18 a barrel,
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the firm international response and the increased production by other 
OPEC members lowered the price to $20 by December.18
The United States was therefore unhappy w ith the effect of the 
embargo and was concerned about the possible negative 
repercussions of time on the cohesion of the coalition. In a way, even 
if in theory sanctions and force could have been applied sequentially, 
they were in fact alternatives as to w ait for sanctions to work could 
undermine the possibility of using force at a later stage. As Kissinger 
remarked while testifying before the Senate's Armed Service 
Committee: "by the time it is evident that sanctions lone cannot 
succeed, a credible military option will probably no longer exist".19 
The US commander in the field, General Norman Schwarzkopf, 
therefore illustrated the plans for offensive operations on October 
21st, which were reported to W ashington by the Chief of Staff General 
Colin Powell and which involved twice as many troops than the 
200000 already deployed. In September, when the buildup had reached 
150000 troops, Iraq had in fact almost tripled its own contingent to 
430000.20
On October 30th, President Bush and his advisers therefore took 
the decision to prepare for the active liberation of K uw ait However, 
the doubling of the US force in the Gulf was only announced on 
November 8th, two days after a Congressional mid-term election. The 
polls indicated decreasing support for an eventual w ar in the Middle 
East and the administration did not w ant to transform the elections in 
a referendum on its policies in the crisis. A great debate ensued in 
which the administration presented its motivations for a tough stance 
with Saddam, which ranged from the need to uphold the principle of 
sovereignty in the "New W orld Order", to the necessity to punish a 
Hitler-like dictator on the verge of acquiring a nuclear arsenal to the 
need to protect jobs by defending the price of oil.
The United States was soon to acquire the military capability of 
attacking Saddam and it therefore sought -on a parallel path- the 
necessary international consensus. In the beginning of November, 
Baker set out on a trip to all major allied capitals to discuss the 
possibility of a UN resolution authorizing the use of force to solve the 
crisis. Diplomatic pressure was thus exerted on the members of the 
coalition and particularly on those w ith perm anent or elected seats in
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the Security Council. Colombia was convinced in a negotiation which 
also involved the discussion of American aid, while Malaysia was left 
to British pressures. Even Yemen and Cuba were contacted, despite 
their anti-American stance.
However, the biggest potential obstacles were China and the 
Soviet Union, which enjoyed the power of veto. Peking, who was 
trying to upgrade its international image after the massacre at 
Tienanmen Square, was convinced by extending an invitation to its 
Foreign Minister to visit W ashington right after the UN vote. In other 
words with China "the technique was purchase".21 Moscow proved 
more problematic because she w anted to actively negotiate about the 
content of the resolution. The United States were initially inclined 
toward an authorization to use force which left the maximum freedom 
-in terms of time and instruments- to the coalition. Gorbachev 
responded by urging two resolutions: one authorizing the use of force 
in general, a second one specifying time and means of the 
enforcement Moscow also successfully pressed for the substitution of 
the phrase "use of force" w ith the vaguer "all necessary means".22 In 
the event, it was agreed that there was to be only one resolution but 
which set out a deadline leaving some time for a diplomatic solution 
in extremiis. W ashington proposed January 1st, Moscow asked and 
obtained the deadline to be moved to January 15th 23 Apart from the 
consultation, Washington also ensured -as a token of esteem- that 
Saudi Arabia granted a conspicuous loan to the USSR. Resolution 678 
authorizing the use of force if negotiations failed by January 15th was 
voted by the Security Council on November 29th.
The only requirement still missing was a favourable public 
opinion in the United States. Partly because the motivations argued by 
the administration were contradictory, partly because they were 
unconvincing to a public willing to cash in the peace dividends from 
the end of Cold War, the president felt that he did not yet enjoy 
sufficient consensus to launch the greatest military operation since the 
Vietnam war. On November 30th, after having secured resolution 678, 
Bush therefore signaled its intention to go "the extra mile for peace" 
by entering into direct negotiations w ith Iraq. The dramatic move left 
the closest members of the coalition -Britain, Israel, Saudi Arabia, 
Egypt and Syria- disconcerted and worried about American
-221-
determination, also because they had not been consulted in advance.24 
The Saudi Ambassador to Washington Bandar thought that the 
initiative was inappropriate: "to you -Bandar told Scowcroft- sending 
Baker is goodwill; to Saddam, it suggests you're chicken".25 For the 
first time since the beginning of the crisis, the administration had 
abandoned its tough stance in order to show to domestic opinion that 
every diplomatic option had been tried.
In this sense, the move was a success because it dramatically 
increased the ratings in favour of the president A poll published by 
the Washington Post showed that 90% of Americans approved of the 
offer.26 The announcement also inhibited Congress, where a strong 
anti-war sentiment was present especially in the Democratic majority, 
from voting in  December on the use of force. The main forum for 
discussion was limited to Congressional hearings in which a 
substantial body of expert and Congressional opinion expressed itself 
in favour of postponing the use of force and of allowing time for 
sanctions to work. Even the former Chairman of the JCS, Admiral 
Crowe testified th a t "I w ould argue that we should give sanctions a 
fair chance before we discard them".27 When a Congressional 
authorization for the use of force was finally sought in January, the 
shift in the public mood after B u sh 's 's  diplomatic initiative and the 
approaching deadline allowed the presidents resolution to pass by a 
narrow margin (52-47).
After the American announcement of November 30th, for a 
brief time it really seemed that a diplomatic solution was possible. 
The French government reiterated its idea that a Middle East 
Conference was a possibility while even the American Ambassador to 
the United Nations, Thomas Pickering, hinted at the possibility of 
linkage.28 Saddam Hussein released all the remaining hostages on 
December 6th as a good will gesture. However, soon the negotiation 
stalled over the date of the meeting. Iraq naturally wanted to 
postpone it as much as possible, so as to render ineffective the January 
15th deadline and to consolidate its position in an indefinite future. 
On the contrary, America wanted the meeting as soon as possible, so 
as to increase pressure on the Iraqis and maintain a military option 
should the negotiations fail. Given the negative prospects of the 
contacts, on December 11th General Schwarzkopf was instructed to
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prepare an attack in the second half of January.29 According to Bob 
Woodward, Bush's circle had m ade up  its m ind by Christmas Eve.30
With the deadline approaching, President Bush m ade one last 
attempt by offering a meeting in Geneva between Aziz and Baker on 
January 7th. However, both sides w ent to the negotiations w ith very 
tight bargaining positions. The United States reiterated the demand 
for an unconditional w ithdrawal, while Iraq wanted a tangible and 
unequivocal concession on the linkage issue. In the event, Aziz did not 
even take back to Baghdad a letter for Saddam Hussein by president 
Bush signaling US resolve. The only achievement of the talks was a 
threat that Baker delivered to the Iraqis about the terrible retaliations 
in case of the use of non-conventional weapons.
After the failure in Geneva, w ar became almost inevitable. Last 
minute attempts at finding a compromize solutions were engineered 
w ithout success. Soviet and Arab attempts at mediation were rejected 
by Iraq. A French proposal for a UN resolution explicitly endorsing 
linkage was also turned down. Finally, the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations, Perez de Quellar, w ent to Baghdad on the eve of the 
deadline but he also failed as he certainly could not go beyond the UN 
resolutions which -having been drafted on the basis of general 
principles- did not easily lend themselves to compromise. On January 
17th, after a 24 hour lag in which no sign of withdrawal came from the 
Iraqis, the Gulf w ar begun.
The first part of the coalition's plan -codenamed Desert Storm- 
involved a massive attack from the air. During the build-up begun in 
August, the international coalition led by the United States had 
gathered a formidable air arm ada composed by 1820 combat aircraft, 
of which 1376 were American. Air supremacy was gained 
immediately as the Iraqi airforce chose not to respond and as airports 
were given high priority by allied targeting. Later in the course of the 
air campaign, 122 of the best Iraqi planes took refuge in Iran. Iraq's 
very extensive air defense network was rendered ineffective by the 
widespread use of stealth fighter-bombers and of cruise missiles on 
heavily defended objectives. Other high priority targets were Iraq's 
command and control centres, its communications network and the 
weapons of mass destruction.31 The first two types of objectives were 
hit w ith considerable success and were especially valuable given
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Iraq's very centralized line of command. The third group of targets 
was more of a disappointm ent As after-war inspections showed, 
Iraq's chemical and nuclear programmes had been much more 
extensive than previously thought and they largely survived the war. 
For w hat delivery vehicles w ere concerned, Iraq's Scud launchers were 
given particular attention even if it has been suggested that, while 
ground based special forces caught some 60 launchers out of a total of 
80,1500 air sorties were unable to hit a single one.32
Given the success of the early phase of the strategic air 
campaign, the coalition moved on to target Iraq's industrial base and 
armed forces, particularly its feared elite Republican Guard divisions. 
It was expected that degradation of military equipm ent in the Kuwaiti 
theater would reach 50% in the first m onth of Desert Storm. An even 
more devastating toll was exacted in terms of troops morale. On the 
whole 110000 combat sorties were flown in total w ith an 
extraordinarily low attrition rate. The m ain problems for the coalition 
were indeed of a logistical nature as the sheer number of flying 
platforms required extreme caution to avoid collisions and damages 
from "friendly fire". Special attention w as also devoted to minimize 
collateral damages to civilians, which could underm ine support for 
the w ar effort especially in the Arab world. With the exception of the 
destruction of the Amyria bunker on the outskirts of Baghdad which 
the United States claimed as a legitimate military target although 
more than 300 civilians were taking shelter there, this was successfully 
achieved as less than 2300 civilians died in the massive air campaign.
Before the war started, Saddam Hussein thought that Iraq could 
withstand the might of the coalition airforce and could remain fit for 
effectively fighting a ground offensive. However, after the first few 
days of bombing, he quickly realized that he had underestimated 
American air-power. Iraq therefore attem pted to regain the initiative 
by spreading the w ar beyond the Gulf. A missile campaign was 
launched with Scud against Saudi and especially Israeli cities in the 
hope that an Israeli retaliation would break the coalition or even 
bring unexpected allies because Arab leaders could not be seen to be 
fighting alongside Israel. However, America successfully reassured 
Israel also with the deployment of Patriot anti-missile batteries, and 
the Shamir government therefore chose restraint frustrating Iraqi
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hopes and minimizing the embarrassment of the Arab members of the 
coalition. The failure of the Scud card led Iraq to a desperate attempt at 
provoking an early ground engagement before its irrevocable 
degradation. On January 22nd three mechanized followed by three 
mechanized divisions occupied the Saudi tow n of Khafji. However, 
also this measure failed. After having recaptured the town on the 31st, 
Schwarzkopf was not tricked into a counteroffensive before he was 
ready.
Given the bankruptcy of his military options, Saddam revived a 
diplomatic alternative. The new attitude found a willing supporter in 
the Soviet Union, which was finding it increasingly difficult to face an 
American military trium ph in the M iddle East which would have 
erased its own influence from the region. Despite Perestrojka, some 
old habits were proving more resistant than expected as the attempted 
coup in the following August staged by m ost key members in the 
Kremlin demonstrates. On February 12th Primakov w ent to Baghdad 
and reported a cautious success having found Saddam willing to 
negotiate. The Soviet envoy's account emphasizes that Saddam was for 
the first time serious about the possibility of an Iraqi re trea t33 On the 
15th, Iraq announced its readiness to accept conditionally Resolution 
660. Although the conditions were unacceptable to the W est and there 
was no mention of the other resolutions, even the partial acceptance of 
the UN terms was an unprecedented step. Three days later, Aziz flew 
to Moscow and the ensuing talks gave rise to a six-point plan 
elaborated by Gorbachev. In exchange for the Iraqi pull out, the UN 
would have had to abandon sanctions and to promote -in a loose form 
of linkage- a general settlement for the whole Middle E ast
America was not pleased by the Soviet plan because it allowed 
Saddam to save too much of its face after a massive Western 
comm ittm ent The United States therefore issued an ultimatum which 
was much harsher than the six-point proposal. In effect, W ashington 
was asking Baghdad to surrender rather than to negotiate. The Iraqi 
withdrawal would have to be supervised by allied -rather than UN- 
troops and sanctions were not to be automatically lifted after the pull 
o u t The Bush administration considered that it could compromize 
very little after more than 6 months of Iraqi defiance. In a way, the 
humiliation of Saddam was by now more a w ar aim in its own right
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than an expedient to liberate K uw ait Baghdad rejected the American 
terms and the ground offensive, which had been planned for the 24th 
because it could not take place during Ramadan or after the beginning 
of the hot season, begun under the name of Desert Saber.
The coalition forces feinted w ith a mock landing on Kuwaiti 
beaches and with a frontal assault toward the capital of the sheikdom. 
In the meantime, the m ain bulk of the W estern forces -the XVII US 
Airborne Corps strengthened w ith the French division and the VII 
Armoured Corps with the British forces- had been moved westward 
so as to encircle the Iraqi troops entrenched further South. The plan 
-defined by Schwarzkopf as a "hail Mary" football running game- 
proved a success. The superior training, leadership, technology, and 
morale of the coalition's forces could be fully exploited in a w ar of 
mobility instead of the attrition warfare which Iraq w ould have 
preferred. In two days, the Iraqi front had been breached and Iraqi 
forces were virtually encircled. In just over 100 hours, the formidable 
Iraqi army in Kuwait had been tom  to pieces.
The success of the ground offensive was indeed such that it 
pressured Washington for an early end to the hostilities. Domestic 
opinion could have quickly turned against a w ar which increasingly 
appeared as the high-tech slaughter of helpless Iraqis while Egypt and 
Saudi Arabia counseled restraint as they w ould have had to sustain the 
post-war stability of the region. After all, the m ain objectives of the 
w ar -namely the liberation of Kuwait and the downgrading of Iraq's 
war potential- had been fully achieved. A continuation of the w ar 
could only have brought the coalition to occupy Baghdad and to 
topple Saddam Hussein. A part from the complications that this would 
have brought w ith the Arab members of the coalition and w ith the 
Soviet Union, the administration was also concerned about 
completely destroying the state which had been the main bulwark 
against Iran. For these reasons, Bush ordered a ceasefire effective on 
February 28th. On March 3rd, ceasefire talks begun. On April 3rd, a 
ceasefire resolution (Res. 687) was voted by the Security Council. The 
Gulf W ar had ended in trium ph for the US-led international coalition.
ii. Iraqi Strategy
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Before the invasion, Iraq w as recovering from its eight-year 
w ar with Iran, which had been opportunistically launched by Baghdad 
after the Islamic revolution in order to protect the Baathist regime 
from Iranian-sponsored fundamentalism. The w ar had soon turned 
into a stalemate and drained precious resources from Iraq's treasury as 
some 40% of GNP had to be devoted to the military budget Baghdad 
had accumulated $40 billion in debt from its Arab neighbours and 
another $40 billion from the West while the reconstruction bill was 
estimated at $230 billion. In other words, Iraq was on the verge of 
bankruptcy. Undoubtedly, economic considerations were prom inent 
in Iraq's quarrel with Kuwait because the oil-rich sheikdom could 
grant debt forgiveness and an increase in oil revenues.34
Nevertheless, there were also political reasons in  Saddam's 
decision to invade. Iraq had accumulated a large army which could 
not readily demobilize because peace had not yet been signed w ith 
Tehran and because the fragile Iraqi economy could not absorb large 
quantities of manpower. Saddam w anted to use this military prowess 
in order to increase Iraq's prestige and make a bid for the leadership 
of the Arab world. In turn, this w ould have strengthened the regime at 
home as the Baathist ideology rested on a strong pan-Arab sentim ent 
The May 1990 Arab meeting in Baghdad which preceded the crisis 
m ust be seen in this ligh t
The end of the Cold War also provided both opportunity and 
incentive to an expansionist course. The end of bipolarity m eant in 
fact the disappearance of superpower restraint on regional clients as 
well as a decrease in protection. Iraq could no longer count on the 
Soviet Union to insulate its regime from Western pressure. Once the 
utility of Iraq to global stability had diminished with the end of the 
w ar with Iran, Saddam believed that its regime was in peril. This 
impression was substantiated by the escalation in Western attempts to 
control Iraq's rearmament especially in the field of nuclear weapons. 
Memories of the Israeli attack in 1981 on the Osiraq nuclear reactor 
were still strong. In the Spring of 1990, further episodes involved the 
assassination of Dr. Gerald Bull, an engineer who was working for 
Iraq on a "supergun" capable of delivering tactical nuclear warheads 
at great distances and the confiscation in London of devices which 
could be used as nuclear triggers while on their way to Baghdad.
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Given these motives, it  is difficult that Saddam's invasion could 
be stopped w ith diplomatic means. Iraq was after very extensive 
concessions from the Kuwaiti regime which could have eased its 
economic plight as well as increase its prestige both at home and 
abroad while the regime was feeling in danger. Even if Western 
deterrence in the event was less than skillful, it is likely that Saddam 
would not have been stopped with minor concessions on the price of 
oil. Nevertheless, it is also likely that an outright annexation was also 
not on Iraq's agenda. Rather, Iraq was probably seeking to satellize 
Kuwait with a puppet regime with a discrete military presence on the 
model of Syria's relationship w ith Lebanon.
It was the international reaction to the invasion and the 
consequent need not to back down in the face of outside pressure 
which led Baghdad to raise the stakes of the crisis. According to 
Primakov, Saddam felt that the West was already determined to 
undermine his regime and that the Iraqi people "after renouncing the 
results of the eight-year w ar with Iran, [...] would not forgive me for 
an unconditional w ithdrawal of our troops from Kuwait".35 He even 
w ent as far as admitting a kind of "Masada complex" by which he 
preferred to fall fighting rather than surrender. Janice Gross Stein 
agrees that Saddam's obsession with the safety of his personal rule led 
him into a kind of paranoia and that Iraq's occupation was 
"irreversible, short of the use of force to compel Iraq's w ithdraw al".36
Baghdad therefore claimed Kuwait as "Iraq's 19th province", 
thereby signaling its intention to call its adversary's hand. Kuwait was 
different from Lebanon as its ties w ith America, its oil reserves and 
key location in  the Gulf m ade it much more im portant in strategic 
calculations. Iraq therefore thoroughly underestimated the 
international reaction to his attack, which was increased by his 
annexation of K uw ait Even Cuba and Yemen, Iraq's usual supporters 
in the Security Council, voted Resolution 662 condemning Iraq's 
announcement.37 Saddam failed to realize that the international 
community simply could not tolerate the disappearance of one of its 
members at the hand of another member.
Baghdad's subsequent handling of the crisis seemed at the time 
inept and a major contribution to the cohesion of the coalition.38 
However, despite some Iraqi blunders, Saddam's strategy was not as
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iunreasonable as it appears w ith h indsight Many of his hopes were 
shared -as nightmares- by W estern analysts throughout the crisis. In 
general, Iraq tried to break the resistance to its actions by dividing the 
enemy camp appealing at particularistic motivations against the 
prescriptions of collective security. Baghdad counted on America's 
reluctance to risk casualties in remote regions on the world, on Soviet 
competition w ith the West and on the anti-Western sentiments on the 
Arabs.39 In the event Saddam did not recognize the fact that, although 
these unilateral motivations were strong, there were other unilateral 
motivations which reinforced the m ultilateral ones which appeared to 
motivate the international coalition. It was America's diplomatic skill 
in emphasizing the latter at the expense of the former that ultimately 
frustrated Iraq's strategy.
Firstly, Iraq's expected that the United States would not be 
willing to sustain a large am ount of casualties. This belief was 
expressed by Saddam in his meeting w ith US Ambassador Glaspie 
before the crisis broke out w hen he claimed that America lacked Iraq's 
readiness to lose 10000 men in  a single battle. In the event; the whole 
coalition lost merely 318 men, even if this figure was considerably 
below even the rosiest W estern estimates. However, Iraq was right in 
the sense that American planners were extremely concerned about 
casualties -the so called "body-bag" factor- and that Schwarzkopf was 
instructed to minimize risks. In a January poll conducted in the United 
States, 63% expressed themselves in favour of war, but this percentage 
decreased to only 44% if w ar involved 1000 casualties and shrank to 
35% if it involved 10000 casualties.40 W hat Saddam did not take into 
account was the overwhelming m ilitary superiority of the W estern 
troops which could liberate Kuwait almost unresisted and the stakes 
involved which authorized W ashington to take some risks. America 
-the only superpower left- could not be openly humiliated by a daring 
but minor power on the global stage. Iraq -in short- underestimated 
both US willingness and US capabilities.41
Secondly, Iraq hoped that the Soviet Union would contain the 
Western response. Aziz expressed to Primakov his disappointm ent for 
the Soviet stance every time they m et during the crisis.42 After all, 
superpower competition had inhibited many times the response of the 
United Nations throughout the Cold W ar and Iraq had always counted
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on Soviet protection. However, Gorbachev's new course required 
international stability and Western financial credit which could only 
be granted if there was no direct confrontation in the Middle E ast For 
this reason, the Soviet Union supported the United States in  all crucial 
turning points of the crisis: from the joint condemnation after the 
invasion to all the Security Council's resolutions. There were indeed 
some differences of opinion between W ashington and Moscow, as the 
two main diplomatic initiatives conducted by Primakov in October 
and in February suggest However, these differences were consistently 
rated as insufficient to break coalition solidarity. Furthermore, Iraq 
did not consider the fact that the Soviet Union actually had an interest 
in the strengthening of the UN collective security mechanism. UN 
involvement was in fact a way for Moscow to gain influence over the 
events on the cheap, w ithout having to divert -as during the Cold 
War- many of its resources to foreign affairs. As a perm anent member 
of the Security Council, the USSR gained in fact an automatic influence 
over UN action. It is in this light that the Soviet proposals in August 
for the revival of the Security Council's Military Staff Committee 
m ust be seen.
Thirdly, Iraq counted on Arab solidarity. Saddam's attempted 
linkage of the Kuwaiti question w ith the Palestinian one and his 
military effort at involving Israel in the w ar were designed to 
mobilize the "Arab street" or even to find support among Arab states. 
However, he did not consider how m uch Iraq was more threatening to 
Arab governments than a Western presence in  the region. He also 
underestimated the capacity of Arab governments to influence 
opinion within their own countries.43 After all, Saddam had been the 
first to break Arab solidarity by attacking a fellow Arab and his 
continued threats to Saudi Arabia alienated him from the Arab 
mainstream. Syria, being Iraq's mortal enemy, had always been a 
special case, as its support of non-Arab Iran during the Iran-Iraq w ar 
already had demonstrated. Far from being suspicious of America, 
Arab governments -and especially Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia- 
were suspicious of Iraq and consistently supported the coalition's 
policies from the Saudi acceptance of Western troops on its soil in 
August, to their collective participation in all phases of the military 
operations. One of the main quarrels occurred indeed when America
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seemed to be willing to accept a negotiate a diplomatic solution in 
December. —-— ”
Although these blunders may not have been completely 
unreasonable, Iraq also committed a series of additional acts which 
alienated it from the international community and which dramatically 
contributed to coalition unity.44 The outright annexation of Kuwait 
has already been mentioned; other episodes include the seizure of 
hostages, the violation of diplomatic premises and immunity (which 
enraged even sympathetic France), the mistreatment of Kuwaiti 
nationals, the looting of Kuwaiti property, the oil spills into the Gulf 
and the destruction of oil wells, the indiscriminate use of Scud attacks 
on cities, the unprovoked attack on non-belligerant Israel, the threat 
to use terrorism as a military weapon.45 Although none of these 
measures was unprecedented especially in the Middle East, the 
salience of the crisis induced world opinion to use international 
standards of conduct to evaluate Iraqi behaviour. In this sense, the 
globalization of the crisis forced Iraq to be judged on the basis of 
global standards rather than on regional ones.
In sum, Iraq hoped to be immune from the precepts of 
collective security as many other states had been in the preceding 
decades. Baghdad also actively but unsuccessfully tried to underm ine 
the international consensus on which the coalition rested. However, it 
underestimated the importance of the issue lying at the heart of the 
Kuwaiti crisis and it clumsily escalated the stakes with its own actions. 
The protection of sovereignty is one of the common denominators of 
international society and one of the core reasons for mobilizing a 
response. The blatant nature of its challenge forced unlikely allies to 
cooperate in defence of the status quo ante. Iraq also misunderstood 
the special historical moment in which its aggression took place. The 
end of the Cold War -as all the other similar times in history- was an 
opportunity for an extraordinary level of great power collaboration. 
These conditions were ideal for a collective security operation.
When, after the beginning of the war, his hopes of dividing the 
coalition and of w ithstanding the military sanctions evaporated, he 
quickly changed his strategy. First he tried to provoke an early 
ground war which would have increased allied casualties by attacking 
Israel and by the Khafji offensive. When also this attempt failed, he
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tried to pursue a face-saving negotiated solution, but it was too late. 
However, Saddam Hussein was neither suicidal nor foolish, as it is 
demonstrated by his restraint in using chemical weapons which 
would have modified the coalition objectives to include his own head. 
He was unfortunate enough to commit an act so blatant that it could 
not be overlooked and to commit it at a time in which the 
international community could gather the consensus and the spare 
resources to punish him.
iii. The US, the UN and the International Coalition 
American motivations evolved in three stages. Before the actual 
invasion, W ashington did not recognize the stark nature of Iraq's 
intentions and it therefore tried to disengage from the crisis w ith 
lukewarm reactions. Reassuring messages were added to the pro­
forma deterrence. America estimated that Iraq was only sabre-rattling. 
It m ust also be said that even the worst-case predictions assumed that 
Iraq was at most planning a limited invasion for limited objectives, as 
for example the Rumaila oil field on the border or the strategic island 
of Bubyian. In such a relatively moderate contingency, the United 
States could not have gathered neither the domestic consensus nor the 
Saudi acquiescence for a large military deploym ent which was 
therefore not an option. As argued by Brian U rquhart
"w e shall never know how much preventive 
intervention even the Kuwaiti government, in its pre-invasion 
state of mind, w ould have welcomes or even tolerated or 
indeed how many governments would have been willing or 
ready to intervene at an earlier stage".46
American policy changed dramatically after Iraq's aggression, 
which overran the whole of K uw ait In an unclausewitzian manner, 
W ashington responded to the use of force as it was a completely 
different issue. For this reason its pre-war policy of deterrence and its 
subsequent policy of compellence were so different. It was the blatant 
nature of Iraq's attack which completely transformed American stakes 
and perceptions in the crisis and led to a determined reaction, which 
had been decided as early as August 4th. On the one hand, it was 
feared that also Saudi Arabia was vulnerable to the same fate. On the
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other, the United States could not ignore such a flagrant violation of 
the rules of international society as the disappearance of a whole state.
The Iraqi subsequent defiant actions such as the taking of hostages and 
the oil spills merely reinforced W ashington's determination.
The third stage in American thinking evolved when confidence 
in the UN embargo crumbled in the Fall. Sanctions did not seem to 
achieve the result of an Iraqi w ithdrawal with sufficient rapidity so as 
not to endanger the cohesion of the coalition. Furthermore, the nature 
of the aggression also influenced the means of the reaction.47 Since 
force had already been used by Iraq, the military option was always 
ranked very highly in W ashington despite the preference of many 
military leaders for a non-violent solution.48 Once it became clear that 
Iraq would not retreat w ithout major concessions, Washington begun 
to plan a military solution. It was Iraq's reluctance to withdraw  soon / 
after the invasion made a military clash almost inevitable.
The risks of a w ar were preferred to the certain costs -in terms 
of reputation- that a compromise solution entailed. Any concession to 
the Iraqis would have been seen as a reward for their invasion and 
subsequent intransigence, thereby increasing the incentives for other 
aggressions in the Middle East or elsewhere. During this period, the 
US evaluated as a "nightm are scenario" a negotiated solution which 
would have underm ined its military option while offering a 
honourable w ay out to Iraq after it had openly challenged the United 
States and the international community. The only superpower left 
after the end of the Cold War could not suffer a direct humiliation by 
a defiant regional power.49 As Henry Kissinger testified to the Senate 
Armed Services Committee: "The perception of American failure 
would shake international stability. Every m oderate country in the 
Middle East would be gravely weakened by a debacle".50
America was therefore motivated mainly by a matter of 
principle. It was more Iraq's means than its objectives which 
mobilized the response. The total occupation of one UN member state 
by another was simply unacceptable. Michael Walzer, who is one of 
the foremost studenj^of the "Just W ar" theory and certainly not an 
enthusiastic supporter of military force, wrote unambiguously:
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"W hat makes for confusion [...] is precisely that this 
would be a clean war, so obviously just that one wants to see it 
fought [...] We would be fighting against the Iraqi state and its 
leader for the sake of another country's political survival. From 
the standpoint of morality, it is hard to imagine a better cause 
or a m ore appropriate enemy. [...] It is very bad to make a deal 
w ith an aggressor at the expense of the victim. For we then 
make ourselves complicitous in the aggression".51
The argum ent that America's reaction was chiefly motivated by 
principles has been virulently attacked at the time and after by those 
who point out that the Al-Sabah regime in Kuwait was autocratic, 
antidemocratic and hardly worthy of a crusade. Furthermore, the 
international coalition included reactionary Saudi Arabia, dictatorial 
Syria and China, which had recently repressed its own democratic 
movement at Tienanmen Square. Yet, the crucial point concerned the 
defence of internationally recognized borders and the domestic 
sovereignty w ithin those borders. These principles are among the 
most sacred w ithin the international community, as is demonstrated 
by the fact that even Cuba and Yemen voted w ith the United States to 
condemn the Iraqi annexation of K uw ait It was not democracy, but 
the fundamental fabric of international cohabitation which was at 
stake. President Bush -in short- m eant w hat he said when he referred 
to a "New W orld Order" as the basis for the US intervention. 
However, the Bush's new world was not a revolutionary one in which 
democracy and prosperity w ould be spread around the globe but it 
was a more minimalistic one in which basic principles of international 
conduct were to be upheld.
This should also clarify another critique of the policies pursued 
by the Bush administration. For example, Noam Chomski argued that 
"principles cannot be selectively upheld" and that Washington was 
being hypocrite because it chose to resist this aggression and not 
others. The truth -Chomski accused- was that "the response to Saddam 
Hussein's aggression because he stepped on the wrong toes", that is he 
threatened oil reserves.52 Thomas Friedman on the New York Times 
also attacked the administration: "Surely it is not American policy to 
make the world safe for feudalism. This is about money, about 
protecting governments loyal to America and punishing those that are 
not and about who will set the price of oil."53 Similar views were
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expressed in the case of Western reluctance to intervene in the 
Yugoslav civil war, when it was argued that Bosnia had no oil. Yet, 
Iraq's invasion was indeed unprecedented because it was the first time 
in the UN era that a state was attempting to swallow another state. It 
was also unprecedented because it occurred a time in which great 
power cooperation to punish it was possible as it had never been 
before. Other cases of violence may be worthy of intervention on 
humanitarian grounds, bu t they do not necessarily involve the 
principles at stake in the Gulf War.
Oil was indeed an im portant element of the crisis. If Kuwait had 
not been an oil producing country, it w ould probably not have been 
invaded in the first place. However, it would be wrong to limit 
American motivations to the issue of oil as it also demonstrated by 
the fact that the price of oil had returned to its pre-crisis levels also 
before the w ar started. More im portant were considerations about 
regional stability. America's decision to intervene was influenced by 
the fear that Saddam w ould also attack Saudi Arabia and by his 
determined efforts to acquire a nuclear arsenal, which he seemed to be 
willing to use against Israel.
Even if W ashington was motivated by principles in its reaction 
to Iraq, this does not necessarily mean that its motivations were 
chiefly multilateral. Iraqi defiance challenged American primacy as 
directly as it challenged UN rules. Principles can be considered as an 
intrinsic and organic part of the national interest even when they do 
not necessarily reflect a preference for a collective policies. According 
to Kissinger: "in  the Gulf War, collective security was invoked as a 
justification of American leadership, not as a substitute for it".54 The 
United States was indeed prepared to intervene alone in the Gulf even 
if the international community was unmoved. As Baker argued before 
Congress, the US remained "the one nation that has the necessary 
political, military and economic instruments at our disposal to 
catalyze a successful response by the international community". Bush 
reiterated this concept "Among the nations of the world only the 
United States of America has had both the moral standing and the 
means to back it up".55
Washington behaved accordingly. The military build-up begun 
in the first decade of August had no UN status at all until Resolution
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678 authorized military force. The UN operation "would not have 
been possible had  not the United States already taken action under 
Article 51".56 The US deployed hundred of thousand of troops w ithout 
seeking a collective endorsem ent On the contrary, when the Soviet 
Union suggested in August to revive the UN's long-forgotten Military 
Staff Committee to coordinate military operations in the crisis, 
W ashington flatly refused. In August, W ashington was even initially 
reluctant to seek authorization for the enforcement of the embargo.
All major decisions throughout the conflict were taken by 
Washington before consulting w ith its allies. Endorsement was sought 
only after the course had already been se t This is true for the crucial 
resolution 678, which was voted at the end of November one month 
after Washington had made up  its m ind about the military option. 
Similarly, the decisions to switch from Desert Shield to Desert Storm 
to Desert Sabre to the termination of the hostilities were unilaterally 
taken by Washington. Even the peace initiative at the end of 
November was launched w ithout prior consultation.
Not only did ^fchcTwashington concentrate in imposing its own 
policies on the coalition, but it also tried to underm ine others' 
initiatives. Analysts have highlighted "US willingness to act alone if 
need be and concern that others acted without US leadership."57 The 
United States remained suspicious of French and Soviet diplomatic 
activity throughout the crisis and it accepted coolly the compromize 
solutions proposed by Paris and Moscow in October and in January. 
Furthermore, the timing and content of its February 22nd ultimatum 
was specifically designed to sabotage Gorbachev's six-point plan. The 
United States w anted to make sure that the leadership of the coalition 
remained firmly in their ow n hands and did not wish to risk its 
reputation and its soldiers for collective decisions.
Nevertheless, the United States recognized the importance of 
the United Nations for its policy because international collaboration 
was absolutely crucial. Charles Krauthammer is wrong when he 
argues th a t
"W hat we have today is pseudo-multilateralism: a 
dom inant power acts essentially alone, but, embarrassed at the 
idea and still worshipping at the shrine of collective security, 
recruits a ship here, a brigade there, and blessings all around to
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give its unilateral action a multilateral sheen. The Gulf is no 
more a collective security operation than was Korea, still the 
classic study in pseudo-multilateralism".58
Without the acquiescence of the Soviet Union, a large military 
operation w ould have been impossible. W ithout a favourable 
disposition of the Arab world, an American intervention would have 
been unthinkable as W ashington could not have deployed such a large 
force without the agreement of Saudi Arabia and the other Arab 
members of the coalition. The United Nations was indispensable 
because it provided the framework w here both the Soviet Union and 
the Arab world could more easily support the Western coalition than 
if it was an explicitly unilateral operation. For these reasons, 
"Washington was convinced that a UN umbrella was essential for 
political if not for legal reasons".59 In M atthew's' opinion: "careful UN 
diplomacy was a precondition of American action, and in that sense 
the need for the US to w ork through the Security Council acted to 
some extent as a constraint".60
The necessity to use collective instruments was made explicit by 
the Soviet Union as early as August, because Gorbachev had to face a 
strong opposition from those who did  not w ant to openly support 
their former enemy. The obvious w ay to overcome these suspicions 
was to make the intervention collective. The Soviet Foreign Ministry 
released a note at the beginning of the crisis stating th a t "the 
experience of many years shows that the most correct and sensible 
way of acting in conflict situations is through collective efforts and the 
utmost use of UN mechanisms".61 It is in this light that the efforts to 
revive the Military Staff Committee and the insistence to obtain a 
resolution for authorizing force m ust be seen. The UN was crucial 
because it gave Moscow some influence over the operation.62 It was 
easier also for the Arab members of the coalition -some of which, like 
Syria, were certainly not a US ally- to be fighting under a UN banner 
than under the American flag.
Moreover, although the US contingent was by far the largest, 
America gained sizable contributions to its military effort as Egypt, 
France, Saudi Arabia, Syria and the United Kingdom sent more than 
10000 troops each; Bahrain, Bangladesh, Czechoslovakia, Morocco, 
Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Senegal and the United Arab Emirates
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sent smaller ground contingents; Argentina, Australia, Belgium, 
Canada, Denmark, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, 
Portugal and Spain sent naval or airforce units; Germany and Japan 
lent substantial financial support to the enterprise.63
The authority and legitimacy deriving from the UN cover were 
also useful at the domestic level, where public and especially 
congressional opinion was hardly enthusiastic about war. The 
leadership of the Democratic majority -composed by the Speaker of 
the House Tom Foley, the Senate's Majority Leader George Mitchell 
and by the Chairman of the Armed Services Committee Sam Nunn- 
preferred economic sanctions and it would not easily have supported 
the military option. Democratic Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan of 
New York said:
"It is as if the great armed force which was created to 
fight the Cold War is at the President's own disposal for any 
diversion he may wish, no matter w hat it costs. He will wreck 
our military. He will wreck the administration."64
Bush knew that he could not avoid a Congressional resolution 
on the use of force because of the large num ber of troops committed 
and of the risks involved.65 He therefore attempted to w in a majority 
by maximizing the aura of legitimacy to the operation. In the event, 
10 democrats defected and allowed the President to pass his resolution 
in the Senate by a narrow margin. Many of these congressmen w ould 
have found it difficult to support a policy which excluded the UN. One 
Democratic supporter of the president explained that one of the 
reasons why America should have resisted Iraq:
"lies in our hopes for the establishment of a new w orld 
order. How we resolve the first crisis of the Post-Cold W ar 
world will have profound historical consequences. [...If] we 
have to use force it will be essential [for the US] to go to w ar 
multilaterally rather than unilaterally. The liberation of Kuwait 
is not only an American responsibility".66
The United States therefore spent much time and effort ensuring 
that its policies were provided w ith the legitimacy of the United 
Nations. The Secretary of State was engaged in virtually constant
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consultation w ith the other members of the coalition, traveling 100000 
miles and attending 200 meetings before the November UN 
resolution, while even President Bush often called his counterparts 
over the telephone. All major steps were endorsed by Security 
Council resolutions, even when US military leaders would have 
preferred a more unilateral approach. Each resolution entailed a risk 
for the administration because a negative vote would have been 
worse than no vote at all. For this reason, UN diplomacy was 
prominent on the US agenda. Egypt and the Soviet Union were 
incentivated with financial advantages. China managed to break its 
post-Tienanmen isolation in exchange for its acquiescence over UN 
resolutions. Considerable pressure was exerted on Latin American 
countries and especially Colombia, which had a seat on the Council. 
Old enemies like Syria received the gracious visit of president Bush. 
Even the Cuban foreign minister had a meeting w ith Baker.
America's attention for the multilateral coalition did not stop in 
New York. Even with reference to the policies in the Gulf, W ashington 
took extreme care in not underm ining international consensus. In a 
way, even the timing for the beginning of the w ar was influenced by 
coalition diplomacy. According to Bob W oodward, the Bush 
administration was convinced that "the international is too fragile to 
hold out indefinitely. To outsiders it m ight look different, but they 
knew, from the inside, that arrangements were quite delicate. [It was 
felt that] it was quite likely that some outside event could absolutely 
shatter the coalition".67 One of these dangerous episodes was the 
Temple Mount incident in Jerusalem in which Israeli security forces 
had killed 22 Palestinians, even if it did not provoke the feared 
international repercussions.
The influence of the coalition on American policies was also 
evident in the termination of the hostilities, called by the United 
States barely 100 hours after the beginning of the ground offensive. 
Certainly, the Bush administration was concerned about upsetting the 
regional balance, leaving Iran free to dominate the power vacuum 
which would have followed Iraq's destruction. However, other 
prominent reasons were the fear that public opinion and many allies 
would abandon the cause. As Michael Brecher puts it: "one of the 
reasons for the abrupt termination was almost certainly 'advice' or
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pressure from the US's Arab allies".68 General Schwarzkopfs own 
account emphasizes the lack of authority to advance to Baghdad since 
it was not an explicit UN goal: "We had no authority to invade Iraq 
for the purpose of capturing the entire country or its capital [...] the 
coalition would have fractured. Even the French would have 
withdrawn."69 The UN was not merely a tool for American policy.
The multilateral coalition was indeed an instrum ent of 
enforcement on behalf of the international community. The real issue 
at stake was that the main players had -to a certain extent- different 
definitions of w hat the international community is. After all, as an 
ideological concept, the idea of international community is subject to 
interpretation. Bush's New World Order was different from the brave 
new world envisaged by the wise m en of the Truman presidency, as it 
was less redemptionist and more exem plarist Eastern Europe after 
1989 was to be welcomed in the West bu t America was no longer 
ready to pay "any price" to spread democracy around the globe.70 On 
the contrary, Saddam was to be punished because it had threatened 
Western interests, but there was no policy of turning Iraq into a 
liberal democracy. After all, Iraq had a completely different 
conception of the international community and it expected regional 
identities to take precedence. Finally, it is im portant to note that the 
Soviet Union, in the m idst of its Perestrojka, was still a world pow er 
which found it congenial to conceptualize the United Nations in 
global terms. It is doubtful whether its successor, Russia, would not 
have asked for a higher unilateral price for its acquiescence.
Although the Gulf War was not the cornerstone of a new w orld 
order in which any disturbance would be m et w ith a collective 
reaction, it was certainly a successful enterprise demonstrating the 
potential of the international community. In particularly stark cases 
such as the invasion and annexation of Kuwait, states have shown to 
be able to overcome rivalries and differences. Under the leadership of 
the United States, supported or acquiesced by the other perm anent 
members of the Security Council, the United Nations have proven 
their ability to resist aggression at least in those instances are 
particularly ripe for a collective security operation.
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CONCLUSION
i. Theory and Evidence
Part I has put forward the possible definitions of the concept of 
collective security and has analyzed its limits and merits. A series of 
hypotheses was presented, constituting a theoretical interpretation of 
the role of institutions in international security. In Part II, the cases of 
Abyssinia, Korea and the Gulf were considered in depth. Now, the 
findings of the two sections will be pu t together in order to 
substantiate the theoretical hypotheses w ith the available historical 
evidence.
The three case studies provide a general picture of collective 
security since the concept was first introduced as they are placed in the 
three main periods after the First W orld War: the inter-war period, the 
Cold War and the post-Cold War period. The common features which 
they present should therefore illustrate the characteristics of collective 
security more than the ones of the specific historical configurations in 
which they took place. In particular, they highlight the major 
strengths and weaknesses of the institutional approach to peace, as 
indicated by the hypotheses identified in  the first p a rt
The major weaknesses are:
(i) Collective security needs the consensus of the great powers and 
their interest in defending the status quo.
In the Abyssinian case, the great powers were unwilling to 
cooperate as Italy was the aggressor, Britain and France stood by the 
League, the United States was bent on isolation and Germany, Japan 
and the Soviet Union had their own revisionist agenda. The attem pt to 
resist aggression backfired and Italy could annex Abyssinia without 
being stopped. Also during the Cold War, the concept has never been 
applied because of the bipolar confrontation between the superpowers 
which inhibited common action. The only exception was the Korean 
War, in which UN intervention was dependent upon the fortuitous 
absence of the Soviet delegate from the Security Council. Finally, the 
intervention in the Gulf could be staged only because the Cold War 
was at an end, allowing the possibility of US-Soviet collaboration.
(ii) Collective security may work only i f  the aggressor is not a major
power.
Italy, even if it was nominally a great power, was 
extraordinarily vulnerable either to an oil embargo or to the closure 
of the Suez canal. Moreover, in the event of war, Rome w ould not 
have survived a joint Anglo-French attack. After 1945, the possibility 
of a collective security operation against a major power was 
eliminated w ith the introduction of the veto power for the five 
perm anent members of the Security Council. Both North Korea and 
Iraq were no t global powers and a reaction could be engineered 
because it d id  not encompass a direct confrontation between 
superpowers. In all the other cases in which a great power was 
directly involved, as in Hungary in 1956, Afghanistan in 1979 or in 
Grenada in 1983, collective security could not be invoked.
(iii) A  collective security operation requires a major power taking the 
lead in implementing the principle.
Given the public good characteristics of collective security, no 
state has an exclusively private interest in providing i t  This is the 
reason why major powers, given their larger share of resources and 
benefits, have a higher interest than smaller players in taking the lead 
in collective action. In all three historical events considered, there was 
a clearly identifiable leader: Britain in the first case, the United States 
in the other two. W ithout such catalyst, smaller players would each 
prefer that another provided the good, while enjoying its benefits as a 
free rider. Collective security is possible only if one state w ith the 
large capabilities necessary to enforce the operation also feels the 
responsibility of doing so.
(iv) The collective interest must not collide with particular interests.
States investing scarce resources and risking the life of their
troops for m ultilateral endeavors will not do so if they hurt their own 
interests. In 1935, Britain and especially France were reluctant to 
impose significant sanctions on Rome because they considered Italy as 
a partner in the containment of Germany. In the other two instances, 
W ashington could uphold the collective principles because they 
happened to coincide w ith its particular in terest the containment of 
Communism in the case of Korea and M iddle Eastern stability in the 
case of the Gulf conflict. The United States could hardly have been 
expected to engage in similar generosity if the aggressor had been a 
precious ally.
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Yet, as a hardened diplom at from a hardened country pu t it, the 
impartial international community and the distant "whole world" 
may not necessarily be the best brokers for a local solutions: "There is 
more to be said for negotiation between concerned parties whose 
destinies will be harmed by failure and served by success".1 
Multilateral principles may often be too abstract to be a useful guide 
to exit a crisis initiated by national interests.
(v) The aggression must be blatant and uncontrovertial.
In the cases of Abyssinia and Kuwait, the violation of 
international norms was so stark as to be unequivocal. In both cases, 
the invasion was completely unprovoked and led to the unacceptable 
annexation of a sovereign state by another country. In the Korean 
case, the situation was more ambiguous even if the massive 
aggression constituted a significant step on the escalation ladder. If the 
circumstances had been less clear or the objectives of the aggressor 
less blatant, as has been the case in most other occasions, the 
international community would have had a harder time in organizing 
a unified response.
(vi) Collective security has been challenged by aggressors.
Even in the only three cases in  which the concept has been 
applied, collective security has not commanded universal support 
Not only did  aggressors break its precepts in particular occasions, but 
they also questioned its foundation in general, implying different 
definitions of the idea of international community. Italy refused to 
recognize a super partes standing for the League of Nations and 
continued throughout the crisis to identify it w ith the national policies 
of Britain. In the Korean case, the Communist bloc continued to 
support N orth Korea and, in the case of Peking, even intervened 
against the UN troops. In the Gulf, Saddam Hussein attempted to 
break the international coalition confronting him by appealing to the 
particularistic sentiments of radical Arab opinion, obtaining some 
success with the PLO and Jordan.
(vii) Collective security is not automatic.
A multilateral operation has never been made mandatory on 
members of a collective security instance. States jealously guard their 
sovereign discretion about how to use their own military resources, 
and have therefore resisted any attem pt to delegate such powers to a
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multilateral authority. In 1935, the sanctions regime was voluntary 
and force was considered only as a possibility. In 1950, the Security 
Council authorized and encouraged members to actively support the 
government of South Korea. In 1990, the UN also authorized the 
coalition to use force but certainly did not m andate i t  The last two 
examples are remarkable because in theory, mandatory sanctions 
would be within the powers of the United Nations, although in 
practice the Security Council, which is composed by states, has never 
applied them. Furthermore, the resolutions supporting the various 
operations have not been taken as absolute imperatives. The 
sanctionist states have continued to negotiate w ith the aggressor even 
after the committment of the international community. The Hoare- 
Laval Plan in 1935 was elaborated well after the Italian invasion. Also 
uvKorea^case, the ceasefire d id  not implement the UN goal of 
' reunification of the country.
(viii) The compellence value of collective security is insufficient.
One of the main advantages argued by advocates of 
multilateralism is that the international community can gather so 
much power as to render the use of force useless because no single 
state can hope to withstand the combined power of all the other states 
together. However, not only this is untrue if the aggressor is a nuclear 
armed superpower, but it has also been untrue in the three examples 
under consideration, which demonstrate the deficit in credibility of 
the concept In all the three cases moral condemnation, economic 
sanctions and the threat to use force may have been useful to condemn 
aggression but they were insufficient to reverse the aggression. It 
might even have been the case that these measures short of war 
strengthened the domestic position of the aggressor by allowing him 
to exploit patriotic sentiments. Only the application of superior force 
could evict these violators. In the case of Abyssinia, this was not done 
and Italy could annex the whole country. In the other two cases, only 
large expeditionary forces of hundred of thousand men could enforce 
the collective decisions.
The major strengths of the concept are:
(i) Collective security does have an impact on state policies.
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Far from being irrelevant, m ultilateral motivations were 
significant in all three cases. In the Abyssinian case, Britain did not 
abandon the League even if its national interest would have suggested 
acquiescence in Africa in order to gain Italian support in Europe. The 
United States was also influenced by collective principles both in 
Korea and in the Gulf. Finally, many states which contributed to the 
last two operations would not have done so if these had been 
unilateral American enterprises. For example India, proudly non- 
aligned throughout the Cold War, would not easily have supported 
the intervention in Korea. Similarly, the Soviet Union and some Arab 
nations would have found it difficult to favour the American actions 
in the Gulf if they had been outside the impartial framework of the 
United Nations.
(ii) In Korea and in the Gulf collective security worked.
In both of the UN instances, aggression was first effectively 
condemned and isolated, and then successfully reversed. After the 
Abyssinian debacle, the institutional improvements of the Charter 
allowed collective security to operate only w hen there were 
significant chances of success. In other words, although the veto pow er 
and the large UN membership make it more difficult for collective 
security to be applied, w hen it is invoked it has a high probability of 
working. Its enhanced credibility should therefore improve its 
deterrent value in discouraging potential aggressors.
(iii) Collective security favours cooperation.
The institutional framework of the international organizations 
induces reciprocity and inhibits free riding, thereby increasing the 
chances of collaboration. The three operations considered involved a 
higher num ber of actors than most unilateral enterprises, and they 
successfully coordinated their policies. In the case of Abyssinia, more 
than 50 states applied sanctions against Italy. In Korea, 29 states 
contributed troops to the UN effort In the Gulf conflict, also 29 states 
joined the US-led coalition w ith military forces. Naturally, the size of 
these arrangements was crucial both to its military and to its political 
effectiveness.
(iv) Collective security provides legitimacy.
The prearranged procedures, the impartial m ultilateral 
framework and the large num ber of players involved contribute to
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the aura of legitimacy granted by collective security to a specific 
operation. The fact that the concept is based upon principles rather 
than interests provides a moral hierarchy according to which one side 
is right and the other is wrong. In turn, legitimacy is useful at the 
international level because it can increase the support for a collective 
security operation as states which are not directly involved by a 
dispute may still w ant the principle to be upheld. Again, this helps to 
explain the large number of states contributing to the three operations 
studied.
(v) Collective security favours domestic support
Similarly, the aura of legitimacy lent by a multilateral 
arrangem ent also helps to gather support with public opinion. In the 
Abyssinian case, public opinion was so much in favour of the League 
that it even pressurized the government to take a tougher stance than 
it w ould have done otherwise. In the Korean and Gulf cases, American 
public opinion was more supportive of the White House than in other 
-more unilateral- instances, such as the Vietnam War or the 
intervention in Grenada. In the Korean case, President Truman did not 
even need a congressional authorization. In the Gulf episode, it may 
even have been possible that the Bush administration did not obtain a 
congressional authorization w ithout the UN support
(vi) The multilateral character forces the leading state to moderate its 
policies.
The legitimacy which contributes to the international and 
public support is a valuable asset for the leading state organizing an 
operation. This leads to moderate policies in  accordance with 
multilateral objectives. In Korea and in the Gulf, the United States was 
eager to maintain UN endorsement and it therefore did not chose a 
diplomatic platform and military means which were likely to 
embarrass its allies. Even if these considerations will not direct a state 
to undermine its own interests, they will still influence its policies and 
lead it to compromize between unilateral and collective objectives.
(vii) Collective security enhances peace.
Although it has rarely been applied and it has been successful 
only twice, collective security has contributed to the idea that war is 
bad and has to be prevented. States have willingly subscribed to 
collective security treaties and they have rarely -if ever- challenged
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the principle as a whole. Even w hen aggressions have been 
committed, states have not challenged the principle in general but its 
application in  particular and they have tried to justify themselves in 
terms compatible with collective security. Only a Century ago, the use 
of force was considered as a legitimate instrument of policy and states 
did not need to find justifications for their actions. Although the 
principle may not always be sufficient to stop aggressors, it may still 
constrain aggressive states in m any situations and encourage a 
response if the constraint should fail.
These points reflect the idea of the conditional utility of 
institutions suggested in Chapter 2. The prerequisites for the 
functioning of collective security are too restrictive for the institution 
to become a security system in its own right capable of dealing with 
all kinds of situations. In many instances, collective security will 
simply be inapplicable or even counterproductive. In the Abyssinian 
crisis, collective security failed. In the Korean and Gulf cases, which 
exhibit many similarities, collective security worked in very 
favourable circumstances bu t still showed its inherent limits.
The anarchic setting of international relations works very 
differently from the hierarchical structure of domestic politics. States 
are induced by the lack of a w orld government to retain their 
resources for their own purposes and for satisfying the desires of their 
own population. They will therefore often free ride if they do not 
have a private and unilateral reason to invest in a public good. When 
they are unwilling or unable to devolve resources to collective 
endeavours, institutions cannot replace them because they cannot 
count on autonomous capabilities. Unless and until a world 
government is created, institutions will remain dependent on the 
desires of states, with all their deficiencies and limitations. This is not 
an argum ent against the institutions for peace but it is rather an 
explanation of why collective security has failed to deliver its 
promises eversince the concept was introduced in international 
relations after the Great War.
Nevertheless, collective security is neither useless nor 
irrelevant If applied with caution and moderation, in certain instances 
it can resist aggression and facilitate collaboration among states, once
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they are already willing and able to cooperate. Collective security has 
also contributed to the establishment of social rules w ithin the 
international community which penalize aggression as an instrument 
of national policy. In general, this principle is worthy in itself and it is 
a prerequisite for further and more ambitious foundations for peace. 
In particular, this principle may have restrained potential aggressors 
which may have behaved differently if the principles had not been in 
place. As w ith other counterfactual hypotheses, we will never know 
how many wars have been avoided in this way. It might not seem 
much to enthusiasts, but in an international system in which there is 
no w orld government to impose peace or to arrange agreements, it is 
one of the precious tools for the cause of stability.
Both of the prevailing views derived from the neorealist and 
neoliberal paradigms therefore do not capture the essence of concept 
According to neorealists, collective security and other institutions 
"have a minimal impact on state behaviour".2 According to 
neoliberals, collective security "w ould provide a more stable world".3 
The concept does not fit either of these images. Collective security is 
not irrelevant because it can sometimes contribute to the success of 
multilateral principles while it cannot be a panacea for all global 
problems because it cannot always be applied. The problem for both 
paradigms derives from their extreme and opposing ideas of 
international institutions, which are seen as completely dependent 
variables for neorealist and completely independent ones for 
neoliberals. Institutions should rather be conceptualized as 
conditionally useful intervening variables, dependent on certain 
requirements but capable of affecting the outcome.
In this respect, both of the prevailing contemporary paradigms 
are inadequate and some of the classical literature should be 
recuperated. Classical theorists like Morgenthau, Wight, Aron, Bull 
and Wolfers -unlike today's structural realists- fiercely criticized the 
excesses of legalism and the dangers of an exclusively institutional 
approach to security w ithout ignoring the significance of institutions 
in general. Far from sketching an antithesis between the spontaneous 
mechanisms of the balance of power and institutions, these thinkers 
recognized the fact that institutions can be useful in reinforcing the
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interests of states, especially w hen cooperation is necessary but 
difficult because of the anarchic condition of the international system.
ii. Prescriptions for UN Reform
In chapter 3, two different conceptions of collective security 
were proposed. While a maximalist version would aim at replacing 
all other security mechanisms, a minimalist one would rather 
introduce multilateral elements alongside unilateral ones. The first 
conception w ould be a substitute for traditional policies, the latter 
would be a complem ent The historical record decidedly points in 
favour of the second conception. N ot only the requirements for 
collective security are not always present, but also it would be 
counterproductive to apply multilateral principles in less than ideal 
circumstances. Even in those few cases in which it has been applied, 
states have instead relied on a minimalist conception, retaining 
discretion throughout the operation.
Nevertheless, the faith in a maximalist collective security has 
withstood both theoretical and historical criticisms. The debate on the 
reform of the United Nations spurred by the 50th anniversary of the 
founding of the organization and by the end of the Cold W ar has been 
mostly characterized by proposals of a maximalist nature regarding 
the scope of collective security, its principal actors and the decision 
making process involved. These ideas rest on the notion that 
minimalist and maximalist collective security lie on the same 
continuum and that it is therefore possible and desirable to move 
incrementally along that continuum in order to strengthen the 
multilateral mechanisms and increase the num ber of cases in which 
they can be applied. According to a major recent study: "collective 
security organizations can take m any different institutional forms 
along a continuum ranging from ideal collective security to 
concerts".4 The following are examples of maximalist reform.
Firstly, the veto power should be restricted and decisions 
should increasingly be taken by a (qualified) majority. As Invar 
Carlsson, co-chairman of the Commission of Global Governance, has 
"n- .'c the veto".5 These suggestions heavily
, , , „ rather than by unanimity. Alternatively,
domestic politics in which parliaments
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the General Assembly -which already decides by majority voting- 
should be invested with more powers vis-a-vis the Security Council. 
The idea is to allow the UN to bypass the opposition of a few 
members and to be able to intervene in an increasing num ber of 
instances.
Secondly, the UN should be endowed w ith a perm anent 
military force composed either of international troops or of 
contingents lent to the organization by the various states. In this way, 
the UN could intervene militarily in  a situation without necessarily 
waiting for the cumbersome decision making process of the Security 
Council and w ithout relying on states' deliberations first Also in this 
case, the idea is to increase the operational autonomy of the 
organization so as to be able to intervene prom ptly and effectively in 
more situations. For example, Brian Urquhart has proposed a 
"relatively small and highly trained" UN volunteer military force 
which "could make a decisive difference in the early stages of the 
crisis".6 Secretary General Boutros-Boutros Ghali has suggested the 
creation of "peace enforcement units available on call and [...] 
consisting of troops that have volunteered for such service".7 In 1995, 
also the Dutch government has pu t forward a "non paper" proposing 
a UN rapid-deployment brigade.8
Thirdly, there has been an increasing pressure for the collective 
mechanisms to be used in new types of situations. In particular, the so- 
called "hum anitarian interventions" refer to operations not only 
restricted to international but also domestic conflicts. Furthermore, 
the scope of intervention has been enlarged to include -besides the 
mere peace-keeping or peace-enforcing missions- a variety of tasks 
such as the provision of supplies to the civilian population or the 
oversight of elections. In a world in which violence is increasingly 
used in civil wars, this process aims at covering w ith multilateral 
mechanisms the maximum number of contingencies. Yet, rather than 
elaborate a new code of conduct to the changed realities, the 
international community has stretched the concept of collective 
security from international security to all kinds of security. The 
"hum anitarian interventions" in Iraq after the Gulf War, in Somalia 
and in Bosnia have all been justified in terms of the "threat to
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international peace and security" rather than as the violation or 
breakdown of international norms at the domestic level.
All three possible reforms try to make the multilateral 
mechanisms more automatic and to maximize the chances that they 
will be used. The world organization w ould increasingly resemble a 
world government w ith the right and the duty to impose peace 
throughout the globe. However, such a reform would backfire if not 
coupled with a simultaneous reform of the way power is organized in 
the international system. Short of creating a global state, the w orld 
organization would see its committments swell enormously w ith the 
states retaining the resources for implementing the multilateral 
objectives. This would hopelessly overstretch the UN resources and 
sooner or later critically underm ine its credibility. Unless states 
surrender sovereignty, maximalism will rem ain a chimera.
The problem is that the two conceptions do not really rest on 
the same spectrum. There is a discrete interval between a minimalist 
organization which can be used by states which are willing and able 
to use it for their own collective purposes and a maximalist 
organization which is an actor in its own right and m ust intervene 
automatically, whatever the circumstances may be. Unless the 
international system is radically reformed, the United Nations cannot 
and should not undergo such a radical reform. The present minimalist 
mechanisms ensure that the m ost im portant states agree that force 
should be used and that they themselves commit the troops for the 
enterprise, w ith all the military and political support that this implies. 
To remove these mechanisms, such as the veto or the absence of 
multilateral military forces, would mean that the UN could become 
embroiled in a whole series of difficult situations w ithout states being 
willing or able to rescue i t
This does not mean that collective security in its minimalist 
conception cannot be improved. However, rather than transforming 
the UN into a maximalist organization, w hat should be done is to 
maximize the advantages of the present system. Two features in 
particular can be strengthened. On the one hand, the UN provides a 
multilateral framework for facilitating cooperation among states, 
once these have decided to cooperate in a specific circumstance. On the 
other, the organization is a forum where the international community
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evolves standards of conduct on which to evaluate international 
actions. For these reasons the necessary reforms are different from the 
ones mentioned above.
Firstly, rather than abolishing the veto power, which is 
necessary to make sure that an operation does not become 
counterproductive, a distinction should be m ade between executive 
decisions and prescriptive ones. While the veto should absolutely be 
maintained for the first type, because it involves the commitment of 
states' resources, it should be limited with concern to the second type, 
in order to facilitate the elaboration of multilateral proposals for 
disputes and the condemnation of unacceptable behaviour. In this 
view, the convention that disputes and threatening situations are to be 
raised in the Security Council only by the parties which are directly 
involved should be overcome.9 Situations which could lead to w ar 
should be considered at an early stage.
Proposals for reform of the Security Council should also 
concentrate on the enlargement of the forum in order to increase its 
value as a representative of the international community. More states 
should be admitted on the basis of their contribution, in economic, 
military and political terms, to the functioning of the institution. The 
legitimacy and authority of the collective organization should 
accordingly increase. Paul Kennedy and Bruce Russett suggest to 
enlarge "the council's overall size [...] and adding to the perm anent 
membership would perm it the Council to reflect the changes in  the 
global balance since the five victorious powers of 1945 insisted that 
the charter include special provisions upholding their status and 
interests".10
However, even a more representative council should not act 
independently from the policies of the states which compose i t  
Furthermore, a bigger Council would become less able to take 
executive decisions. In this respect, there should be no shortcuts; if 
decision making is difficult it means that states have in fact problems 
in identifying a common solution. The value of the United Nations is 
in the legitimacy that characterizes their decisions, placing a premium 
on its wide, quasi-universal and heterogeneous membership. 
However, decisions about eventual enforcement should rather be left 
to the discretion of individual states, which are the ones to provide the
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blood and treasure for the multilateral operations. The UN can 
approximate a Parliament, setting the framework and the broad 
directions of policy, but it cannot aspire to become a World 
Government.
Secondly, rather than establishing international military forces, 
the UN should concentrate on acquiring intelligence and monitoring 
capabilities, in order to provide the international community with 
impartial information about specific situations. In other words, a 
satellite network would be more appropriate than a rapid reaction 
brigade. According to a recent and influential opinion: "now the 
central issue is ambiguity about the type and degree of threats, and 
the basis for cooperation is the capacity to clarify and cut through that 
ambiguity"; more im portant than the classical nuclear umbrella is 
therefore an "information umbrella" which can help states to 
understand the situation.11 The UN should be able to stimulate and -if 
need be- impose discussion w ithout necessarily imposing an 
operation if states are unwilling or unable to intervene.
Thirdly, rather than stretching the concept of collective security 
to include domestic violence, the international community should 
devise similar but distinct concepts for these kinds of contingency. 
With a slow but steady process, the idea that force cannot be used to 
settle international disputes is today part of the fabric constituting 
international society. Virtually all states opposed the annexation of 
Kuwait on the part of Iraq. However, such a consensus does not yet 
exist for w hat "hum anitarian intervention" is concerned also because 
many states fear that such a principle could be used against them. A 
concept for dealing w ith domestic violence should be created and 
established w ith an equally slow but steady process of consensus 
building w ithout jeopardizing w hat has already been achieved with 
international security.
Conceptual clarity is one of the prerequisites for a successful 
system. This means that there should be a clear, distinction between 
interventions for collective security aimed at protecting the integrity 
and the sovereignty of states and interventions for hum anitarian 
purposes aimed at solving problems within the sovereignty of states. 
This also means that there should be a clear distinction between 
collective security on the one hand, which should seek to organize an
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active response against an aggressor, and peacekeeping on the other, 
which involves the passive use of force to provide an impartial 
presence between two combatants. Whereas the active use of force 
cannot be impartial, the passive use of force does not reverse 
aggression.
iii. Prospects for Collective Security
Maximalist collective security and the dream to abolish w ar by 
international agreement have captured the imagination of the three 
generations which had the responsibility of reconstructing the 
international system after the three great conflicts of this Century. The 
prospects for an easy way out of the age-old question of international 
order have been popular for three reasons which have resisted the 
critiques of the concept and the failures of the League of Nations and 
of the United Nations. Firstly, the solution was radical: w ar was not to 
be contained or minimized bu t abolished. Secondly, the responsibility 
for the implementation of the system fell on a metaphysical 
multilateral mechanism rather than on individual states themselves. 
Thirdly, the maximalist conception appeals to popular imagination 
because it draws on the domestic analogy of the rule of law and of law 
enforcement.
This approach has been correctly defined by W ight as 
rationalist because, rather than seeking a radical transformation of the 
international system, it appeals to the common interests of states 
within the existing framework of international politics. Even w ithout 
a world government, if states find w ar by and large 
counterproductive, they should pool their resources together in order 
to avoid such undesired outcomes. Voluntarism is deemed sufficient 
to establish a proxy of world government allowing states to behave as 
if they were rationally avoiding the suboptimal outcomes of conflict
Yet this approach overlooks the perverse effects of anarchy on 
the international system. The lack of a world government compels 
states to take care of themselves. This means that sometimes they will 
be competing for scarce resources and that other times they will free 
ride on multilateral efforts in order to save their resources for other 
-more unilateral- ends. The bottom line is that the limits and the 
merits of collective security are those which characterize all other
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international institutions. On the one hand, institutions act as a 
positive feedback on cooperation as they can facilitate the 
collaboration of many actors which w ould find it otherwise difficult 
to coordinate their actions. On the other hand however, institutions 
are dependent upon a previous disposition to cooperate. Their utility 
is therefore conditional upon the ability and willingness of states to 
uphold multilateral principles.
At closer inspection, this restricts the instances in which the 
concept will be useful. If states already feel secure enough to invest 
their scarce resources in multilateral principles, then the utility of 
collective security will be limited because international relations 
would already be prone to stability. The recent opportunities which 
multilateral measures have enjoyed through the actions of the United 
Nations are due more to processes which have operated to change the 
international system than to the multilateral measures themselves. 
The relative stability which characterizes the world after the Cold War 
has not been brought about by collective security, but by the advent of 
nuclear weapons, the decreasing importance of territory as a source of 
power and wealth, the democratization of societies, the rapid and 
transnational spread of information and the rise of a global market 
economy. The fact that collective security works where these processes 
have taken place does not necessarily mean that by exporting it 
elsewhere one would also obtain the same results even where these 
processes have been less powerful.
The fundamental problem is that collective security cannot 
work if states are not already prepared to cooperate. This means that 
collective security is useless in those situations in which it is most 
needed, that is when the major powers disagree and international 
peace is in peril. Its direct impact on aggression has been restricted to 
situations which involved relatively minor threats to global peace 
compared w ith the great conflicts of this Century. In this view, 
collective security seems more a product, than a producer, of stability. 
If multilateral principles can be afforded by states in an anarchic and 
pitiless setting only when they feel secure, then there is not much 
hope that collective security will become the main security system of 
the future until the international system remains in its present shape.
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If on the other hand states do not feel that they can divert their 
resources, then a collective operation w ould be dangerous because it 
risks to be based on insufficient means. Anarchy inhibits voluntaristic 
experiments because there is no w orld government which can 
guarantee states that their investment in multilateralism will not be 
wasted and will not backfire. If states do not dispose of the 
willingness or the capability to divert to a multilateral institution, 
then institutions will certainly not be able to fill that gap because -by 
definition and unlike supranational organizations- they do not 
possess autonomous resources. Despite the emphasis on multilateral 
means, the burden of implementation in the final instance falls onto 
states.
Furthermore, collective security presents a tougher choice to 
member states than is detectable w ith a superficial analysis. The 
particularly sensitive nature of security exacerbates certain dilemmas 
inherent in  institutions. If deterrence fails and the international 
community is actually faced w ith a determined aggression, there are 
two different and equally difficult routes. Firstly, the international 
community can make concessions in order to reach a negotiated 
outcome, but it would then countervene the letter of collective 
security by rewarding aggression. Secondly, the international 
community can fight w ar w ith war, punishing the aggression but 
contradicting the peaceful spirit of collective security.
On the contrary, minimalisi|( collective security is unpopular 
because it does not prospect a messianic perpetual peace and it does 
not relieve states -and their societies- from the costs for the 
maintenance of peace. However, the minimalist conception is realistic 
because it does not claim to be able to solve all types of insecurities 
irrespective of the prevailing conditions of the international system. 
There is no easy solution for international order and it is useless to 
find a multilateral scapegoat for unilateral failures. Minimalism is 
based on the modest notion that, although a general solution to the 
problem of w ar is impossible in the present circumstances, it is still 
worth to try to avert as many individual wars as it is possible. This 
conception concentrates on w hat collective security does best. Firstly, 
it provides a framework where states which are already willing to 
cooperate can broaden and deepen the foundations for their
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collaboration. Secondly, it establishes a forum where international 
standards of behaviour can be elaborated and spread by processes of 
socialization. Since cooperation under anarchy is difficult and 
precarious even if in everyone's interest, these functions are precious.
Unlike in domestic politics, in  international relations there is a 
tradeoff between autoritas and potestas. Authority is based on 
legitimacy and impartiality. Power is based on physical capabilities 
and the will to use them. In a decentralized system, authority is 
accumulated especially if it is built on consensus rather than on the 
direct exercise of power. The role of institutions is precisely that to 
enhance their authority which can then be used to influence state 
policy. On the contrary, the direct exercise of power would undermine 
that authority because it w ould break the consensus on which it is 
based and it would challenge states as the ultimate repositories of 
sovereignty. While minimalism correctly concentrates on autoritas, 
maximalism unrealistically and inconclusively toys w ith potestas.
Institutions cannot create cooperation like matchmakers cannot 
guarantee that the marriages they fix will work. It is unfortunately not 
the case that it is sufficient for states to meet to automatically resolve 
their differences and conflicts. Nevertheless, institutions can prom ote 
and facilitate cooperation and should therefore be directed to 
maximize their inherent qualities. This means that they should be 
improved as a setting where discussion and diplomacy take place and 
which amplifies cooperation once states have reached an agreem ent 
However, institutions should not be distracted from these primary 
roles by the ambition to substitute the deficiencies of states. A policy 
of replacing the unwillingness and inability of states will fail because 
institutions can only dangerously increase their own responsibilities 
but not the necessary resources to fulfill them.
The insistence w ith maximalist collective security would not 
only backfire, but would also erode the credibility of the institution to 
perform even those functions which can be effective. The advocates of 
collective security should therefore not underm ine its utility by 
raising expectations beyond its capabilities. Unless and until it will be 
recognized that collective security is not the solution to the problem of 
international order but only one factor in the tension between conflict 
and cooperation, the international community will be on the wrong
-261-
track. Unfortunately, in international politics there is yet no 
institutional substitute for diplomacy, prudence and patience. The 
international community will have to make the difficult choice 
between an unappealing and unambitious system and one which is 
popular but doomed to fail.
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